counterinsurgency http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/ en The South African Border War (1966-1989) and its Callwellian influence http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/south-african-border-war-1966-1989-and-its-callwellian-influence <span>The South African Border War (1966-1989) and its Callwellian influence</span> <span><span>Riley.C.Murray</span></span> <span>Wed, 11/10/2021 - 4:13am</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">The roots of modern counterinsurgency are often traced to Colonial Wars or Small Wars of the 19th Century. One case which may demonstrate such a relationship is the South Africa Border War (1966-1989) in which variables such as, intelligence and people-centered operations utilized by the South African Defence Force (SADF) demonstrated striking similarities to C.E. Callwell’s reflection on 19th Century Small Wars.</div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/south-african-border-war-1966-1989-and-its-callwellian-influence" rel="tag" title="The South African Border War (1966-1989) and its Callwellian influence" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about The South African Border War (1966-1989) and its Callwellian influence</span></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Wed, 10 Nov 2021 09:13:53 +0000 Riley.C.Murray 140080 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com Lessons from American Counterinsurgency Operations During the Occupation of Haiti http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/lessons-american-counterinsurgency-operations-during-occupation-haiti <span>Lessons from American Counterinsurgency Operations During the Occupation of Haiti</span> <span><span>Riley.C.Murray</span></span> <span>Wed, 06/16/2021 - 4:23pm</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">The United States occupied Haiti and ran many of its critical governmental functions between 1915-1934 in one of America’s most protracted conflicts and occupations. During this occupation, multiple internal conflicts arose that required the small garrison of American Marines and the Marine-led Haitian Gendarmerie to execute brief but generally effective counterinsurgency campaigns. An examination of these campaigns will illuminate what lessons can be drawn for contemporary and future use. </div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/lessons-american-counterinsurgency-operations-during-occupation-haiti" rel="tag" title="Lessons from American Counterinsurgency Operations During the Occupation of Haiti" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about Lessons from American Counterinsurgency Operations During the Occupation of Haiti</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/jrnl/art/lessons-american-counterinsurgency-operations-during-occupation-haiti#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">1 comment</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/35/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1632300317" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Wed, 16 Jun 2021 20:23:03 +0000 Riley.C.Murray 139641 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com The Case for Maintaining an Advisory Presence in Afghanistan http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/case-maintaining-advisory-presence-afghanistan <span>The Case for Maintaining an Advisory Presence in Afghanistan</span> <span><span>SWJED</span></span> <span>Mon, 04/20/2020 - 9:35am</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">Barring an unforeseen event or shift in policy, it seems likely that by May 2021, the United States will remove its military forces from Afghanistan. Despite claims of progress, the United States and its allies have undeniably made many mistakes over the past two decades. Some commentators have argued that Afghanistan has been an “undeniable failure.” While many commentators and policymakers have focused on getting out of Afghanistan, the past shows the potentially devastating consequences such actions could bring. Instead, the United States and its NATO allies should consider leaving a small presence of advisors to support institutional development at the ministries and institutions.</div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/case-maintaining-advisory-presence-afghanistan" rel="tag" title="The Case for Maintaining an Advisory Presence in Afghanistan" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about The Case for Maintaining an Advisory Presence in Afghanistan</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/jrnl/art/case-maintaining-advisory-presence-afghanistan#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">3 comments</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/35/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1632405302" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Mon, 20 Apr 2020 13:35:29 +0000 SWJED 138105 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com “Accidental Guerrilla” Syndrome in California, 1836-1846 http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/accidental-guerrilla-syndrome-california-1836-1846 <span>“Accidental Guerrilla” Syndrome in California, 1836-1846</span> <span><span>SWJED</span></span> <span>Wed, 04/01/2020 - 3:21am</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">Sun Tzu’s injunction to “know your enemy” is never more critical than in counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. During its COIN conflicts in the last hundred years, the United States military has fallen especially prey to the thinking trap of lumping all its opponents into the same category. COIN expert David Kilcullen identified this phenomenon as “accidental guerrilla syndrome” in his 2009 book of the same name.</div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/accidental-guerrilla-syndrome-california-1836-1846" rel="tag" title="“Accidental Guerrilla” Syndrome in California, 1836-1846" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about “Accidental Guerrilla” Syndrome in California, 1836-1846</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/jrnl/art/accidental-guerrilla-syndrome-california-1836-1846#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">3 comments</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/35/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1632478569" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Wed, 01 Apr 2020 07:21:35 +0000 SWJED 137204 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction, and Future http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/taliban-fragmentation-fact-fiction-and-future <span>Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction, and Future</span> <span><span>SWJED</span></span> <span>Mon, 03/30/2020 - 9:09am</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">For years, the U.S. military pursued a "divide and defeat" strategy against the Afghan Taliban, attempting to exploit the supposedly fragmented nature of the group. Drawing on the academic literature on insurgency, civil war, and negotiated peace, this report finds that the Taliban is a far more cohesive organization than a fragmented one.