News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Riley Murray.
1. Six North Korean Soldiers Cross River Border to Escape to China
2. It Is Time for a Realistic Bargain With North Korea
3. North Korean Survey Reveals More than 100 Deaths, 13,000 ‘Suspected’ COVID-19 Cases in One Province
4. North Korean border guards in Chagang Province seen wearing gas masks
5. U.S. condemns N. Korea's missile launch as 'destabilizing'
6. Joint task force cracks down on users of illegal cell phones in Hyesan
7. Moon slams North Korea’s missile test amid efforts for dialogue
8. Court awards damages from North, Kim Jong-un
9. North Korea Gives Biden a Missile Test—a Familiar Hello
10. US labeling mishap of ‘East Sea,’ ‘Sea of Japan’ fuels debate
11. As North Korea plots revenge over ‘spy’ extradited to US from Malaysia, assassinations and abductions may be next
12. N Korea confirms missile tests as Biden warns of response
13. South Korea should join the Quad: Korea Herald writer
14. Asking China to Solve the North Korea Problem Is Completely Foolish
15. Kim Jong Un aims his missiles at Biden
16. U.S. will 'respond accordingly' to North's escalation of tensions: Biden
17. N.Korean Spy on Trial 'Was Kim Jong-un's Liquor Runner'
18. New KN-23 ballistic missile to boost N. Korea's tactical nuclear capabilities: experts
19. ‘Business as Usual’: North Korea Restarts Ballistic Missile Tests
1. Six North Korean Soldiers Cross River Border to Escape to China
While everyone is focused on north Korean provocations (reported cruise missile and SRBM launches) I want to flag this incident (and some other recent ones) to make sure we continue to observe the indications and warnings for possible internal instability.
As we were working on the original planning for north Korean instability and regime collapse in the 1990's Bob Collins and I tried to determine what were the key conditions that would lead to internal instability and regime collapse. The two were the loss of the ability for the regime/party to govern all of north Korean territory from Pyongyang combined with the loss of coherence of and support by the military. One of the early indicators of the loss of coherence would be small unit military defections/escapes. While we have long seen individual soldiers try to escape it is a significant escalation of potential instability when (small) units do so together. There can be many reasons for the escape but the fact that a group of soldiers can conspire and act indicates conditions may be making them desperate to act and the three chains of control and command are breaking down - the first chain is the tradition military chain from general to private, the second chain of control is the political chain, and the third chain of control is the security chain. When you combine this with other reports of CVOID outbreaks and other instability indicators it is imperative that the military and intelligence communities be alert for indications and warnings of instability along with indications and warnings of provocations and attack.
I am not predicting imminent collapse or that even the regime will eventually collapse. Kim continues to impose draconian population and resources control measures in the name of COVID mitigation but with the intent to crack down on anti-regime actions and potential resistance. I will predict that if it does collapse it will be catastrophic. Therefore, we need to be as ready for this contingency as any of the others, most importantly because the conditions that lead to instability and collapse could lead to Kim Jong-un making the decision to execute his campaign plan to unify the peninsula by force under his rule to ensure survival of the regime. Yes, I can be accused of being a chicken little screaming the sky is falling or the boy who cried wolf. I will gladly accept all criticism if none of these scenarios play out. But I am a worst case planner.
2. It Is Time for a Realistic Bargain With North Korea
Foreign Affairs · by Eric Brewer and Sue Mi Terry · March 25, 2021
If we embark on arms control negotiations we are agreeing to north Korea as a nuclear power and that it will keep its nuclear weapons. We need to recognize that we are making a deliberate decision to allow the north to be a nuclear power. If that is what we are willing to do I would offer that we should answer two key questions:
What do we want to achieve in Korea?
What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK/US Alliance interests on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia?
I would also ask given what we assess to be the nature and objectives of the Kim family regime, would an arms control agreement alter the answers to these two key questions?
Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has (or will ever) abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?
In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has (or will) abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?
All that said, I would not be opposed to arms control negotiation if (and only if) it was a line of effort as part of a superior form of a political warfare strategy that was focused on solving the "Korea question" (para 60 of the Armistice) and achieving the acceptable durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK/US Alliance interests.
Conclusion:
An arms control approach might well meet the same fate as other failed U.S. strategies for dealing with North Korea, but the Biden administration should still test whether it can work. Last year was one of North Korea’s toughest since the famine of the 1990s. The measures that Kim took to save his country from COVID-19—including closing the border with China—did more economic damage than sanctions have done. Kim has not been easily swayed by economic pressure in the past, but it is possible he is desperate enough for sanctions relief—and confident enough in his existing nuclear and missile capabilities—that he would trade some limits on his weapons programs for a significant reduction in sanctions.
