News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Daniel Riggs
1. Alternate Paths to Resuming Negotiations With North Korea
2. Not No, But Not Yet: Pyongyang Reacts to Washington’s Reaction
3. South Korean President Moon Jae-in Makes One Last Attempt to Heal His Homeland
4. U.S. will lead with diplomacy to mitigate threats from N. Korea: Austin
5. North Korea seeks more concessions from US: experts
6. North Korea says it won't engage in talks with U.S. that would get nowhere
7. 'This Is a Window of Opportunity.' Ret. General Vincent K. Brooks on Why Things Might Be Moving Again With North Korea
8. North Korea executes 10 people who 'secretly used phones to call outside world'
9. North Korea's food supply in crisis as imports from China drop 90 percent
10. Can Kim Jung Un Survive North Korea's Next 'Arduous March?'
11. North Korea: The long-awaited fallout of summit diplomacy
12. Kim not exaggerating the food shortage; it’s bad
13. ＜Breaking News Inside N. Korea＞ Markets in turmoil across the country. Trading suspended as food prices hit year high and fears of what will happen next grow.
14. North Korea ramps up crackdowns on "non-socialist and anti-socialist behavior" in border region
15. S. Korea, U.S. agree to be ready for 'concrete' action if N. Korea responds to dialogue offer: source
16. Seoul city OKs relocation plan of U.S. embassy in Gwanghwamun to former USFK site
17. Relocation of U.S. embassy to Yongsan gets closer
18. North Korea Has Collapsed: The Headline You Don't Want to Ever See
1. Alternate Paths to Resuming Negotiations With North Korea
38north.org · by Joseph R. Detrani · June 23, 2021
Conclusion: “Regardless of how skeptical one may be about North Korea’s willingness to denuclearize, the options for dealing with North Korea are finite: negotiations with the goal of complete and verifiable denuclearization, in return for a path to normal relations; acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state with the myriad of national security risks this would entail; or containing and further sanctioning North Korea while enhancing our deterrence posture in the region, with greater missile defense deployments and a likely discussion of the re-introduction of tactical nuclear weapons in the region. Stumbling into accidental conflict on the Korean Peninsula is a real possibility once we stop negotiating, assuming we do not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state and do not engage the North in arms control negotiations.
Unilaterally or multilaterally re-engaging with North Korea to establish a road map for verifiable denuclearization of a North Korea that wants normal relations with the US would continue to be the best approach for dealing with a nuclear North Korea.
2. Not No, But Not Yet: Pyongyang Reacts to Washington’s Reaction
38north.org · by 38 North · June 23, 2021
Interesting (and hopeful) analysis: “In other words, “meaningless” contact is out, but by implication, more substantive talks are still possible. It is also conceivable that, at least in part, with the COVID restrictions still in place and face-to-face diplomatic contact not possible anyway, Pyongyang is throwing up this objection to “meaningless contact” as an excuse to buy time until it is ready. Although, over the years, Pyongyang has often said—and actually sometimes meant—it didn’t want talks for talks’ sake.
3. South Korean President Moon Jae-in Makes One Last Attempt to Heal His Homeland
TIME · by Charlie Campbell
It is very difficult for me to accept this statement from President Moon. To me this illustrates the problem we have in the alliance - the differing views on the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. Kim Jong-un as "honest?" Really?: “Asked about Kim’s character, Moon found him “very honest … very enthusiastic [and] one with strong determination” who has “a good idea of what is going on around the world.” But lest we forget, this is the same man who murdered his uncle and half brother in cold blood and, according to a landmark 2014 U.N. Commission of Inquiry, presides over “crimes against humanity” including extermination, torture, rape and causing prolonged starvation.”
4. U.S. will lead with diplomacy to mitigate threats from N. Korea: Austin
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · June 24, 2021
Another statement at the SECDEF and CJCS HASC hearing yesterday that went unnoticed by the US press.
5. North Korea seeks more concessions from US: experts
The Korea Times · by Jung Da-min · June 24, 2021
Exactly right. KJU is trying to shape the environment to be able to successfully demand sanctions relief and other concessions in return for a promise to talk. He continues his long con, political warfare, and blackmail diplomacy. We need to see his words and actions for what they really are.
