News and Commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and Published by Daniel Riggs
1. ODNI Releases 2021 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community
2. Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense in the Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia
3. Will Afghanistan Become a Terrorism Safe Haven Once Again?
4. Afghanistan’s Situation Didn’t Change. American Politics Did
5. That Suburban Home Buyer Could Be a Foreign Government
6. China Poses Biggest Threat to U.S., Intelligence Report Says
7. Israelis May Ban High Tech Cars From Bases: ‘Perfect Espionage Vector’
8. National Defense Strategy 'unrealistic,' says House Armed Services chairman
9. Misinformation in the Military Community and the Next National Security Strategy
10. American Vulnerabilities in an Age of Great Power Competition: The Case for Understanding Domestic Extremism through an Irregular Warfare Lens
11. Getting Serious About Women, Peace & Security
12. Opinion | Biden takes the easy way out of Afghanistan. The likely result is disaster.
13. Biden’s Afghan Exit
14. Japan Is Now Our Most Important Ally. Here’s Why.
15. Big changes coming to Army Stryker brigades
16. Personnel spending cuts won’t help military readiness, key lawmaker warn
17. Number of US Troops Linked to Domestic Terror Plots Small but Growing
18. Would Russia Invade Ukraine and China Invade Taiwan Simultaneously?
19. Troops are Leaving Afghanistan. Can the U.S. Still Advise Afghan Security Forces?
20. China’s Dystopian “New IP” Plan Shows Need for Renewed US Commitment to Internet Governance
21. FDD | Diplomatic Malpractice: Reforming the WHO After China’s COVID Cover-up
22. FDD | Biden Administration Nominates Key Cyber Personnel
23. ‘Last Out: Elegy of a Green Beret’ adapted to film
24. Secret and Careful: How America Spied On Imperial Japan in China
25. The Special Forces op that supported the 2003 invasion of Iraq
26. Intelligence officials reassert their role post-Trump
1. ODNI Releases 2021 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community
odni.gov · by ODNI Office of Strategic Communications
The 27 page unclassified report here:
Excerpts: “Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang have demonstrated the capability and intent to advance their interests at the expense of the United States and its allies, despite the pandemic. China increasingly is a near-peer competitor, challenging the United States in multiple arenas—especially economically, militarily, and technologically—and is pushing to change global norms. Russia is pushing back against Washington where it can globally, employing techniques up to and including the use of force. Iran will remain a regional menace with broader malign influence activities, and North Korea will be a disruptive player on the regional and world stages. Major adversaries and competitors are enhancing and exercising their military, cyber, and other capabilities, raising the risks to US and allied forces, weakening our conventional deterrence, and worsening the longstanding threat from weapons of mass destruction.
NORTH KOREAN PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un may take a number of aggressive and potentially destabilizing actions to reshape the regional security environment and drive wedges between the United States and its allies—up to and including the resumption of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) testing.
· We assess that Kim views nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent against foreign intervention and believes that over time he will gain international acceptance and respect as a nuclear power. He probably does not view the current level of pressure on his regime as enough to require a fundamental change in its approach.
· Kim also aims to achieve his goals of gaining prestige, security, and acceptance as a nuclear power through conventional military modernization efforts, nuclear weapon and missile development, foreign engagement, sanctions-evasion, and cyber capabilities.
Military Capabilities
North Korea will pose an increasing threat to the United States, South Korea, and Japan as it continues to improve its conventional military capabilities, providing Kim with diverse tools to advance his political objectives or inflict heavy losses if North Korea were attacked.
· Pyongyang portrayed a growing and more diverse strategic and tactical ballistic missile force during its January 2021 and October 2020 military parades.
WMD
North Korea will be a WMD threat for the foreseeable future, because Kim remains strongly committed to the country’s nuclear weapons, the country is actively engaged in ballistic missile research and development, and Pyongyang’s CBW efforts persist.
· Despite announcing an end to North Korea’s self-imposed moratorium on nuclear weapons and ICBM testing in December 2019, Kim thus far has not conducted long-range missile testing and has left the door open to future denuclearization talks with the United States. Kim may be considering whether to resume long-range missile or nuclear testing this year to try to force the United States to deal with him on Pyongyang’s terms.
