transition

Transition in Afghanistan: Lessons from the Past

Peter J. Munson — Fri, 14 Jun 2013 07:25:00 +0000

Transition in Afghanistan: Lessons from the Past

If critical issues are not dealt with prior to 2014, they most likely will result in Afghanistan’s returning to a state of civil war or a highly dysfunctional state.

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Cautious Optimism

Peter J. Munson — Wed, 05 Jun 2013 07:30:00 +0000

Cautious Optimism Peter J. Munson Wed, 06/05/2013 - 3:30am

Comparing the final days of the Communist Regime in Afghanistan with America’s drawdown.

Iraqi Provincial Elections: Iraq’s Political Pulse

Peter J. Munson — Thu, 02 May 2013 07:30:00 +0000

Iraqi Provincial Elections: Iraq’s Political Pulse

A Q&A with Kirk Sowell of Inside Iraqi Politics.

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The Day After Assad: What to Expect Based on Events in Post-Saddam Iraq

Peter J. Munson — Thu, 14 Mar 2013 07:30:00 +0000

The Day After Assad: What to Expect Based on Events in Post-Saddam Iraq Peter J. Munson Thu, 03/14/2013 - 3:30am

Regardless of whether Britain and France arm the rebels, Syria faces more challenges than Assad’s rule. An interview with Nathaniel Rosenblatt from Caerus Ascociates by Robert Tollast.

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Afghanistan: What Went Wrong?

Peter J. Munson — Tue, 05 Feb 2013 08:30:00 +0000

Afghanistan: What Went Wrong? Peter J. Munson Tue, 02/05/2013 - 3:30am

Afghanistan required a different approach yet we failed in our analysis, strategy, and application of resources.

When Company Command Becomes an Advisory Tour

Peter J. Munson — Fri, 18 Jan 2013 08:30:00 +0000

When Company Command Becomes an Advisory Tour Peter J. Munson Fri, 01/18/2013 - 3:30am

If you’re afforded the opportunity to lead a critical team at a critical juncture in our nation’s history… see the big picture and embrace it from the beginning.

Notes from Kabul: Thoughts on Building Peace and Nations in an Insurgency

Peter J. Munson — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 08:30:00 +0000

Notes from Kabul: Thoughts on Building Peace and Nations in an Insurgency Peter J. Munson Thu, 01/17/2013 - 3:30am

Observations from a month-long secondment in Afghanistan with DCOMISAF.

Trial by Fire in Afghanistan

Peter J. Munson — Tue, 15 Jan 2013 19:00:00 +0000

Trial by Fire in Afghanistan

As the endgame in Afghanistan nears, debate over the pace of withdrawal has intensified. Commanders in Afghanistan worried about ground conditions have argued for a slow transition. Some officials in Congress and the White House have pushed for an accelerated withdrawal, citing political concerns about declining popular support for the war effort.

Few have argued for a faster withdrawal based on what is best for Afghanistan. The proponents of a more gradual transition argue that pulling out too quickly could lead to a split in the army, mass defections, or even the collapse of the government. These are real possibilities. What is certain is that at some point in the near future, western troops will depart and the Afghan army and police will face a trial by fire.

It would be better for Afghanistan to face that trial sooner rather than later, before the Taliban manage to recover from the surge of US forces and while there is still time for the government to adjust to independence. Continuing with the current gradualist effort will only delay the inevitable and give the Taliban time to prepare for another offensive.

There is little additional value to be gained from another year or two of advising and training at the tactical level. If after more than a decade the Afghan security forces cannot operate without foreign partners and embedded advisors, they will never be able to.

For years now, US and NATO forces have operated closely with their Afghan partners – patrolling alongside them, supporting them logistically, and helping them plan and execute operations. Afghan soldiers and police have taken heavy casualties and fought bravely and well.

Yet, rarely have Afghan units been truly tested in fully independent operations, for fear they might fail. With few exceptions, Afghans have operated only under the comfortable umbrella of western combat forces. They have come to expect that western troops will rescue them if they get into a bind and give them fuel and ammunition if they run out. In the words of one Afghan army officer in Helmand, "we like drinking the American milk."

The potential for the Afghans to stand on their own will remain in doubt until they have demonstrated their ability to do so. As long as large numbers of foreign troops remain embedded in the Afghan army and police, the perception that western forces are propping up the security forces will persist, as will the growing belief that they will collapse as soon as the bulk of US and NATO troops depart.

These perceptions are among the Taliban's main advantages. They are also a major obstacle to successful negotiations. The Taliban have little reason to come to the bargaining table as long as they believe the Kabul government will not survive the departure of western troops.

Commanders in Afghanistan are understandably cautious about pulling back too quickly. No one wants to see an Afghan army battalion or district police force fail, given the amount of blood, treasure, and sheer grit that has been devoted to raising them. So far, these fears have not been realized. Helmand, for example, where the number of US Marines has been cut by more than two thirds, remains stable.

Instead of causing chaos, the draw-down has forced the US and NATO to do things they should have done years ago – such as handing greater responsibility to Afghan forces, conducting fewer operations on their own, and refraining from pushing into remote areas that the Afghan government has no intention of securing on its own. Above all, the draw-down has compelled the US pursue a political solution after more than a decade of war.

As any good parent or teacher knows, the bird must leave the nest before it can learn how to fly. When ordinary Afghans see that their army and police can function with minimal foreign support, they will have greater confidence in the future and the Taliban will not seem so frightening.

It is time to pull US forces out of Afghanistan’s towns and villages and out of tactical army and police units. The US and NATO should continue to provide the Afghan security forces with whatever they need, in terms of material support and over-watch, but should no longer patrol or train with Afghan forces or live with them on small, remote bases.

Peter J. Munson Tue, 01/15/2013 - 2:00pm

Transition in Afghanistan: A War of Perceptions

Peter J. Munson — Thu, 10 Jan 2013 08:30:00 +0000

Transition in Afghanistan: A War of Perceptions Peter J. Munson Thu, 01/10/2013 - 3:30am

The war in Afghanistan is a war of perceptions on progress made thus far. A widening gap in perceptions will complicate the transition .

Multi-National Corporations and Stability Operations: A New Role?

Peter J. Munson — Mon, 01 Oct 2012 09:35:00 +0000

Multi-National Corporations and Stability Operations: A New Role? Peter J. Munson Mon, 10/01/2012 - 5:35am

Multi-national corporations--particularly from the extractive sector with long project life cycles, access to capital, and attractive return on investment--could act as a new phase in civil-military operations.