advising http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/ en Conceptual Model of Advisor-Counterpart Interactions to Develop Institutional Viability http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/conceptual-model-advisor-counterpart-interactions-develop-institutional-viability <article data-history-node-id="140054" role="article" class="article teaser clearfix"> <h2> <a href="/jrnl/art/conceptual-model-advisor-counterpart-interactions-develop-institutional-viability" rel="bookmark"><span>Conceptual Model of Advisor-Counterpart Interactions to Develop Institutional Viability</span> </a> </h2> <footer> <article> <drupal-render-placeholder callback="masquerade.callbacks:renderCacheLink" arguments="0=75508" token="H6LBrGYXMcqRqnXmeALZPldAbNx4XlvHlu4E5bPmC5w"></drupal-render-placeholder></article> <div class="author"> <span>Thu, 11/04/2021 - 2:59am</span> </div> </footer> <div class="content"> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">In Train, Advise and Assist (TAA) efforts, a conceptual model of advisor-counterpart interactions is needed to enable common understanding and to create a framework for enabling growth in our counterparts. The conceptual model presented in this article frames advisor-counterpart relationships as a balance in terms of who initiates and makes decisions. </div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/conceptual-model-advisor-counterpart-interactions-develop-institutional-viability" rel="tag" title="Conceptual Model of Advisor-Counterpart Interactions to Develop Institutional Viability" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about Conceptual Model of Advisor-Counterpart Interactions to Develop Institutional Viability</span></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> <h2>About the Author(s)</h2> <div class="views-element-container form-group"></div> </div> </article> Thu, 04 Nov 2021 06:59:51 +0000 Riley.C.Murray 140054 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com The Afghan Air Force: A Harsh Lesson in the Expensive Game of Airpower Reconstruction http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/afghan-air-force-harsh-lesson-expensive-game-airpower-reconstruction <span>The Afghan Air Force: A Harsh Lesson in the Expensive Game of Airpower Reconstruction</span> <span><span>Riley.C.Murray</span></span> <span>Sun, 10/10/2021 - 3:36am</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">“Not to have an adequate air force in the present state of the world is to compromise the foundations of national freedom and independence.”[1] British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, recognized the value of airpower as early as 1933 during the rise of Adolf Hitler, and his words hold to this day. The United States spent sixteen of the last twenty years and precious resources attempting to rebuild the Afghan Air Force (AAF) into a viable, self-sustaining military aviation component capable of supporting the democratically-elected Afghan government. The withdrawal of U.S. and Coalition forces in August of 2021, and the embarrassingly swift takeover by the Taliban, have left the AAF in shambles. Many pilots fled with their aircraft to neighboring countries, where their fate remains uncertain, while the rest are now in Taliban hands.</div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/afghan-air-force-harsh-lesson-expensive-game-airpower-reconstruction" rel="tag" title="The Afghan Air Force: A Harsh Lesson in the Expensive Game of Airpower Reconstruction" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about The Afghan Air Force: A Harsh Lesson in the Expensive Game of Airpower Reconstruction</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/jrnl/art/afghan-air-force-harsh-lesson-expensive-game-airpower-reconstruction#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">4 comments</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/123/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1674806510" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Sun, 10 Oct 2021 07:36:30 +0000 Riley.C.Murray 139977 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com Taking a Bite out of the Elephant: How to Improve Security Cooperation http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/taking-bite-out-elephant-how-improve-security-cooperation <span>Taking a Bite out of the Elephant: How to Improve Security Cooperation</span> <span><span>Riley.C.Murray</span></span> <span>Sat, 07/17/2021 - 2:50pm</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">It is difficult to ascertain if a security cooperation initiative is effective or not. This could be in part because most of the indicators of success used by security cooperation stakeholders may not be focused on measures of effectiveness, but of performance, i.e., quantity of equipment delivered and number of units trained.  As one begins to peel back the layers of an initiative, it becomes apparent that the necessary in-depth analysis which forecasts secondary and tertiary orders of effect may have been overlooked, along with critical, measurable metrics that explain how an initiative would specifically elicit a proposed reaction.  The example utilized by Maj Croshier described the unanticipated difficulties of providing a C-208 fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft and Command and Control (C2) equipment to Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.  The focus of this initiative was placed mainly on the equipment, without fully accounting for the significant personnel, doctrinal, and maintenance challenges that would ensue.