Cyber
North Korea’s cyber program poses a growing espionage, theft, and attack threat.
· Pyongyang probably possesses the expertise to cause temporary, limited disruptions of some critical infrastructure networks and disrupt business networks in the United States, judging from its operations during the past decade, and it may be able to conduct operations that compromise software supply chains.
North Korea has conducted cyber theft against financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges worldwide, potentially stealing hundreds of millions of dollars, probably to fund government priorities, such as its nuclear and missile programs.
2. Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense in the Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
Some doctrinal background on UW and FID.
The two key Title 10 special operations missions are unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. Below are four key definitions from the JP 1-02.
The definitions are short and simple. The UW definition was shortened by a USSOCOM working group in 2009 because the CDR, USSOCOM at the time wanted an easy to articulate and easily understood definition of UW to improve understanding and acceptance outside of SOF. However, this sacrificed more detailed understanding and a certain level of intellectual rigor. In reality if a practitioner wants to know more about the concepts he/she has to go to the relevant doctrinal manual but of course few outside the SOF community do so (and probably many within the SOF community do not do so either). However, up until 1997 DOD used to produce something called the Joint Encyclopedia which I believe served as the bridge between the DOD Dictionary and detailed doctrinal publications.
Below I have provided the terms from the current JP 1-02 followed by the entries in the Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia. UW and FID are two of the most misunderstood and undervalued special operations missions and the reason for that is few outside of the SF and SOF community read the doctrine. However, if we would resurrect the Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia we might be able to provide useful information to help understand the UW and FID missions (and all the other concepts well beyond SOF in the 737 page encyclopedia). These entries provide another level of description and understanding of the concepts in the DOD Dictionary.
I think you can see that UW in particular is a very comprehensive and robust mission and not just about overthrowing a government with guerrilla forces which is the subconscious definition for most people.
I offer these Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia entries as a "public service" for those who want to have a better understanding of the UW and FID missions but cannot do the deep dive necessary in the doctrine. I would argue that these are critical concepts for irregular warfare, support to political warfare and campaigns as part of Great Power Competition and operations in the "gray zone."
From the January 2021 Joint Pub 2-01 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
special forces — United States Army forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare capabilities. Also called SF. (JP 3-05)
subversion — Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority. See also unconventional warfare. (JP 3-24)
unconventional warfare — Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Also called UW. (JP 3-05)
foreign internal defense — Participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID. (JP 3-22)
This is an excerpt from the Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia which is still posted on the DTIC web site. The latest version is from 1997.
3. Will Afghanistan Become a Terrorism Safe Haven Once Again?
The New York Times · by Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt · April 13, 2021
And what if it does sooner rather than later? What is our response?
4. Afghanistan’s Situation Didn’t Change. American Politics Did
defenseone.com · by Kevin Baron
A very interesting question in the subtitle. Can we fight terrorism in a new way?
5. That Suburban Home Buyer Could Be a Foreign Government
WSJ · by Konrad Putzier
I have been observing a lot of homes in suburban Alexandria being sold very quickly at very high prices. Now I wonder if foreign governments are buying these.
Excerpts: “Today, more U.S. real-estate companies and Wall Street firms are buying in bulk or building single-family rental homes specifically for rentals, allowing foreign investors to back them with large sums of money.
Home builder Lennar Corp. , for example, recently launched a venture to buy single-family rental homes across the country. The company said it already has commitments from investors for $1.25 billion and will use that to buy $4 billion worth of homes. A number of these investors are based or affiliated with companies abroad, say people familiar with the matter. That includes Allianz Real Estate, a subsidiary of the German insurance giant, which said it committed $300 million.
In the U.S., Allianz had focused mostly on office skyscrapers in big cities, which tend to be easier to buy and sell. It then branched out to warehouses and apartments. The firm started discussions with Lennar about the venture in early 2020.
Unlike a decade ago, when investors bought foreclosed homes and those already occupied, the focus is now on newly built properties. “The lack of institutional ownership just shows you how difficult it is to get into the market,” said Christoph Donner, who heads Allianz Real Estate’s North America business.
