It's time for a timeout on this. General Petraeus has ordered an investigation so let's back off the prosecutor, judge and jury speculation, please. I want the Paul Harvey version of the 'rest of the story'.
Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell has, arguably, the toughest and most important job in Afghanistan -- training the Afghanistan Security Forces so they -- not us -- can fight the good fight. General Caldwell, I know him and respect him, takes his job to heart and frankly, given the cards he has been dealt, is doing a damn fine job.
Andrew Exum, at Abu Muqawama - Stay classy, Michael Hastings! - has given us permission to repost his first take on this affair:
One of the ugliest sentences you will ever read in a piece of journalism:
Caldwell seemed more eager to advance his own career than to defeat the Taliban.
That is not a quote from someone else -- those words belong to the journalist himself. Classy. I would recommend reading Michael Hastings' dispatches for Rolling Stone not as sober journalism but as particularly poorly sourced policy papers. Essentially Michael Hastings is doing bad think tank policy analysis with a little character assassination thrown in for extra measure.
When policy analysis is done well, it starts with a research question and then constructs methodology and accumulates data to test an initial hypothesis. When policy analysis is done poorly, the researcher just cherry-picks data to support his desired argument and doesn't ask basic epistemological questions that might call into question the researcher's assumptions or conclusions. Michael Hastings is doing the latter. He obviously has a desired policy preference, and he is cherry-picking the sources that would support that preference. He's obviously not above taking a grotesque cheap shot at a respected senior officer, either.
[In the interests of full disclosure, I should add that Joe Busch, who is one of the officers mentioned in the cited article, is a friend of mine. Also, I once met with LTG Caldwell at CNAS before he took command of NTM-A. But the number of times I have met LTG Caldwell at CNAS is equal to the number of times I have met Michael Hastings at CNAS.]
I'll also leave you with some food for thought from Tom Ricks at his Best Defense blog:
... The article is by Michael Hastings, who popped Gen. McChrystal and seems to be looking for another scalp. That is OK by me. Aggressive journalism is a good thing, and has a role to play especially when the military falters in self-examination.
The cowpie Caldwell stepped into is that there is no clear bright line between using "public affairs" to manipulate Americans and using "information operations" to manipulate others. The skills employed are basically the same, and the internet has ensured that information flows easily and quickly across national borders. Plant a story in an Iraqi paper, and the Baghdad bureaus of the major American newspapers would read it and perhaps write about it within 24 hours. Not a problem -- unless the story were false. Not supposed to lie to the American people.
This ambiguity has been hanging out there for several years. It is aggressive generals like Caldwell who are running afoul of it. Guys who simply are passive don't get into trouble in today's military...
That's right guys and gals, being aggresive is NOT bucking for the next star - it's putting it on the line. Give me an aggressive general anytime over a passive risk-adverse company man.
Comments
The use of the term "psy-ops," instead of "PSYOP" pretty much proves they have not received any training in the Psychological Operations field. Ask any guy who has gone to the PSYOP schoolhouse, officer or enlisted, and they'll tell you there is never an 's' at the end of that acronym/word, nor a hyphen. This is yet another reason why putting IO in front as a coordinating function has failed. None of these IO officers even understand where the lines are drawn.
Whether or not anyone broke the law...there isn't enough detail in the story to tell. So unless you were there, or have access, your opinion on all the players motivations or who is at fault is worthless. I would condemn both parties for the vindictive nature of all their discourse. What is sad is that this type of stuff happens all the time, it just never ends up in Rolling Stone, thank God. I've seen more than a few field grade to high ranking officers engage in this type of childish behavior when they don't get their way, especially when it comes to IO vs. PSYOP stuff. Why I'm not sad to be leaving the military.
Also, the journalist didn't do enough background research, that is for sure.
You all do realize that, while there are contortions within the US/DOD over who is "psyop", "MISO", "IO" and what constitutes same; that while there are rushes to accuse this LTG of being a risk taker or risk adverse; while every "expert" is weighing in on the relative merit and value of NTM-A and like missions...while all this is going on, AQ and their fellow travelers are laughing their collective butts off, wonder how the hell we are still able to think ourselves a superpower.
Just sayin'...
Seems pretty straightforward to me:
1) 2 (non-psyop) officers were told to do something they didn't want to do. When they cried foul the command retaliated by investigating them and finding some relatively benign misconduct. The 2 officers retaliated against the command once they redeployed and returned to their civilian lives- but trumped up the charges against the command.