Such a strategy would not be risk free, and just because arms control aims for less doesn’t mean it will be any easier to achieve. Unlike the distant objective of total denuclearization, a limited arms control agreement would force tough, near-term tradeoffs with other U.S. policy goals. But given the failure of existing approaches, arms control is at least worth a shot. As long as Biden doesn’t make premature sanctions concessions in return for empty North Korean promises, the worst that can happen is that his administration winds up back where it started with the current containment regime.
3. North Korean Survey Reveals More than 100 Deaths, 13,000 ‘Suspected’ COVID-19 Cases in One Province
Of course, this is unvetted and so we must take this with a grain of salt. We should be grateful to Radio Free Asia for being able to provide this kind of reporting from its contacts within north Korea. But it is plausible and if true it could have dire consequences for the regime. Another reason why we need to continue to observe for the full spectrum of indications and warnings from attack to provocation to internal instability.
4. North Korean border guards in Chagang Province seen wearing gas masks
dailynk.com – by Jang Seul Gi - March 25, 2021
Another unusual indicator.
Interesting:
Soldiers in the border buffer zone in Chunggang-eup, Chagang Province, were recently seen wearing full gas masks instead of medical masks. According to a source in the area, North Korean authorities ordered soldiers stationed on the border to wear gas masks to prevent infection by COVID-19 variants.
A source in Chagang Province told Daily NK on Mar. 24 that “soldiers started wearing gas masks on Mar. 15,” adding that “[The military] gave the gas mask order because the COVID-19 variant is different from ordinary viruses in that it is a ‘protein poison’ [RNA virus], so regular masks won’t filter it out.”
...
A North Korean defector familiar with the situation in North Korea said that “From what I heard, suspected COVID-19 cases have increased so much that [patients] can no longer be quarantined in [existing medical] facilities.” He further said that “It appears that North Korea is overreacting beyond the bounds of common sense because the pandemic has become so difficult to control.”
5. U.S. condemns N. Korea's missile launch as 'destabilizing'
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · March 26, 2021
We should not forget this is a violation of UN Security Council resolutions. These are actions that are not taken by responsible members of the international community.
Excerpt: "The United States condemns the DPRK's destabilizing ballistic missile launches. These launches violate multiple UN Security Council resolutions and threaten the region and the broader international community," a department spokesperson told Yonhap News Agency in an email.
6. Joint task force cracks down on users of illegal cell phones in Hyesan
dailynk.com – by Ha Yoon Ah - March 26, 2021
Not surprising. We estimate there are 6.5 million smartphones in north Korea. These are key for passing on economic information about market activity but obviously they are used for other things (passing on information, providing "funds" through the electronic transfer of cell phone minutes, and of course viewing K-dramas and other media from outside north Korea as well as smuggling and trafficking).
7. Moon slams North Korea’s missile test amid efforts for dialogue
koreaherald.com · by Lee Ji-yoon · March 26, 2021
The question is are these missile launches enough to cause the Moon administration to reevaluate its strategic assumptions about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime?
8. Court awards damages from North, Kim Jong-un
This is good to see.
The buried lede here is that there are Koreans from the South actively supporting the Kim family regime to include those affiliated with the Moon administration.
Excerpts:
Following their successful lawsuit, Han and Noh requested that the Foundation of Inter-Korea Cooperation –– which since 2005 has collected royalties from South Korean companies using copyrighted North Korean materials on behalf of the North Korean state television service KCTV –– pay them the damages.
The foundation is led by Im Jong-seok, President Moon Jae-in’s former Chief of Staff and current Special Advisor for Foreign Affairs and Special Envoy to UAE. The accrued royalties, which totaled 1.6 billion won in 2018, are under court administration due to ongoing international sanctions against the North.
9. North Korea Gives Biden a Missile Test—a Familiar Hello
https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-gives-biden-a-missile-testa-new-but-familiar-hello-11616682497 - by Timothy W. Martin and Andrew Jeong
Of course, the tests may only be because they are necessary to advance their capabilities. And if there are new capabilities, the regime did tell us they were developing new ones.
But as I have written I think we have to assesses these launches in the context of all statements and actions and in my opinion this is all about making the new Biden Korea policy DOA and to set the conditions for Kim's demand for sanctions relief if the Biden Administration want to move forward with negotiations of any kind.
I have previously provided a laundry list of potential responses. I recall being a crisis action planning on the UNC/CFC/USFK staff back in the 1990 we used to generate responses across the elements of national power (even those outside the purview of the military element - we always tried to offer a holistic approach because reliance on one instrument is always insufficient.). I am sure the panners in Korea have quote a menu of options for recommendation.