6. China Poses Biggest Threat to U.S., Intelligence Report Says
The New York Times · by Julian E. Barnes · April 13, 2021
Excerpts: “Typically, the director of national intelligence delivers the threat assessment to Congress and releases a written report alongside it. But no declassified assessment was issued last year, as the Trump administration’s intelligence agencies sought to avoid angering the White House.
In 2019, Dan Coats, then the director of national intelligence, delivered an analysis of threats from Iran, North Korea and the Islamic State that was at odds with President Donald J. Trump’s views. The testimony prompted Mr. Trump to lash out on Twitter, admonishing his intelligence chiefs to “go back to school.”
Avril D. Haines, the director of national intelligence; William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director; and other top intelligence officials will testify about the report on Wednesday and Thursday.
“The American people should know as much as possible about the threats facing our nation and what their intelligence agencies are doing to protect them,” said Ms. Haines, whose office released the report.
7. Israelis May Ban High Tech Cars From Bases: ‘Perfect Espionage Vector’
breakingdefense.com · by Arie Egozi and Brad D. Williams · April 13, 2021
Wow. This is an interesting OPSEC problem.
Excerpts: “Some countries, including China, have already banned Tesla cars from entering military bases. This has prompted Tesla and its CEO Elon Musk to publicly defend the company.
The company’s Beijing office issued a statement regarding its onboard cameras on Chinese microblogging site Weibo. Last month, speaking virtually at the China Development Forum, Musk said, “If a commercial company did engage in spying, the negative effects to that company would be extremely bad.” He added the company would be “shut down everywhere.”
But Tesla, the company, as a threat actor is only part of the concern for military services. Another, perhaps far more serious threat, would be other governments hacking the cars as a means of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance on bases — or for more reckless or dangerous purposes. In particular, Iran has not shied away from conducting destructive and reckless cyberattacks against its regional adversaries in the past. Following an Israeli cyberattack on Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility on Sunday, tensions are high between Israel and Iran.
If the IDF does ban cars, the leased cars and those owned by the IDF and equipped with cameras and GPS may be parked outside the bases that will operate shuttle services from the main gate. The IDF and other sensitive facilities stopped the use of video equipment made in China several years ago after some experts said that some of these systems had a “backdoor” that could enable someone to see what the video equipment sees.
Other security experts told Breaking Defense that the danger of hacking military systems calls for “hardening” certain subsystems that may be affected remotely by hostile parties.
The IDF is operating a massive cyber defense operation, but experts who spoke with Breaking Defense said that while main systems are protected, the danger can be posed by “basic threats” like connected cars.
8. National Defense Strategy 'unrealistic,' says House Armed Services chairman
Stars and Stripes · by Sarah Cammarata · April 13, 2021
The key question and the essence of strategy: What is truly necessary and possible?
Excerpts: “Smith argued the document’s long list of aims – winning an “all-out” war with China, countering Russian aggression, bolstering the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and deterring North Korea – is not only extremely costly, but requires more military personnel to achieve than the U.S. has now.
“We don’t have the people to meet that many different needs, to fight that many battles at the same time… we’re sort of perpetually chasing our tail,” he said.
Smith said, for example, combatant commanders frequently complain that requests they make for forces, whether that includes aircraft carriers, troops, drones or planes, go unfilled.
“We need to get back to a core principle of what is truly necessary and what is possible,” the congressman said.
9. Misinformation in the Military Community and the Next National Security Strategy
thestrategybridge.org · by Matthew G. Butler · April 14, 2021
This is analysis I did not expect. Some food for thought.