2) I think the command probably could have found something else for those guys to do- if googling senators' voting records is what we have LTCs doing, then maybe we are promoting the wrong people ;) or we are deploying the wrong ones... I think the command could have responded to their complaints differently instead of the petty investigation. Other than that- nothing too bad seen from here.
3) the main instigator here seems to have misrepresented who he is/was and what he was doing. A training command doing "psyops" (I thought it was "psyop"...)? Uh-huh. Instead of re-directing folks whose "specialties" are not needed anymore- I'd advocate sending them home. I hope the command does some lessons learned on this episode- but unfortunately it looks like they are circling the wagons and admitting no fault.
Hah, from their <a href="http://www.manta.com/c/mtp44m5/syzygylogos-llc">SyzygyLogos LLC page</a> (these two savvy strat comm / IO types don't even have a real web presence that I can find - relying on third party sites and social networks):
<i>A woman-owned/veteran-owned small business providing Strategic Communications and Intelligence support to both government and private customers.
SyzygyLogos LLC provides two broad-based lines of service. As a Government Contractor, we provide trained and experience subject-matter expert instructors and practitioners in the fields of Strategic Communications, Military Information Support Operations, Intelligence analysis and Targeting. For our commercial customers, we provide project management and consulting advice on organization and marketing to enhance and improve both sales and production performance. SyzygyLogos uses both Lean Six Sigma and experienced military expertise to identify and solve problems and align its clients' intentions with actions and words to achieve the desired effect in the target audience. SyzygyLogos - Changing the way people act by changing the way they think!</i>
Yea, right, they screwed the pooch on this strat comm issue and actually expect the U.S. Government or those in the private sector to hire them on? Hint, you go radioactive and you can expect that you'll be treated as such by the adult world. Moreover, if your number one claim to fame is being a "woman-owned/veteran-owned small business" that is a tip off that you DO NOT have the expertise to win contracts on your professional merits.
Holmes and Levine got their 15-minutes of fame. Unfortunately for them they blew any chance of being taken seriously by those who require strat comm / IO services. Shows a lack of professionalism, a lack of foresight, and is an indicator that their version of what transpired during their tours in Afghanistan might not exactly be the real deal.
Yep...makes you want to cry...not...
I don't think the 'public figure' defence for libel applies to the military so hopefully these two will soon get their day in court - just not the way they wanted it...
For some good thoughts on strat comm, google for Steve Tatham...he's a Brit who 'gets it' on this subject...
From the article linked to by SJPONeill:
<i>The whole experience has left Holmes seemingly heartbroken by the military he served in. "My father was an officer, and I believed officers would never act like this," he says. "I was devastated. Ive lost my faith in the military, and I couldnt in good conscience recommend anyone joining right now."</i>
Earlier press reporting attributed this statement to MAJ Laurel Levine. Seems to me both officers lost their faith in the military when they created and hyped their private strat comm / IO company while on active duty, while in Afghanistan, while on the public dime, and misrepresenting themselves to potential clients on Army time. They got caught and their "strat comm" defense is crocodile tears to be sure.
This is rapidly becoming a runaway non-story...I could't resist following it some more on other sites and don't think it is any better summarized than this comment from Yahoo!News:
"...Two things amaze me.........from the lack of details on what was actually done, I guess some posters imagine drugged pastries at the morning briefings, subliminal suggestions in Powerpoint presentations, and "70s Show" psychadelic spirals. I'm willing to bet that what Caldwell asked of his troops was <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/s/dailycaller/20110224/pl_dailycaller/reportarmyg… an effective and persuasive presentation</a>...
We... if GEN Caldwell is guilty, I guess a bunch of others are going to go down alongside him - pretty well any officer who have ever done more than the bare minimum when supporting any form of media engagement. I was always under the impression that this was part of our job in supporting the commander:
"...When we had embedded reporters, I routinely surveyed what they had written about Iraq to develop a feel for their opinions, their assumptions, and their general attitudes about specific operations, the war in general, and the military. I presented this information at the daily commander's update briefs - not because the commander requested it, but because I thought it was important for him and subordinate commanders to be aware of this information. Our unit was going to be visited by people who viewed the world through a lens colored by certain opinions, assumptions, and attitudes. Those people would report what they saw through that lens to the entire world. I thought that the chain of command needed to be aware of this..." From anon a couple of posts up...
Maybe if his staff had done the same, GEN McCrystal might still have a job...? It's a key staff function for any visitor...
