A 3-Star General Explains 'Why We Lost' In Iraq, Afghanistan

The reason why we "lost" in Iraq and Afghanistan was based on the miscalculation of our then-national leaders; this, due to hubris. Let me explain:

Item I - What Our National Leaders Thought:

Our national leaders embarked upon these activities believing that the appeal of our way of life, our way of governance and our underlying values, attitudes and beliefs -- and the offer of same to the Afghans and Iraqis -- would allow that, quickly and easily:

a. Our enemies would be defeated and

b. The states and societies of Afghanistan and Iraq would be transformed -- and re-formed -- more along modern western political, economic and social lines.

Herein, our national leaders believing that the military would only have to, after regime change, deal with a few "losers" / "dead-enders." Thus, relatively small and short-term operations.

Item II - What Our National Leaders Learned:

Our national leaders soon came to understand that our "universal values," our "shining house on the hill" and our offer of same to the Afghans and the Iraqis were as likely -- or indeed more likely -- to:

1. Inflame, widen, and deepen these conflicts.

2. Increase the size and resolve of our enemies and

3. Cause the states and societies of Afghanistan, Iraq -- and elsewhere -- to be transformed more along NON-western political, economic and social lines.

Thus, the miscalculation I have identified above, and our realization of same, provided that we either had to:

a. Ramp our effort up substantially. (This being something that our national leaders were not, for financial and other reasons, prepared to do.) Or

b. Find some way to back out/get out of Dodge. (This, before we did any more, possibly irreversible, damage.)

So:

What might we say that our military did wrong here?

I would say: Nothing.

They were sent into battle based on a grossly invalid premise. (See my Item I - What Our National Leaders Thought section above.)

After that, their (the military's) job became -- not to "win" -- but, rather, to simply get out of Dodge.

And this (getting out of Dodge) our military would seem to be doing as best they can - based on the errors made by our national leaders -- and their continuing consequences.

Outlaw 09:

<BLOCKQUOTE>"It would be more interesting if he had addressed the overall lack of a strategy and that we both in Iraq and AFG went from one tactical decision to the next tactical decision all the while thinking that it was leading to success and 'victory'."</BLOCKQUOTE>

Without having read General Bolger's book, I nonetheless took the impression from his recent NPR interview (<A HREF="http://www.npr.org/2014/11/09/361746282/a-3-star-general-explains-why-w…;) that he doesn't actually understand strategy. Much of his criticism focuses on the idea that we were somehow fighting the wrong enemies by not focusing the entirety of our efforts on al Qaeda, apparently misunderstanding the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban both before and after 9/11, and misunderstanding the wider strategic context of OIF (discouraging state sponsorship of terrorism, attempting to settle the security dilemma that necessitated an unpopular American military presence in the Gulf, etc.). A few minutes' research shows that he attended the same Army War College that gave Senator John Walsh a master's degree in Strategic Studies; he did so prior to 9/11; and his "strategy research project" focused on a tactical engagement from the Gulf War, drawing lessons on what any competent strategist could only very generously call "operational strategy", vice the grand strategy that he seems to be attempting to comment upon in his book. So, while agreeing with your observation that a discussion of grand strategy would have been more helpful, my impression is that General Bolger doesn't appear to be conversant in grand strategy.

<BLOCKQUOTE>Lastly it would have been really even more interesting if he had finally driven a wooden stake into the heart of COIN as being simply what it was---a failure.</BLOCKQUOTE>

I'd quibble a bit. COIN itself is not a failure, as there are numerous historical examples in which COIN was very effective. With some limited tactical and operational level exceptions, the DoD's implementation of COIN principles in Afghanistan and Iraq has been muddled, lackluster, and typically involved a lot of kicking and screaming. Policy-makers also attempted to draw lessons from failed campaigns such as Algeria and Vietnam, and virtually ignored successful campaigns like the Dhofar Rebellion. A colleague and I were published here at SWJ in an <A HREF="http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/six-requirements-for-success-in-mo… to remedy that shortfall</A>, but the fact remains that the DoD was late to adopt even incoherent COIN principles, and did so only after repeated attempts to throw more conventional warfare at the Afghan and Iraqi campaigns failed to produce satisfactory results. I'm reminded of a presentation that one of my own MSc/Strategic Studies colleagues - not at the Army War College, I might add - gave in which he was able to demonstrate that, no, humanitarian interventions weren't all doomed to failure, the early 1990's efforts in Somalia were just so badly botched as to dissuade the international community from trying it again. COIN is no different: just because America has yet to execute a successful COIN campaign doesn't mean that COIN is impossible; indeed, sometimes it will be necessary in order to achieve critical strategic ends.

Robert C. Jones: Treating terrorism as a criminal issue, while appropriate under some specific circumstances (e.g. the Unabomber, Oklahoma City, or Northern Ireland), has not typically been successful, and tends to "manage" the problem instead of solving it. It also ignores the inconvenient facts that 1) sometimes those with political grievances will use terrorism as an adjunct to guerrilla warfare, and such instances - probably the majority of terrorism, in fact - do not lend themselves to criminal categorization; 2) those motivated by religious, political, and/or ideological imperatives will not be deterred by the threat of legal ramifications. (This also ignores the fact that extraditions are potentially difficult, as various world governments and even the United Nations have yet to agree on the definition of "terrorism".) I'll also point out that your critique of regime change and legitimacy ignores some pretty significant historical examples, most notably Germany and Japan. If anything, the lesson is not that all regime change is illegitimate, but rather, regime change requires a long-term commitment and a credible host nation counterpart.