6. North Korea says it won't engage in talks with U.S. that would get nowhere
The Hill · by Lexi Lonas · June 23, 2021
I am sure someone will create some memes for KJU and his road to nowhere.
7. 'This Is a Window of Opportunity.' Ret. General Vincent K. Brooks on Why Things Might Be Moving Again With North Korea
TIME · by Charlie Campbell
8. North Korea executes 10 people who 'secretly used phones to call outside world'
Mirror · by Chris Kitching · June 23, 2021
Information and communication is an existential threat to the regime.
9. North Korea's food supply in crisis as imports from China drop 90 percent
Newsweek · by Rebecca Klapper · June 23, 2021
This is part of KJU trying to shape the environment to get sanctions relief. Yes I think there is tremendous suffering inside north Korea and I agree it is a rare admission by KJU that things are bad. But he may be trying to appeal to our humanitarian instincts to try to coerce or co-opt us into providing concessions. Furthermore this reinforces the beliefs of those who advocate sanctions relief in order to bring KJU to the negotiating table. This can help drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance which is one of the critical lines of effort for the regime.
Also, note the comments on the public distribution system (PDS). It failed during the arduous march of the famine of the 1990s. And it has been the market activity that replaced the PDS that has helped the people to survive. But in the name of COVID defense the regime has cut off legal and illicit trade with China and this is severely impacting market activity. It cannot be replaced by the PDS.
Excerpts: “The World Food Program (WFP) said in a 2021 report that North Korea has had one "food crisis" and one "major food crisis" in the last five years, while also acknowledging there is limited reliable data for the country.
Peter Ward, an expert on the North Korean economy and contributor to NK Pro, told NK News that the official admission of a food crisis is rare, and signifies how difficult the situation is.
North Korean officials have spoke about guaranteeing distribution and processing of grain, which Ward told NK News sounds like a reintroduction of the public distribution system (PDS). The PDS was a ration system introduced during the Cold War to adequately provide for all citizens. It largely collapsed during the famine in the 1990s.
"It sounds like they're doubling down on the PDS, it's not clear exactly what they're going to do, but I do think that stricter control of the food system and the utilization of strategic food reserves or dumping strategic reserves into the PDS in the short run — with the hope that they can reopen the border in a couple of months and replenish their stocks with Chinese aid — is probably what's going on," Ward said.
10. Can Kim Jung Un Survive North Korea's Next 'Arduous March?'
The National Interest · by Mitchell Lerner · June 23, 2021
Probably. Unless some outside forces want to push the regime through instability and to collapse. But China will likely do everything it can to prevent the failure of hee regime.
Excerpts: “These lessons from the past carry a warning for those who see opportunity in the current situation. As it has in the past, the Kim family will likely emerge from this crisis just as firmly in control as it has been for decades. Signs are already suggesting a similar playbook is being engaged. As conditions worsen, a domestic crackdown is underway, as is a campaign to lobby verbal assaults against its traditional enemy across the Pacific. More provocative steps can be expected to follow, designed largely for domestic consumption as a means of rallying the people behind their leaders and re-directing their sense of grievance away from the Korean shores.
In the end, then, the North’s future seems to promise a selfish and perfidious stability at the top and a painful instability for everyone else. The more things change, the more they stay the same.
11. North Korea: The long-awaited fallout of summit diplomacy
lowyinstitute.org · by Khang Vu
Perhaps after three meetings with an American president KJU thinks he can demand to only meet with a US president.
But I don't think he will ever agree to a summit unless it includes significant sanctions relief up front. And that is what KJU is trying to do - push the US toward sanctions relief in the hope that the administration will realize the only way for diplomacy to advance is through giving concessions. And the push for concessions has an added longer term strategic benefit for the regime and that is it can help to drive a wedge in the alliance.
Conclusion: “North Korea must now decide its next step. South Korea is willing to offer a big upfront “payment” to restart the process, but international sanctions have long been an obstacle, and the US looks unlikely to budge. If Trump could offer huge initial concessions to North Korea and the summits still failed, Pyongyang sees no need to quickly agree to Biden’s outreach at a much cheaper price with even lower odds of success. North Korea may be exploring ways to nudge Biden towards increasing the rewards by hinting it is not against dialogue altogether. But the latest moves are yet another reminder that when it comes to diplomacy with North Korea, money talks.
