2 January SWJ Roundup

The David Ignatius piece "Transforming Military Might into 21st-century Weapons" in the Washington Post is interesting, but we shouldn't become too mesmerized by high-tech. I remember during the Kosovo intervention in 1999 when a retired Army field grade officer told me the future of land warfare was in stand-off weapons and that Infantry combat was a thing of the past. That was back when the Army was "Transforming" itself with net-centric communications-electronics systems.

Pete,

Understand your point that the "Revolution of Military Affairs" and FCS went way too far. Nevertheless, I still see the Army trying to field I-Phone-like devices to Soldiers and develop applicable apps. More information can be forwarded to tactical Soldiers at the point of the spear than at any time in history.

As Mr. Ignatius points out, whether all in the U.S. military embrace future weapons is irrelevant because China and others will so the DoD must. What becomes a problem is when the ground component rejects advances and claims the fog of war cannot be partially overcome. That just means other air and sea components get all the modernization and ground component naysayers lose opportunities and continue to bear the brunt of casualties.

Given the failed Airborne Chemical Laser Weapon in October mentioned in his Op-Ed, it's unclear how China would dominate us using lasers farther out in space. We recently saw NASA launching an unmanned spacecraft that one can imagine is as capable as anything China might produce.

Similarly, the potential for F-22 and F-35 to employ EW appears equally up to anything China might produce and export. And the more complex systems become, the less likely rogue nations can afford large numbers of them. Meanwhile the DoD likely will field 2000+ F-35s.

The ability of carriers to launch both F-35s and UCAVs is another example of evolving current technology to match future threats. There are certainly challenges in ballistic missile defense using missiles launched from ships but doubt they match that of laser and microwave weapons.

China might consider attempting to solve their smog, transportation, desertification, and aging population problems before they seek war with the U.S. that would only hurt the both of us.

During my year as a participant on the Small Wars Council forum the one topic that seems to dominate most of our discussions is Infantry small-unit tactics and techniques. During the wars of the past decade the U.S. has enjoyed uncontested air and naval superiority, yet we still have trouble defeating enemies armed with AK-47s and RPGs. We keep returning to that age-old question when units become pinned down by fire --"What do we do now?" I don't think the answers are to be found in high-tech.

Pete said: <I>"the one topic that seems to dominate most of our discussions is Infantry small-unit tactics and techniques</I>

True to some extent. But you also frequently see discussions discounting the value of COIN and implying the Army should save itself for major combat operations that are unlikely to occur and are even harder to get to with HBCTs literally on slow boats to China.

If you reject Army capabilities to perform full spectrum ops to include stability ops (that civilians can't do without security contractors), and MCO is highly unlikely, there is little reason to retain a large Army.

I've also noted that the Marines seem to have no problem embracing infantry-support technology between the MV-22, F-35B, and EFV. So why is the Army diffferent?

I would submit it comes down to the philosophy that every Marine is an infantryman. In the Army, every Soldier is whatever branch he happens to be in. In the Marines, they even have an aviator commandant because he knows who he supports. The Army probably would never allow that and while the Marines are spending hefty budget sums on MV-22 and F-35B, the Army cannot seem to get funding for a new OH-58D replacement despite the superb work it has performed in Iraq and Afghanistan...to include for Marines.

Special Operations Forces also seem to have no heartburn about cost and capabilities of MH-60/MH-47/AH/MH-6 aircraft.

In addition, the Early Infantry BCT (E-IBCT) Modernization equipment that could have excelled at "Self-Rescue" at Wanat and Keating may get eliminated as well. OP Topside may never have been endangered had it possessed the small unmanned ground vehicle and/or unattended ground sensors placed in the dead space 10 meters to its north and west and farther up the ridge.

The Class I UAS quite likely could have found or deterred the same insurgents attempting to sneak up in dead space and surrounding slopes. NLOS-LS, had it not been terminated quite possibly prematurely, easily could have supported both Afghanistan COPs with precision-fires in close proximity to friendlies and provided support from littoral combat ships.

Only the XM-25 and larger UAS seem to be surviving budget cuts and naysaying. True E-IBCT have had past problems. There has been plenty more to naysay about on the MV-22 and EFV, yet those concepts are sound to a certain number of systems so there was value in pursuing the concept. The same applies with regards to E-IBCT gear, armed aerial scout, and Army UAS. All these systems would support full spectrum operations.

All it takes is an open mind to move forward instead of exclusively living in the past.

I would in turn respectfully submit that there are some very basic issues involving Infanty warfare in the raw that have yet to be fully worked out. The good news is that the solutions would not cost a lot of money because they mainly involve changes in personnel selection, leadership and training; the bad news is that there are no easy answers for what to do when a machine gun has you pinned down.

This is one of those timeless kind of questions that goes way way back, technology notwithstanding. Some things never change; as they say, "Pick Up Your Weapon and Follow Me."

There are only two parts in the Army -- the Infantry and those who support the Infantry. If we can't get the fire and maneuver thing right than everything else the institution does is a big waste of money.

Considering the low casualty rates relative to Vietnam, they must be doing something right with body armor, M-ATV etc. But it just seems wrong to me that the branch with the most casualties and repeated months of deployment is the Army...and yet other branches get all the asymmetric advantages.

Guess part of the idea might be to avoid being in a situation like Wanat where you are immediately pinned down by machine gun and RPG fire. BTW, apologize for the wrong dead space...it was on the north and east, not west. Putting your vehicles behind HESCO and avoiding wooden buildings in your COP probably would not hurt either.

Defense is part of full spectrum ops after all.