10. US labeling mishap of ‘East Sea,’ ‘Sea of Japan’ fuels debate
koreaherald.com · by Ahn Sung-mi · March 26, 2021
I recall the time in 1997 or 1998 when we replaced all maps in current with the updated WGS 84 version. I was called on the carpet by a Korean general because it had the Sea of Japan on it as well as the Yalu river (which is the Chinese name for the river - the Korean name is Amnokgang). He demanded I get them replaced with corrected versions. Of course, I could not meet his demand.
11. As North Korea plots revenge over ‘spy’ extradited to US from Malaysia, assassinations and abductions may be next
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3126937/north-korea-plots-revenge-over-spy-extradited-us-malaysia – by Amy Chew
Extensive comments from me below (as well as my friend and National War College colleague Zach Abuza).
12. N Korea confirms missile tests as Biden warns of response
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM · March 26, 2021
A "new" weapon: "KCNA quoted top official Ri Pyong Chol, who supervised the test, as saying that the new weapon’s development “is of great significance in bolstering up the military power of the country and deterring all sorts of military threats existing on the Korean Peninsula.”
13. South Korea should join the Quad: Korea Herald writer
straitstimes.com · by Robert J. Fouser · March 26, 2021
Concur.
Excerpts:
President Biden has put the Quad at the centre of his efforts to contain China's rising influence. On March 13, the leaders of the Quad held their first virtual summit and wrote an op-ed piece for the Washington Post.
The article focused on cooperation among the four nations on climate change and distributing Covid-19 vaccines.
Though the article did not mention China, the four leaders rejected the Chinese authoritarian model by stating, "We recommit ourselves, once again, to an Indo-Pacific region that is free, open, secure and prosperous."
Surely South Korea shares these goals. In the article, the four leaders invited other nations to join them. South Korea should accept the invitation immediately, not just out of national interest, but as an expression of its values as a leading democracy.
14. Asking China to Solve the North Korea Problem Is Completely Foolish
The National Interest · by Doug Bandow · March 25, 2021
I do agree with Mr. Bandow. We cannot expect China to solve the national security problems of the ROK and US.
I think the recent reinforcement of the PRC-DPRK alliance this past week is one indicator that if the new Biden Korea policy relies on Chinese assistance then it is doomed to fail. I think the renewal of the alliance is one indication the Chinese and the Kim family regime are working in concert to try to make the new policy DOA.
15. Kim Jong Un aims his missiles at Biden
asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · March 25, 2021
Blackmail diplomacy: The use of threats, increased tensions, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions. A line of effort of the regime's political warfare strategy.
16. U.S. will 'respond accordingly' to North's escalation of tensions: Biden
Accordingly. We must demonstrate strategic reassure and strategic resolve. That must be the foundation upon which the Biden Korea policy will rest.
17. N.Korean Spy on Trial 'Was Kim Jong-un's Liquor Runner'
A liquor runner? Does one put that on his resume?
18. New KN-23 ballistic missile to boost N. Korea's tactical nuclear capabilities: experts
en.yna.co.kr · by 오석민 · March 26, 2021
We still need to see accurate reporting on what systems were employed on Sunday and Thursday this week.
19. ‘Business as Usual’: North Korea Restarts Ballistic Missile Tests
csis.org · by Victor Cha · April 1, 2021
Like the scorpion and the frog. north Korea is like a scorpion - "it is my nature."
"The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the moden commander..."
- T.E. Lawrence, The Evolution of a Revolt, 1920
"If one wishes to influence American foreign policy, the time to do so is in the formative period, and the level is the middle level of bureaucracy – that of the assistant secretary and his immediate advisers. That is the highest level in which people can still think. Above that, the day to day operation of the machine absorbs most of the energy, and the decisions that are made depend very much on internal pressures of the bureaucracy."
- Henry Kissinger, Bureaucracy and Policy Making (1968)
"War in the age of technological integration and globalization has eliminated the right of weapons to label war and, with regard to the new starting point, has realigned the relationship of weapons to war, while the appearance of weapons of new concepts, and particularly new concepts of weapons, has gradually blurred the face of war. Does a single "hacker" attack count as a hostile act or not? Can using financial instruments to destroy a country's economy be seen as a battle? . . .Obviously, proceeding with the traditional definition of war in mind, there is no longer any way to answer the above questions. When we suddenly realize that all these non-war actions may be the new factors constituting future warfare, we have to come up with a new name for this new form of war: Warfare which transcends all boundaries and limits, in short: unrestricted warfare."
- Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing, 1999