12. Kim not exaggerating the food shortage; it’s bad
asiatimes.com · by Bradley K. Martin · June 24, 2021
Yes, he is not exaggerating it but he is exploiting it.
13. ＜Breaking News Inside N. Korea＞ Markets in turmoil across the country. Trading suspended as food prices hit year high and fears of what will happen next grow.
A failed economy caused by KJU's decisions. And it is made worse because there is no mechanism to solve these problems.
14. North Korea ramps up crackdowns on "non-socialist and anti-socialist behavior" in border region
dailynk.com · by Kim Yoo Jin · June 24, 2021
I stand corrected. The regime believes it does have a way to solve its problems: through more ideological training.
15. S. Korea, U.S. agree to be ready for 'concrete' action if N. Korea responds to dialogue offer: source
en.yna.co.kr · by 김승연 · June 24, 2021
Of course, KJU wants to see the concrete action before he will agree to talks.
16. Seoul city OKs relocation plan of U.S. embassy in Gwanghwamun to former USFK site
en.yna.co.kr · by 장동우 · June 24, 2021
I wonder how the Koreans with anti-American sentiment will react to this. Wil see a sustained protest presence? Although the location is in a very small section of the old Camp Coiner I think most Koreans probably believe all of Yongsan is being returned.
17. Relocation of U.S. embassy to Yongsan gets closer
koreajoongangdaily.joins.com · by Harry Kazianis · June 24, 2021
Embassy rendering and map at the link.
18. North Korea Has Collapsed: The Headline You Don't Want to Ever See
19fortyfive.com · by Harry Kazianis · June 23, 2021
Yes, be careful what you wish for. But it is a real possibility that must be addressed with prior preparation. As Cohen and Gooach wrote, all military failure (and I would include national security failures) result from a failure to learn, a failure to adapt, and a failure to anticipate. Not enough policy makers and planners are anticipating this possible contingency.
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The Coming of War
The First Assaults
In spite of a year of continuous psychological and political pressure and a number of military false alarms, the actual invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 came as a surprise. Many of the KMAG advisors and ROKA officers and men were on passes and spending the weekend in Seoul and other towns. Of the four divisions and one regiment assigned to the defensive positions south of the 38th Parallel, only four regiments and one battalion were actually at the front. The remainder were located in positions well to the rear.1
Early on the morning of the 25th, elements of the ROK 17th Regiment stationed on the Ongjin Peninsula received heavy small arms fire from the North Korean Border Constabulary brigade facing them across the Parallel. (Map I) About 0400 high-explosive artillery and mortar shells began to fall on the ROK lines in increasing numbers.2 For over an hour the North Koreans continued a tremendous barrage. After the initial stunning shock, the ROK defenders rallied and returned fire, but, as dawn broke with overcast skies at 0530, elements of the North Korean (N.K.) 6th Division passed through the Border Constabulary and attacked in force. Soon they had annihilated an entire ROK battalion and had compelled the remnants of the 17th Regiment to fall back toward the sea.3
-Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, by Major Robert K. Swayer
Paik Sun Yup (1920–2020) was only twenty-nine years old when the war broke out in Korea in 1950, but he was already a colonel and the commander of the First Division of the army of the Republic of Korea (ROK; South Korea). On the scene from the first day of conflict, Paik would be one of the principal players in the war until its end three years later. A highly talented military leader, he had been trained as a soldier in Manchuria, a large territory in northern China, and had served in the Manchurian army in World War II (1939–45). During the Korean War, Paik became Korea's first four-star general.
...
On the day of the invasion, however, Paik had been away from the ROK First for ten days, attending infantry school in Seoul. When he learned of the attack, he hurried to ROK headquarters. He soon learned that a good portion of his division had been given leave while he was away. When he got to the battlefront he found his Thirteenth Regiment fighting well, although just beginning an orderly withdrawal. The Eleventh Regiment, which had been on reserve, was beginning to muster its soldiers and appear on the scene. But the Twelfth Regiment had been almost entirely wiped out near the border town of Kaesong.
- From a review of From Pusan To Panmunjom: Wartime Memoirs Of The Republic Of Korea's First Four-Star General
"History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap"
-Ronald Reagan