01/30/2021 News & Commentary - Korea

News and Commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and Published by Riley Murray.

1. Ruling Party Membership No Longer Automatic for North Korean Soldiers

2. North Korean magazine depicts an upbeat 2020 unlike elsewhere

3. Personnel moves offer hints to Biden's approach to North Korea

4. Biden and both Koreas

5. Controversy erupts over Seoul's possible push to build nuke plant in North Korea

6. The nuclear elephant in the room: To restrain or disarm?

7. Kim Jong Un's true intentions were revealed through the anti-reactionary thought law

8. South Korea, US set to move closer under Joe Biden, but China has concerns

9. Japan's role to increase in North Korean denuclearization in Biden era

10. Incidents at sea highlight tension between North and South Korea

11. South Korea Shows OECD How It's Done In Covid-19 Era

12. South Korea's COVID Success Stems From an Earlier Infectious Disease Failure

13. North Korean Defectors Explain Just How Popular BTS Is In North Korea

14. No need to hurry in regaining OPCON

1. Ruling Party Membership No Longer Automatic for North Korean Soldiers

rfa.org

Most of the military and security services actually fall into Songbun's wavering class.

Excerpts:

"According to the Supreme Commander's order, the new standard is to bolster party membership by first accepting soldiers from basic combat units, including from ships, guard posts and infantry deployed in the front lines," the source said, clarifying that this meant soldiers stationed near the military demarcation line that separates North and South Korea since the 1953 Korean War Armistice.

"It is likely that membership opportunities will greatly decrease for soldiers in non-combat units or those stationed in the rear," the source said.

Screening for potential members from the military's ranks will also be more comprehensive, according to the source.

"Candidates are to be carefully selected by thoroughly reviewing their levels of faithfulness to the party, how well they performed their military tasks, including combat and political training, and any other 'exemplary activities' in building a strong state," said the source.

2. North Korean magazine depicts an upbeat 2020 unlike elsewhere

asahi.com – by Takeshi Kamiya – 28 January 2021

There is no propaganda like north Korean propaganda.

Excerpts:

The Korean-language magazine also offers insight on what North Korean authorities apparently chose not to show.

Amid a plethora of images of rebuilding from natural disasters and military parades, a mere single page is dedicated to the COVID-19 pandemic and features scenes of infection control efforts at a zoo, railway facilities and elsewhere.

Yet oddly it stands out due to its lack of a reference to novel coronavirus countermeasures.

Pyongyang maintains that no one has yet been infected with the novel coronavirus in North Korea.

The magazine, bearing the imprint of the Foreign Languages Publishing House, was likely produced as propaganda for North Korea's achievements primarily targeted at those living outside the country with an interest in affairs of the Korean Peninsula.

3. Personnel moves offer hints to Biden's approach to North Korea

washingtontimes.com · by Guy Taylor

Personnel is policy.

4.  Biden and both Koreas

m.lasvegassun.com · by Donald Kirk · January 30, 2021

Yes, here are a number of alliance issues that must be resolved.

In the interests of a smooth relationship with Biden, Moon will endorse the U.S.-Korean alliance. Questions, however, surround OPCON, giving South Korean operational control of forces in the event of war. It's not clear whether South Korean and U.S. forces are capable of coordinating smoothly under OPCON in a real-time emergency. They need to test their capabilities in intricate joint exercises that infuriate the North Koreans.

At the same time, the U.S. and South Korea have to resolve contentious negotiations on the South's contribution to the cost of keeping U.S. bases and 28,500 U.S. troops in the country. Trump badly upset the alliance by demanding South Korea pay $5 billion a year, more than five times the $927 million paid last year. Biden's team will be looking for agreement on slightly more than $1 billion.

Trump as president left many difficult issues for Biden to settle. After all his big talk, his showmanship, his dream of a Nobel peace prize, North Korea remains a de facto nuclear power holding nukes and missiles like a club over South Korea, Japan and the U.S. If there is reason for hope, it's that North Korea is too weak for Kim to be able to carry out any of the threats with which he is greeting Biden, whom he never congratulated for defeating his friend Trump in November's presidential election.

5.  Controversy erupts over Seoul's possible push to build nuke plant in North Korea

The Korea Times · January 29, 2021

Hmmm..... admit nothing, deny everything, and make counter accusations:

"(The existence of the deleted documents) has been wrongly interpreted with regard to the government's intentions. That's not true," a ministry official said. "The previous Park Geun-hye government also examined various inter-Korean energy cooperation plans in preparation for unification," the official argued.

6. The nuclear elephant in the room: To restrain or disarm?

thebulletin.org · by Rob Elder · January 29, 2021

A discussion of the arguments of the disarmament advocates and the "restrainers" and nonproliferation.

Conclusion:

The expansive foreign policy long practiced by Washington has contributed substantially to nuclear nonproliferation, a prerequisite of total nuclear disarmament. But insofar as a shift toward restraint entails deep cuts in defense spending and drawdowns from legacy commitments of US forces abroad, restrainers imperil the ambitious goal of disarmament. If Americans grow more willing to take a chance on a new grand strategy, uncertainty about the contours of a restraint-based US foreign policy will become a less convincing argument for staying the current course, and nonproliferation will likely become a lower priority in Washington. Disarmament advocates will be increasingly pressured to choose between the incompatible goals of peace and nuclear weapons abolition. The implications of their choice could hardly be greater.

7.  Kim Jong Un's true intentions were revealed through the anti-reactionary thought law

dailynk.com – by Mun Sun Bo - January 29, 2021

Again, not to beat the horse too much more dead, but the new DASS for EAP, Dr. Jung Pak always asks who does Kim Jong-un fear more: the US or the Korean people living in the north?  This is an obvious answer to that question.  Control over the populations (and the denial of their human rights) is of paramount importance to ensure the survival of the Kim family regime.