This whole things sounds like a disgruntled part-timer who hasn't fully absorbed the military ethos, doesn't have the experience that comes with Regular officers of the same rank, and who is throwing out a bit of a smoke screen over his own indiscretions while in theatre...
As I commented in the other version of this thread, maybe LTC Holmes needs to <a href="http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2011/02/three_times_you_have_to_speak.html?cm_m… when to shut the hell up</a>.
1 - NTM-A is not supposed to be risk-adverse or risk-tolerant; their mission to to advance training of ANA-ANP-ANSF.
Agreed it would be far more effective to have Army-ISAF train ANSF from the front instead of via PPT, but that's a different issue...
2 - Conducting PSYOPS on McCain, Lieberman, Levin? If it's true, then he needs to be NJP'd for wasting resources; those are about the most-Afghan mission friendly politicians in DC.
I'm not sure if this is relevant, but I'll throw it out there...
I was not in the IO career field, but was slotted in a branch immaterial IO slot, received several months of training and preparation (a dozen 40-hour courses on IO core competencies and related functions) and then served in OIF as the IO Planner for Bn-sized TF.
When we had embedded reporters, I routinely surveyed what they had written about Iraq to develop a feel for their opinions, their assumptions, and their general attitudes about specific operations, the war in general, and the military. I presented this information at the daily commander's update briefs - not because the commander requested it, but because I thought it was important for him and subordinate commanders to be aware of this information. Our unit was going to be visited by people who viewed the world through a lens colored by certain opinions, assumptions, and attitudes. Those people would report what they saw through that lens to the entire world. I thought that the chain of command needed to be aware of this.
Am I a law breaker, too?
I would have done the same in preparation for any VIP visit. I would have determined what issues the VIP was most concerned about, what he already knew, where his knowledge was lacking, and then made this clear to the chain of command so that they could make the visit productive. If the chain of command felt strongly that the mission was in peril for want of a particular resource or due to a policy, I would have determined the position of the VIP on those issues and attempted to determine how his/her position was arrived at, so that the commander could have more clearly conveyed his concerns in terms that the VIP would understand. Would that have made me a law breaker?
First off this LTC Micheal Holmes isnt even a psychological operations officer. He hasnt been trained in psychological operations at Ft Bragg. He wasnt with a psychological operations team or unit. Psychological operations is only a active duty and reserve compoent not national guard. He was a information operations officer. Trained in information operations which isnt psychological operations. Hes assigned to the 71st information operations group in the texas national guard. Hes using miss information to claim he was order to do psychological operations on us personnel. He got himself into some trouble over there and his carrer in the army is kind of over with. So hes trying to get even with them, calling his information gathering psychological operations. His job is almost like a public operations officer, except he can put a spin on the information he gathers and it doesnt have to be the truth like hes doing now.
who cares really. corporations, unions, private individuals, foreign govts. etc etc... can all lobby senators what difference is this? i really dont think this is a big deal. after all the DOD is the biggest employer of the country. if wall street can get trillion dollar bail outs for ruining the global economy, why cant our generals lobby the senators? and that too for a good cause.
I'd have to agree with anon- NTM-A is pretty risk-averse. And it is tied very closely to their take on information engagement. If you allow your soldiers to take risks- that leads to bad public affairs metrics. So, interesting that the command is being described as non-risk-averse because they take chances on information engagement- when that very same engagement is causing them to lock their soldiers up on their camp with policies that make a mockery of the hazardous duty pay they get.
Here's the logic running that HQ:
- Ultimate objective: Show progress in #s of ANSF trained in order to convince domestic (including European) politicians/think-tanks to support the effort with $ and trainers.
- Underlying assumption: The only way we will be successful in Afghanistan is to convince American and European politicians and think-tanks to support the effort until the Afghans are able to "take the lead" (maybe in 2014???). We also assume that "taking the lead" will mean the Afghans will do what we are doing today (prosecute COIN a la 3-24 against the Taliban).
- Over-all assumption: NTM-A must train as many ANSF as they can in as little time as possible and do that with as little negative press (like Coalition deaths) as possible.
- Key sub-assumption: a Coalition (NTM-A) trainer death will turn-off support at home and kill efforts to get more European trainers.
- Result: Risk is taken in stepping over the line in terms of influence operations, but very little risk is taken with interacting with Afghans, partnering with Afghan forces, and getting out "on the ground"- (where you see THAT kind of risk is with "IJC forces" (combat forces- not trainers) and then only in a few key districts where IJC has promised to show progress with metrics dealing with insurgents.
