... Countering terrorists and extremism requires more than a conventional military approach. Military operations enable you to clear areas of extremist and insurgent elements, and to stop them from putting themselves back together. But the core of any counterinsurgency strategy must focus on the fact that the decisive terrain is the human terrain, not the high ground or river crossing.
Focusing on the population can, if done properly, improve security for local people and help to extend basic services. It can help to delegitimise the methods of the extremists - especially if you can contrast your ability and willingness to support and protect the population with the often horrific actions of extremist groups. Indeed, exposing their extremist ideologies, indiscriminate violence and oppressive practices can help people to realise that their lives are unlikely to be improved if under the control of such movements.
For the strategy to work, it is also necessary to find ways to identify reconcilable members of insurgent elements and to transform them into part of the solution...
More at The Times.
Comments
First, DCI P has no business touting his formerly military positional party line in a speech. He is the Director of Central Intelligence, morally and legally obligated to provide intelligence assessments and evaluations to our Executive Branch, not to be America's cheer leader. To this observer, his thinly-veiled future political campaign is becoming less and less veiled.
Second, it is evident that we still have not done a strategic analysis of the revolutionary environment. If DCI P had included that in preparation for his remarks, he would have had to mention the lack of strategic alternatives for the common Afghan tribal and clan leader - that they will eventually turn against the government (if they are not already) because there is no lasting pro-government alternative that does not include dying at the hands of the Taliban within two years after we leave, regardless of the Special Operations component that remains. There is a huge logic-train to follow, but it starts with the fact that the President of Kabul cannot create resources where there are none to be had in order to provide those "basic services" even if he was interested. And, Mr. Director, Karzai is not interested.
I'm not so sure that it has been.
News created for mass consumption is dominated by troop numbers because that is something that the average schmoe can grasp, even if he can't locate Afghanistan on a map. But the discussion among practitioners and people in the know does not appear to have been dominated by troop numbers at all. It is a lot of discussion about whether COIN and/or CT are appropriate, how best to go about attempting them, to what degree nation building is necessary and/or should be attempted, etc.