Also, your point #5 about religion is a popular notion with little basis in fact - although many competing and complementary motives exist, religion is most certainly in the mix, and for many it is the driving force. The idea that Osama bin Laden, Mohammed Omar, or Abu Bakr al Baghdadi aren't legitimately motivated by religion is just plain hogwash. If ISIS/DAESH were called "A Bunch of Angry Dudes", it would have drawn in far fewer recruits.

That said, I think a couple of your points are very important. One is that American foreign policy has been insufficiently adaptive since the end of the Cold War; and the second is that the DoD's focus on, as you phrase it, "magic tactical cure(s)" handicaps efforts to understand and adapt to the overarching strategic context.

Let's start by addressing what "lost" actually means, in strategic terms, to the United States/the West.

"Lost," for the United States/the West, means that the country that they have become involved in will not be successfully transformed more along modern western political, economic and social lines.

Thus:

a. China is "lost" to an other-than-Western political, economic and social system (communism) cir. 1949 and

b. Vietnam is "lost," to this same non-Western system, cir. 1975.

Likewise today, Iraq and Afghanistan may be "lost," to other-than-Western political, economic and social systems, if things continue as they are now.

In this regard consider how, as LTG Bolger points out, the "enemy" comes to be seen not in terms of those who attacked us (AQ) but, rather, as those elements within the populations (the Taliban in Afghanistan; the Sunni Arabs/ISIS/Malaki in Iraq) who stand in the way of our efforts to transform these countries more along modern western lines. In this vein, note LTG Bolger's thoughts below:

"But that's not who we ended up fighting most of the time. Sure, we went after al-Qaida at times. But we ended up fighting the Taliban, which were Pashtun people in Afghanistan who were trying to run that country. We evicted them in 2001. And we ended up fighting Sunni Arab insurgents in Iraq, who, again — although they might make common cause with al-Qaida — those weren't the guys who attacked us on 9/11."

So: What are LTG Bolger's suggestions for "winning," to wit: achieving successful transformation, more along modern western lines, of these and other outlying states and societies? Note his answer below:

"The only way you can win is that the local people have to take the lead, and they have to have the sure knowledge that they've got a long-term U.S. commitment to help them in the things they have trouble with."

And this (a long-term U.S./western commitment, defined as being 50 or more years) the United States/the West WAS NOT prepared to do in China following WWII, WAS NOT prepared to do in Vietnam during the Cold War and, it appears, IS NOT prepared to do re: Iraq and Afghanistan today.

This being the case, then we must -- for Iraq and Afghanistan -- expect the same strategic results as what occurred with the the "loss" of China and Vietnam earlier, to wit:

a. The "locals" will be allowed to "sort it out among themselves" and, thereby,

b. The transformation of these states and societies -- more along modern western political, economic and social lines -- will not be achieved/will be delayed.

Thus, another strategic "loss" for the United States/the West -- much as was the case with China and Vietnam in the 20th Century -- and for much the same reason?

(The common denominator here being that neither China and Vietnam then -- nor Iraq and Afghanistan now -- were/are seen as being of sufficient strategic importance as to warrant a long term [50 or more years] U.S./Western commitment? These such efforts thought to be better directed toward Germany and Japan following WWII -- and toward the Asia-Pacific today?)

While I appreciate LTG Bolger's candor and willingness to stand up and admit we didn't handle this well militarily, I also believe he is still completely missing the strategic reasons for our failures.

This really speaks to the military problem. We can't escape being threat focused, or our Clausewitzian agonizing over how we could have defeated the treat more effectively.

I think we get into more interesting areas of self-analysis when we explore:

1. The inherent problems associated with taking what was essentially a massive criminal event and attempting to achieve justice and prevention of future similar crimes though a war response.

2. The inherent illegitimacy of any government created by an outside military force and how that will naturally drive a revolutionary insurgency response against that government by the population cut out of the political equation.

3. The inherent illegitimacy of any regime change operation, and how the presence of foreign military forces, regardless of how pure they believe their intentions to be, or how "bad" anyone thought the removed regime was, will naturally drive a resistance insurgency response within the population of that place.

4. The fundamental difference between resistance insurgency (a continuation of warfare) and revolutionary insurgency (an internal, populace-based, illegal, political challenge). How the causes and the cures are completely different - even when the insurgents look and act the same; or in many cases are men equally motivated by both lines of causation.

5. That none of this is about religion, even though the parties are divided on religious lines.

6. How a US Foreign Policy designed for a Cold War era world was and is sorely out of step with a rapidly evolving, globalized world. And how policies can create an occupation/resistance insurgency effect very similar to a physical occupation.

I can go on, but my point is that we keep looking to the magic tactical cure that would have allowed us to defeat some threat. And that is not the issue at all.

Finally the concept of "seeing" but "not understanding" is coming home to roost.

It would be more interesting if he had addressed the overall lack of a strategy and that we both in Iraq and AFG went from one tactical decision to the next tactical decision all the while thinking that it was leading to success and "victory".

Lastly it would have been really even more interesting if he had finally driven a wooden stake into the heart of COIN as being simply what it was---a failure.