</div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/taking-bite-out-elephant-how-improve-security-cooperation" rel="tag" title="Taking a Bite out of the Elephant: How to Improve Security Cooperation" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about Taking a Bite out of the Elephant: How to Improve Security Cooperation</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/jrnl/art/taking-bite-out-elephant-how-improve-security-cooperation#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">1 comment</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/123/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1632299887" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Sat, 17 Jul 2021 18:50:08 +0000 Riley.C.Murray 139749 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com Competing through Deception: Expanding the Utility of Security Cooperation for Great Power Competition http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/competing-through-deception-expanding-utility-security-cooperation-great-power-competition <span>Competing through Deception: Expanding the Utility of Security Cooperation for Great Power Competition</span> <span><span>Riley.C.Murray</span></span> <span>Fri, 06/25/2021 - 10:46am</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">In the paradigm of strategic competition the United States should increase the use of strategic deception to impede competitor’s decision-making processes, increase rival competition costs, and better protect U.S. interests. Security Cooperation is an instrument that enables the generation of strategic deception by potentially confusing rival nations about what the U.S. interests and objectives are or even causing that rival to expend unnecessary resources. The United States Army is the service best postured to support combatant commanders to develop and execute strategic deception through cooperation. Executing any form of strategic deception entails a level of risk to reputation but provides the United States an invaluable tool in a geopolitical environment in which competition below levels of conflict has become the norm. </div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/competing-through-deception-expanding-utility-security-cooperation-great-power-competition" rel="tag" title="Competing through Deception: Expanding the Utility of Security Cooperation for Great Power Competition" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about Competing through Deception: Expanding the Utility of Security Cooperation for Great Power Competition</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/jrnl/art/competing-through-deception-expanding-utility-security-cooperation-great-power-competition#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">2 comments</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/123/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1632299925" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Fri, 25 Jun 2021 14:46:29 +0000 Riley.C.Murray 139672 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com The Localization Strategy: Local Logic and Energy in Belgium’s Advising Mission to Niger http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/localization-strategy-local-logic-and-energy-belgiums-advising-mission-niger <span>The Localization Strategy: Local Logic and Energy in Belgium’s Advising Mission to Niger</span> <span><span>Riley.C.Murray</span></span> <span>Sat, 05/29/2021 - 11:53am</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item"><h2><span><span><span><span><b>The Localization Strategy: Local Logic and Energy in Belgium’s Advising Mission to Niger </b></span></span></span></span></h2> <p><span><span>By Pierre Jean Deheane</span></span></p> <p><span><span><b>Introduction</b></span></span></p></div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/localization-strategy-local-logic-and-energy-belgiums-advising-mission-niger" rel="tag" title="The Localization Strategy: Local Logic and Energy in Belgium’s Advising Mission to Niger" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about The Localization Strategy: Local Logic and Energy in Belgium’s Advising Mission to Niger</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/jrnl/art/localization-strategy-local-logic-and-energy-belgiums-advising-mission-niger#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">2 comments</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/123/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1632316264" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Sat, 29 May 2021 15:53:19 +0000 Riley.C.Murray 139576 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com Modern War Institute: Learning to Fly: How the US Military can fix the Problems Plauging Aviation Advising Missions http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/modern-war-institute-learning-fly-how-us-military-can-fix-problems-plauging-aviation-advising <span>Modern War Institute: Learning to Fly: How the US Military can fix the Problems Plauging Aviation Advising Missions</span> <div class="field field--name-field-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item"><p>Link: https://mwi.usma.edu/learning-to-fly-how-the-us-military-can-fix-the-problems-plaguing-aviation-advising-missions/</p> <p>An in depth discussion on the issues facing aviation advising missions from a USAF Combat Aviation Advisor.</p> <p> </p> <p>Ad hoc missions, competition for personnel, selecting ideal advisors, managing contractors, and more. </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> </div> <span><span>Riley.C.Murray</span></span> <span>Thu, 04/01/2021 - 8:06am</span> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/blog/modern-war-institute-learning-fly-how-us-military-can-fix-problems-plauging-aviation-advising" rel="tag" title="Modern War Institute: Learning to Fly: How the US Military can fix the Problems Plauging Aviation Advising Missions" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about Modern War Institute: Learning to Fly: How the US Military can fix the Problems Plauging Aviation Advising Missions</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/blog/modern-war-institute-learning-fly-how-us-military-can-fix-problems-plauging-aviation-advising#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">1 comment</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/123/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1618250710" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Thu, 01 Apr 2021 12:06:14 +0000 Riley.C.Murray 139366 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com The Case for Maintaining an Advisory Presence in Afghanistan http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/case-maintaining-advisory-presence-afghanistan <span>The Case for Maintaining an Advisory Presence in Afghanistan</span> <span><span>SWJED</span></span> <span>Mon, 04/20/2020 - 9:35am</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">Barring an unforeseen event or shift in policy, it seems likely that by May 2021, the United States will remove its military forces from Afghanistan. Despite claims of progress, the United States and its allies have undeniably made many mistakes over the past two decades. Some commentators have argued that Afghanistan has been an “undeniable failure.” While many commentators and policymakers have focused on getting out of Afghanistan, the past shows the potentially devastating consequences such actions could bring. Instead, the United States and its NATO allies should consider leaving a small presence of advisors to support institutional development at the ministries and institutions.