</div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/taliban-fragmentation-fact-fiction-and-future" rel="tag" title="Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction, and Future" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction, and Future</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/jrnl/art/taliban-fragmentation-fact-fiction-and-future#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">1 comment</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/35/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1632478575" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Mon, 30 Mar 2020 13:09:21 +0000 SWJED 137096 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com Coronavirus Poses Yet Another Challenge to the Afghan Peace Process http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/coronavirus-poses-yet-another-challenge-afghan-peace-process <span>Coronavirus Poses Yet Another Challenge to the Afghan Peace Process</span> <span><span>SWJED</span></span> <span>Thu, 03/26/2020 - 9:37pm</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s effort this week to bring the parties together failed and led the U.S. to reduce aid to Afghanistan. Amid all this uncertainty, Afghanistan is beginning to see the signs of a coronavirus outbreak, which could devastate the country given its poor health infrastructure and pollution problems. USIP’s Scott Smith explains how the coronavirus could further exacerbates an already complex situation.</div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/coronavirus-poses-yet-another-challenge-afghan-peace-process" rel="tag" title="Coronavirus Poses Yet Another Challenge to the Afghan Peace Process" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about Coronavirus Poses Yet Another Challenge to the Afghan Peace Process</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/jrnl/art/coronavirus-poses-yet-another-challenge-afghan-peace-process#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">1 comment</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/35/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1632478761" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Fri, 27 Mar 2020 01:37:04 +0000 SWJED 136936 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com Winning Small Wars in Contests for the People http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/winning-small-wars-contests-people <span>Winning Small Wars in Contests for the People</span> <span><span>SWJED</span></span> <span>Thu, 03/05/2020 - 12:28pm</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">A dilemma is now facing western militaries, in-so-far as, the contextual terrain has shifted to such an extent that their enemies refuse to engage them in a manner that would ensure their own destruction. Focus on this modern Sphacterian-dilemma has led to discussions and debates that are encapsulated within the ‘War amongst the people’ arena.</div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/winning-small-wars-contests-people" rel="tag" title="Winning Small Wars in Contests for the People" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about Winning Small Wars in Contests for the People</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/jrnl/art/winning-small-wars-contests-people#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">2 comments</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/35/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1632478847" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Thu, 05 Mar 2020 17:28:48 +0000 SWJED 135641 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com Case Analysis: The FARC in Colombia http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/case-analysis-farc-colombia <span>Case Analysis: The FARC in Colombia</span> <span><span>SWJED</span></span> <span>Thu, 03/05/2020 - 12:42am</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">An understanding of this particular case offers not only relevant lessons for the U.S. in our continuing small wars operations, but also on national interests in Colombia—including economic considerations and counter-narcotics efforts—could become threatened by FARC’s dissident groups.</div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/case-analysis-farc-colombia" rel="tag" title="Case Analysis: The FARC in Colombia" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about Case Analysis: The FARC in Colombia</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/jrnl/art/case-analysis-farc-colombia#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">1 comment</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/35/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1632478852" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Thu, 05 Mar 2020 05:42:40 +0000 SWJED 135621 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com The Three Misunderstandings of Soviet Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/three-misunderstandings-soviet-counterinsurgency-afghanistan-0 <span>The Three Misunderstandings of Soviet Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan</span> <span><span>SWJED</span></span> <span>Wed, 02/19/2020 - 10:58am</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">Several major actions taken by the United States and coalition in the last 18 years share much in common with the efforts of the Soviet Union during its combat operations in the country (1979-1989). It is therefore incumbent upon any student of the current conflict to firmly understand the Soviet conflict, its doctrine, execution, and most importantly, the Soviet methods of counterinsurgency.</div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/three-misunderstandings-soviet-counterinsurgency-afghanistan-0" rel="tag" title="The Three Misunderstandings of Soviet Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about The Three Misunderstandings of Soviet Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/jrnl/art/three-misunderstandings-soviet-counterinsurgency-afghanistan-0#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">1 comment</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/35/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1632480592" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Wed, 19 Feb 2020 15:58:47 +0000 SWJED 134448 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com Improving the Understanding of Political Legitimacy in COIN Doctrine http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/improving-understanding-political-legitimacy-coin-doctrine <span>Improving the Understanding of Political Legitimacy in COIN Doctrine</span> <span><span>SWJED</span></span> <span>Tue, 02/18/2020 - 9:45am</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Doctrine was initially developed in the midst of the Iraq War as the military struggled to accept the situation it found itself in and struggled to create a strategy to address it. Initially published in 2004 as an interim doctrine, and then in 2006 as a completed publication, the Army and Marine Corps’ primary counterinsurgency doctrine has only been updated once since then.</div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/improving-understanding-political-legitimacy-coin-doctrine" rel="tag" title="Improving the Understanding of Political Legitimacy in COIN Doctrine" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about Improving the Understanding of Political Legitimacy in COIN Doctrine</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/jrnl/art/improving-understanding-political-legitimacy-coin-doctrine#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">3 comments</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/35/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1680744608" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Tue, 18 Feb 2020 14:45:41 +0000 SWJED 134353 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com