Conclusion: “In conclusion, the next National Security Strategy must address misinformation within the military community. If the next National Security Strategy forces that introspection, military leaders can work toward possible solutions throughout the community. Secretary Austin committed “to rid our ranks of racists and extremists” during his Senate confirmation hearing.[26] Furthermore, Austin emphasized the criticality of fighting internal threats within the military to ensure the Department of Defense could fight external adversaries.[27] Misinformation creates fog and friction in the battlespace of the mind. The National Security Strategy sets the tone throughout the national security enterprise and, specifically, provides senior leadership guidance to thwart misinformation among service members, veterans, and military family members. Lastly, misinformation must be addressed throughout the continuum of military affiliation, crossing multiple departments from Defense to Veterans Affairs and into broader society. Twenty percent of the arrested and charged January Insurrectionists were veterans spurred by misinformation to join hundreds of individual threats (in the form of fellow Americans) to national security.[28] The next National Security Strategy can serve as a response to a genuine need in the military community as well as defense against potential domestic insurgents.”
10. American Vulnerabilities in an Age of Great Power Competition: The Case for Understanding Domestic Extremism through an Irregular Warfare Lens
mwi.usma.edu · by Wes J. Bryant · April 14, 2021
Conclusion: “In examining how we can better protect our nation, its interests, and the American people, the United States must make a deliberate shift inward to assess domestic vulnerabilities from the perspective of those who can, and will, exploit them. Perhaps it is even more fitting, in this context, to borrow wisdom from the rich cultural and military history of one of those very adversaries, for as Sun Tzu reminds us: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”
11. Getting Serious About Women, Peace & Security
thestrategybridge.org · Joan Johnson-Freese and Nalani Tyrrell · April 13, 2021
Excerpts: “During the May 2019 House Intelligence hearing, more transparent strategies in granting security clearances, clear feedback from promotion boards, and more blind hiring practices were raised by intelligence community representatives for implementation within the intelligence community. Those procedures, and committed leadership at every level, will further promote inclusive diversity in the intelligence community. The military should make similarly appropriate efforts as well, as cogently pointed out by a female member of the Air Force cyber warriors team, else risk an even bigger shortage of cyber specialists than already expected.
Leadership at all security related organizations must—perhaps for the first time—read and commit to implementation of the Women, Peace and Security framework for entrenched policies and practices to change. They must understand and assure their subordinates do as well, that implementation of the Women, Peace and Security framework is not a “nice thing to do” but a 21st century security imperative. Including it in the National Security Strategy is a good way to assure that happens.”
12. Opinion | Biden takes the easy way out of Afghanistan. The likely result is disaster.
The Washington Post · by the Editorial Board · April 13, 2021
The Washington Post Editorial Board is critical of President Biden's decision.
13. Biden’s Afghan Exit
WSJ · by the Editorial Board ·April 13, 2021
The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board is also critical of President Biden's decision.
14. Japan Is Now Our Most Important Ally. Here’s Why.
hudson.org · by Kenneth R. Weinstein
This may not be helpful with our broader alliance structure. Our Korean allies may have an emotional response to this. We have avoided the "rating" by calling our alliances the cornerstone (Japan) and linchpin (Korea).
15. Big changes coming to Army Stryker brigades
armytimes.com · by Todd South · April 13, 2021
Excerpts: “Speaking at the annual Maneuver Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate out of the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, on April 7, Mason laid out both the changes to the formation and gear that SBCT soldiers will see in the near and long-term future.
For soldiers, some of the bigger changes will come in the setup of the formation.
The Army plans to add an electronic warfare platoon, a cyberspace electromagnetic activities cell, drones, additive manufacturing and drone maintenance platoons, an additional platoon to each cavalry squadron, two more artillery guns per battery, a third engineer company, robotic combat vehicle operators and an attached Mobile Short-Range Air Defense from the division level.”
16. Personnel spending cuts won’t help military readiness, key lawmaker warn
militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · April 13, 2021
Pennywise and pound foolish. Servicemembers will pay the bill.
17. Number of US Troops Linked to Domestic Terror Plots Small but Growing
voanews.com · by Jeff Seldin
Based on Seth Jones' recent CSIS report.
18. Would Russia Invade Ukraine and China Invade Taiwan Simultaneously?
19fortyfive.com · by Daniel Davis · April 11, 2021
Daniel Davis provides us with one very worst case planning scenario.
19. Troops are Leaving Afghanistan. Can the U.S. Still Advise Afghan Security Forces?
realcleardefense.com · by Alexander Powell
Sure. We will call them advisors and not combat troops and put a force cap on the mission and then forget about it.