</div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/case-maintaining-advisory-presence-afghanistan" rel="tag" title="The Case for Maintaining an Advisory Presence in Afghanistan" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about The Case for Maintaining an Advisory Presence in Afghanistan</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/jrnl/art/case-maintaining-advisory-presence-afghanistan#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">3 comments</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/123/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1632405302" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Mon, 20 Apr 2020 13:35:29 +0000 SWJED 138105 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com Three Reasons Air Advising is Essential to America’s National Defense Strategy http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/three-reasons-air-advising-essential-americas-national-defense-strategy <span>Three Reasons Air Advising is Essential to America’s National Defense Strategy</span> <span><span>SWJED</span></span> <span>Sat, 04/11/2020 - 12:11am</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">Through the mission of Air Advising, the Air Force can produce a network of partners to counter the network of non-state terrorist organizations that threaten global stability. Embracing Air Advising as a core mission will also provide the U.S. with a promising way to counter China’s growing influence in developing nations. Finally, this mission ensures that America retains much needed low-intensity conflict expertise and capability. Air Advising can greatly reduce the risks the U.S. is taking in shifting its defense priorities, but to so, the Air Force must embrace it as a core mission.</div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/three-reasons-air-advising-essential-americas-national-defense-strategy" rel="tag" title="Three Reasons Air Advising is Essential to America’s National Defense Strategy" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about Three Reasons Air Advising is Essential to America’s National Defense Strategy</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/jrnl/art/three-reasons-air-advising-essential-americas-national-defense-strategy#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">1 comment</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/123/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1632478516" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Sat, 11 Apr 2020 04:11:27 +0000 SWJED 137692 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com Tactical Advising is Not the Problem: How to Get Security Force Training Right http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/tactical-advising-not-problem-how-get-security-force-training-right <span>Tactical Advising is Not the Problem: How to Get Security Force Training Right</span> <span><span>SWJED</span></span> <span>Thu, 09/12/2019 - 1:29pm</span> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">Advising foreign forces is hard, but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be doing it. Since the inception of the Military Transition Team (MiTT) early in the Iraq war people who were disgruntled by the fact they had to serve on one or didn’t understand how they worked would rail against their existence.</div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/tactical-advising-not-problem-how-get-security-force-training-right" rel="tag" title="Tactical Advising is Not the Problem: How to Get Security Force Training Right" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about Tactical Advising is Not the Problem: How to Get Security Force Training Right</span></a></li><li class="comment-comments"><a href="/jrnl/art/tactical-advising-not-problem-how-get-security-force-training-right#comments" title="Jump to the first comment." hreflang="en">1 comment</a></li><li class="comment-new-comments"><a href="/taxonomy/term/123/feed" class="hidden" title="Jump to the first new comment." data-history-node-last-comment-timestamp="1632571258" data-history-node-field-name="comment"></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> Thu, 12 Sep 2019 17:29:04 +0000 SWJED 125126 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com Strategic Advising: Should it be Transactional or Transformative? http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/strategic-advising-should-it-be-transactional-or-transformative <article data-history-node-id="111223" role="article" class="article teaser clearfix"> <h2> <a href="/jrnl/art/strategic-advising-should-it-be-transactional-or-transformative" rel="bookmark"><span>Strategic Advising: Should it be Transactional or Transformative?</span> </a> </h2> <footer> <article> <drupal-render-placeholder callback="masquerade.callbacks:renderCacheLink" arguments="0=4" token="2JcDkyvoNdz7AbcUTZXDTgfSvABuLH-TUc0jYOzfCs0"></drupal-render-placeholder></article> <div class="author"> <span>Wed, 12/12/2018 - 6:35pm</span> </div> </footer> <div class="content"> <div class="field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field--item">The purpose of this paper is to offer some thoughts and, hopefully, stimulate debate about the Department of Defense’s collective advising efforts over the last fifty plus years; of which I have been a witness from Vietnam to Afghanistan.</div> <ul class="links inline list-inline"><li class="node-readmore"><a href="/jrnl/art/strategic-advising-should-it-be-transactional-or-transformative" rel="tag" title="Strategic Advising: Should it be Transactional or Transformative?" hreflang="en">Read more<span class="visually-hidden"> about Strategic Advising: Should it be Transactional or Transformative?</span></a></li><li class="comment-forbidden"></li><li></li></ul> <h2>About the Author(s)</h2> <div class="views-element-container form-group"></div> </div> </article> Wed, 12 Dec 2018 23:35:25 +0000 SWJED 111223 at http://archive.smallwarsjournal.com