Excerpts:

Authors Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith pointed out in their book, The Dictator's Handbook, that a dictator is someone who hates freedom. Their reasoning is because if you allow freedom, then the people will recognize each other's suffering and easily cooperate in antigovernmental demonstrations. This same analysis can also be applied to Kim Jong Un because the people's freedom can be a threat to one's rank. If outside information gets in (to North Korea) and people become aware of freedom and human rights, then the stronghold of Kim Jong Un's dictatorship that he worked tirelessly to build will easily collapse. This is why Kim Jong Un feels the need that he must desperately block the spread of liberalism. The anti-reactionary law was formed from within this context.

The anti-reactionary law was enacted by the North Korean authorities last year on Dec. 4. at the 12th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (SPA). The essence of this law is that anyone who uses, distributes, or stores any cultural content from South Korea, or other countries such as the US and Japan, could be punished with a maximum sentence of the death penalty. Daily NK obtained and released specific details of this law on Jan. 15.

8. South Korea, US set to move closer under Joe Biden, but China has concerns

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3119846/south-korea-us-set-move-closer-under-joe-biden-china-has – by Laura Zhou and Rachel Zhang – 30 January 2021

Korea is the shrimp among whales.

China recognizes the alliance friction with the different views toward north Korea here:

Wu Xiangning, an assistant professor at the University of Macau, said South Korea and the US had different views on how to achieve denuclearisation in North Korea and that was having a negative impact on their military alliance.

"The Moon administration wants the US to restart talks with North Korea," he said. "Over 70 per cent of South Korean people expect Biden to meet Kim Jong-un, but [the US president] made it clear he would not meet Kim unless he committed to denuclearising."

"In the meantime, the US will continue to impose sanctions on North Korea, which Moon does not want it to do as he is hoping for a peaceful unification of the peninsula and doesn't want to upset North Korea too much."

9. Japan's role to increase in North Korean denuclearization in Biden era

The Korea Times · January 30, 2021

As I have mentioned many times we need our linchpin and cornerstone alliances (and sufficient cooperation between the two) to be successful in addressing the challenges posed by the mafia-like crime family cult in north Korea. 

10. Incidents at sea highlight tension between North and South Korea

korea.stripes.com · January 30, 2021

11. South Korea Shows OECD How It's Done In Covid-19 Era

Forbes · by William Pesek · January 29, 2021

Some good news but with advice not to make the same mistakes as in the past.

Excerpts:

Moon, though, needs to stop making the same mistake as predecessors: putting most of his chips on the Bank of Korea. Since December, the BOK has been under pressure to expand its mandate to support growth. Fair enough. But Moon's economy would get more mileage from tax and regulatory changes that level playing fields to realize his vision for a "fair economy."

That also means clamping down on the family-owned giants known as "chaebols" to make more space for a startup boom.

It will take levels of courage Moon has yet to display to roll out new anti-trust measure to reign in powerful household names like Daewoo, Hyundai, LG, Samsung and SK.

The good news is that Moon has more than a year left to act. The even better news is that his economy is flashing optimistic signs that Seoul can harness to confound the naysayers yet again. It's kind of become Korea's brand.

12. South Korea's COVID Success Stems From an Earlier Infectious Disease Failure

Slate · by Jiyeon Kim · January 29, 2021

Learn, adapt, anticipate - and repeat.

Conclusion: While South Korea's specific public health measures might not be transferable to other countries, its willingness to learn from mistakes certainly is. Moreover, after the last four disastrous and shambolic years, rebuilding public trust in government is more important than ever in the United States. While the recent rollout of COVID-19 vaccines brings hope, initial distribution has been met with delays and obstacles. We failed with testing and contact tracing, yet we could have learned from these mistakes and done better with the vaccine. New, more infectious COVID-19 variants have forced the United Kingdom and other countries into national lockdowns again and are already spreading throughout the United States. While the previous administration never had a coordinated plan to control the virus, there is still a chance-and urgent need-to do better. South Korea's model offers both a blueprint of success and a reminder that a combination of good governance, good science, and public trust is the only way to effectively deal with public health crises.

13. North Korean Defectors Explain Just How Popular BTS Is In North Korea

koreaboo.com · January 30, 2021

One data point that we can get information into the north. The regime cannot keep it out.

14. No need to hurry in regaining OPCON

donga.com – 30 January 2021

Sigh.... This is why we need an IO plan for OPCON transition. There is no "regaining" OPCON by Seoul.  There is no transfer of OPCON from Washington to Seoul. When a Korean general takes command of the ROK/US CFC he will still answer equally to both countries through the Military Committee.  The US does not have OPCON of ROK forces and when the transition is complete the ROK will not have OPCON of US forces. The ROK/US CFC will exercise OPCON of both ROK and US forces (when each government decides to provide forces to the command) and the command will answer equally to both countries through the Military Committee.  The failure to explain this to the press, the politicos, the pundits, and the public will continue to cause long term friction with the transition process.

But most importantly the process is conditions based because the conditions must be met to ensure the security of the ROK. Failing to meet the conditions and still going forward with the transition has the potential to put the ROK and the people of South Korea at great risk.

"Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought."

- John Rawls, A Theory of Justice

"The illusion of free will, of freedom, is a useful tool you know. Let people think they are free and present them with a danger to their so-called freedom, a fear. It's amazing how much you can get them to deal with just as long as you tell them they're still free."

- Jordon Greene, They'll Call It Treason

"The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism."

- George Washington