In a hastily-assembled hearing tomorrow, Gen. David H. Petraeus will appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee as a prelude to his confirmation as the new top commander in Afghanistan. Petraeus -- author of the military's manual on counterinsurgency warfare, who commanded the counterinsurgency in Iraq -- should, and likely will, receive the unanimous support from the committee. But the hearing should nevertheless be a forum for a penetrating analysis of President Obama's policy in pursuing the war.
Announcing Gen. McChrystal's relief and Petraeus's nomination, the president was emphatic in saying that his action was a change in people, not policy. But the nation-building policy begun by President Bush in Iraq and Afghanistan and continued by Obama, is -- by objective criteria -- failing. It deserves to be dissected publicly, and Petraeus is the best person to explain how it could work. Here are some of the questions that committee members should pose...
Read the five questions at Real Clear Politics.
Update: For ease of commenting here are the five questions as extracted from Jed Babbin's fine article.
1. How can the counterinsurgency succeed unless these sources of funding are cut off?
2. What is the competing cause offered by the Afghan Government, and how can it be made more attractive than the Islamic fundamentalism that has existed in Afghanistan for decades or even centuries?
3. What are the major advantages and disadvantages you foresee in Afghanistan and how do they compare with those you faced in Iraq?
4. Can the counterinsurgency succeed without first terminating Iran's lethal assistance to the Taliban?
5. The next major Afghanistan policy review will occur in December. What measures of success or failure do you believe should be applied in December to decide the way forward?
Please see the original article for commentary and insights that accompany the questions.
Comments
Question 1: A very good question. Attention should also be paid as to how to bring pressure to bear on major players by restricting their access to funds held outside of Afghanistan.
Question 2 is too simplistic in its underlying analysis. Afghanistan is a network of insurgencies and Islamic Fundamentalism is in my opinion not the dominant theme for them. "In a country with a relatively poor record of central government, how can this be made a more attractive and pertinent proposition" is a better question.
Question 3. I see no advantages, only disadvantages (geography, society, types of insurgencies, weak government, confused coalition civilian effort et al)
Question 4. I am confused, I would have though that the Pakistan issue is more pressing then the Iranian.
Question 5. Perhaps the Administration should clarify what a successful conclusion to the campaign would be?
I think question 4 would be useful if the word "Pakistan" were substituted for the word "Iran." The Taliban cannot survive without the firm and sustained backing of the Pakistani Army/ISI. And I wonder if we can beat it if that backing continues. It can survive without Iran's.
Question 2 assumes the distorted version of Islam that appeals to some rural Pathans has equal appeal to the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and all other Pathans. I'm not sure that is the case.
Potential answer to Question #2:
Economic Improvements.
The achievement of which, however, will require that the Afghan people agree to [1] significant societal changes and [2] significant exposure to foreign peoples, foreign goods and services, and [3] foreign ideas.
In this regard, consider GEN Petraeus' endorsement of a "Modern Silk Road" concept for Afghanistan:
"Sound strategy demands the use of all instruments of power. The vision for Afghanistan and the region makes a compelling case that transportion and trade can help restore the central role of Afghanistan in Central Asia. By once again becoming a transport hub, Afghanistan can regain economic viability and thrive as it did in the days of the Silk Road."
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/silkroadpapers/1005Afghan.pdf (Page 5)
It remains to be seen, however, whether the vision that WE have for Afghanistan and the region (Modern Silk Road/transport hub: In support of the global economy) is something that the Afghan people can or will buy in to.