doctrine

Improving the Understanding of Political Legitimacy in COIN Doctrine

SWJED — Tue, 18 Feb 2020 14:45:41 +0000

Improving the Understanding of Political Legitimacy in COIN Doctrine SWJED Tue, 02/18/2020 - 9:45am

Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Doctrine was initially developed in the midst of the Iraq War as the military struggled to accept the situation it found itself in and struggled to create a strategy to address it. Initially published in 2004 as an interim doctrine, and then in 2006 as a completed publication, the Army and Marine Corps’ primary counterinsurgency doctrine has only been updated once since then.

What is an “Expeditionary Force?” No, Really, What is It?

SWJED — Thu, 13 Feb 2020 13:52:29 +0000

What is an “Expeditionary Force?” No, Really, What is It? SWJED Thu, 02/13/2020 - 8:52am

For a Pioneer nation like America, built on exploration and a seemingly endless frontier, the romance of expeditions is part of our national psyche. The term “Expeditionary Force” sounds cool, as it evokes feelings of adventure and risk-taking in far-away places. Expeditionary forces are comprised of tough, competent men who travel light in remote areas, and rely on their wits to survive and win in unfamiliar environments. Thus, it’s only natural we want to call everything our military does abroad an “Expeditionary Force.”

Western COIN: The Rise of “Soft” Counterinsurgency Doctrine

SWJED — Sun, 15 Sep 2019 04:38:53 +0000

Western COIN: The Rise of “Soft” Counterinsurgency Doctrine SWJED Sun, 09/15/2019 - 12:38am

This paper examines the major shifts in irregular warfare, defined here in accordance with the U.S. Department of Defense’s Joint Operating Concept as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over [a designated] population.” While there have been several noteworthy evolutions in the ways in which insurgents wage war, this paper argues that the most consequential developments in irregular warfare have occurred on the state-side, reasoning that Western democracies’ embrace of “soft” COIN approaches has spread worldwide.

Why Doctrine Matters

SWJED — Sun, 30 Jun 2019 21:17:07 +0000

Why Doctrine Matters SWJED Sun, 06/30/2019 - 5:17pm

Critics will argue that furniture instructions are a poor analogy for doctrine. And yes, they are correct. Doctrine is not meant to be a step-by-step guide. It is meant to allow flexibility and adaptability as conditions change. Doctrine, however, should not be shunned. It should not sit idle on a shelf or the Army Publishing Directorate website.

Parade and Event Security

SWJED — Thu, 27 Sep 2018 05:21:15 +0000

Parade and Event Security

Establishing effective parade and event security at mass gatherings, in certain circumstances can involve mitigating a sub-set of terrorist, extremist or violent bombings with an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) classified as in-situ attacks. An in-situ attack occurs where an IED has been used against people who are packed or blocked into a confined space, offering a dense target. The attack results in a higher level of fatal casualties. A core problem with mass gatherings is that these unavoidably create areas where people are blocked together unable to freely move, for a lengthy time.

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The Challenge of Fighting Small Wars While Trying to Adequately Prepare for Big Ones

SWJED — Thu, 20 Sep 2018 06:51:21 +0000

The Challenge of Fighting Small Wars While Trying to Adequately Prepare for Big Ones

Except for the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003, America has been fighting small, counterinsurgency wars since 9-11. This begs the question of whether fighting small wars inhibits or enhances our readiness to transition to large, high-intensity conflicts against peer or near peer competitors? The answer is complicated and somewhat ambiguous.

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A Policy of Defeat

SWJED — Wed, 04 Jul 2018 10:31:42 +0000

A Policy of Defeat

This work intends to assess how the German military achieved in six and half weeks in 1940 what it could not accomplish in over four years of fighting a generation earlier.

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Deception as a Pervasive and Elemental Force

SWJED — Wed, 17 Jan 2018 05:28:29 +0000

Deception as a Pervasive and Elemental Force

The purpose of this short review is to present a different concept of deception - that it should be viewed as a pervasive and elemental force in operations.

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United Nations Peacekeeping Offensive Operations: Theory and Doctrine

SWJED — Thu, 28 Sep 2017 15:42:33 +0000

United Nations Peacekeeping Offensive Operations: Theory and Doctrine SWJED Thu, 09/28/2017 - 11:42am

The point of departure of this paper is that the UN has not defined offensive operations, and specified what this means in practice.

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British Counterinsurgency: Returning Discriminate Coercion to COIN

SWJED — Fri, 25 Aug 2017 06:17:21 +0000

British Counterinsurgency: Returning Discriminate Coercion to COIN

Modern British doctrine, while espousing many successful principles, neglects some critical lessons from actual British practice.

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