But seriously, this is a discussion of a concept of a "remote advisory cell."
Conclusion: “In conclusion, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State remain present in Afghanistan, and the U.S. retains an enduring interest in keeping counterterrorism pressure on those groups. As long as the Taliban waver on their counterterrorism commitments, the Afghan Air Force and SOF are the United States’ chief and best options for conducting counterterrorism operations absent a U.S. troop presence on the ground. A remote advisory cell is a feasible option for maintaining security cooperation relationships with critical Afghan partner units, though it should adhere to the common features identified above to be as effective as possible. The Taliban, meanwhile, are unlikely to readily accept the establishment of a remote advisory cell, limiting the idea’s utility to specific circumstances. Even so, a remote advisory cell may have domestic political benefits given the increased force protection and likely reduced costs it would afford over the current U.S. footprint in Afghanistan.”
20. China’s Dystopian “New IP” Plan Shows Need for Renewed US Commitment to Internet Governance
Just Security · by Mark Montgomery and Theo Lebryk · April 13, 2021
Conclusion: “The United States cannot afford a similar failure to compete, as was the case in international fora associated with 5G development and international cybercrime. Chinese dominance in standardization will cost American firms market share and can open the door for more Chinese backdoors around the globe. Huawei dominance on New IP and 6G would not only create a less free, less interoperable internet, it would pave the way for authoritarian governments to gain expanded say over future changes to the internet for years to come.
The Chinese New IP proposal can be successfully contested, but only if the United States rallies its private-industry partners and like-minded international democratic governments to the cause. They must all work together to collectively rein in the threat of authoritarian governments using multilateral institutions such as the ITU to export their vision of the internet worldwide before it is too late.”
21. FDD | Diplomatic Malpractice: Reforming the WHO After China’s COVID Cover-up
fdd.org · by Craig Singleton · April 13, 2021
Excerpt: “The anniversary of the first COVID-19 lockdowns came and went, and yet the world remains no closer to understanding the virus’ true origins. Nor is the WHO positioned to respond more effectively to the next global pandemic, which may be only years, not decades, away. Chinese authorities have actively obstructed the investigation into COVID-19’s origins and deserve ample condemnation for putting global health at risk. Yet the WHO also bears substantial responsibility for the current impasse. It has resisted multiple efforts to implement reforms after previous failures to deal effectively with outbreaks of infectious diseases, including SARS and Ebola. Nor does the WHO’s current leadership appear capable of standing up to member states such as China that undermine its work. Finally, the United States bears some responsibility for the WHO’s flawed performance, since Washington has donated billions of taxpayer dollars to the organization without demanding any accountability in return. After the devastation wrought by COVID-19, continued engagement without a serious campaign for WHO reform would be nothing short of diplomatic malpractice.”
22. FDD | Biden Administration Nominates Key Cyber Personnel
fdd.org · by Mark Montgomery · April 13, 2021
23. ‘Last Out: Elegy of a Green Beret’ adapted to film
armytimes.com · by Harm Venhuizen · April 14, 2021
24. Secret and Careful: How America Spied On Imperial Japan in China
The National Interest · by Warfare History Network · April 13, 2021
Some often overlooked history of the OSS in WWII.
25. The Special Forces op that supported the 2003 invasion of Iraq
wearethemighty.com · by Miguel Ortiz · March 19, 2021
An often overlooked mission.
26. Intelligence officials reassert their role post-Trump
CNN · by Katie Bo Williams, Kylie Atwood and Zachary Cohen
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"I have noticed that nothing I never said ever did me any harm."
- Calvin Coolidge
"I will not disgrace the soldier's arms, nor abandon the comrade who stands at my side, but whether alone or with many,
I will fight to defend things sacred and profane.
I will hand down my country not lessened, but larger and better than I have received it."
- Athenian Oath
"I cannot give birth to wisdom myself and the accusation that many make against me, that while I question other, I myself bring nothing wise to light due to my lack of wisdom, is accurate. The reason for this is as follows: God forces me to serve as a midwife and prevents me from giving brith."
- Socrates