I, for one, disagree with many of these assumptions. I don't think trainer deaths will result in any less (they already don't send trainers they pledge) trainers from Europe- nor will they get DoD to bust the cap on troops- and I think the American people are tired of spending money over there- especially in the current economic conditions.
I don't think the ANSF will prosecute COIN a la 3-24 when they "take the lead". I don't even think they need to to be successful. What I do agree with NTM-A on is that think-tankers and politicians will think raw #s of ANSF are a measure of progress. I think it is wrong of the politicians and think-tanks to think that way- but NTM-A has been successful at convincing them it is.
<i>" Give me an aggressive general anytime over a passive risk-adverse company man.</i>"
LTG Caldwell is the most risk-averse general I know in Kabul. See all the previous threads, posts, articles about how *not* to fight a COIN campaign in the 'center of gravity's' capital. All of his troopers are kept inside the hescos to never actually, maybe, god-forbid, even see an Afghan.
Next to the definition of 'risk-averse' in the dictionary, there's a photo of the NTM-A patch.
There is a definitive difference between psyops targeting and having someone take the time to put together information related to a given individuals concerns, and probable questions in order to put one's best foot forward.
The sad part about this whole affair is that some of those who absolutely know the difference have chosen seem to have ignored the reality of that distinction in efforts to create supporting arguments for their own agendas.
FWIW General Caldwell has been one of those who have actually helped the DOD get their heads around exactly how important communication is to effectively carrying out the mission.
Thats a far cry from anything out of line, it's just common sense
The impact of what they did/were told to do/the command did seems to be neglible. If you really believe NTM-A got billions of $ because some jedi mind-trickers told them this wasn't the war they were looking for- then I've got some really light body armor that looks like wood to sell you...
Were psyop bubbas asked to do things that were against the law? Hmmm. Laws are interpreted. I'd say it probably depends on who you ask. They MAY have thought they were- or maybe they just didn't want to do more work. I know the National Guard gets a bad rap sometimes for having fat and lazy do-nothings- but maybe these two were also lazy! ;) I do know there is a weird atmosphere today within the PA/IO/Psyoper communit(ies) wherein some will quote doctrine as if it is biblical and many want to draw very straight and literal lines delineating the functions/responsibilities/etc between them. I for one think that is very inflexible- and thus to me makes most of our PA/IO/STRATCOM- etc.- worthless.
Not that it is worthwhile anyway. I agree with the one comment- I think on the MISO thread- that these communities (and the Army as a whole) do the nation a disservice by hyping what it is they do. Our information engagements- regardless of the audience- really only has a very low amount of influence in my experience/opinion. And that has more to do with human nature than that we are just idiots doing a bad job.
What I will fault NTM-A on is how they handled the situation. Although Holmes and Levine seem to have been hard-headed and a little bit doctrine-bound, NTM-A could have avoided this public affairs (IO?) mess if they would have handled the 2 differently than the bureaucratic, knee-jerk "disloyal" route that many HQs in the Army handle "wave-makers". A petty investigation that found too much time on facebook and going out on the town in civilian clothes perhaps wasted more of NTM-A's time than will be wasted answering questions reference this media event.
I predict nothing will come out of this. The REAL psyop is being done on the think-tankers- and it has been effective. Too bad they are influencing how decisions are being made reference Afghanistan. Too bad Rolling Stone can't direct a more serious investigation into THAT angle...
First, I don't know anything about the allegations in this case.
Points: We always read the bio's of incoming VIPs and if it is available we review their voting record. Of course all this is public information that is intended to be read.
In Infantry or Special Operations vernacular we may carelessly say we want "intell" on the VIP, but it means nothing more than what is listed above. No one is asking anyone to tap their phones or put surveillance on them, so please give this part a break.
When you brief someone, you usually have a purpose/reason you're briefing. I recall our old rule was to stick to two to three main points we wanted to highlight (our message to the audience, hardly propaganda, but standard briefing art). Again, an officer may have carelessly said I want to use PSYOP to get our points across, not meaning to cross the line, but looking for techniques to make the ideas stick. Maybe it did cross the line, but it wasn't about PSYOP'ing Americans.
The Rolling Stones Rag is clearly anti-military magazine, and it is enjoying all the attention they're getting with poorly researched articles that generate controversy and sale more issues. I'm sure this is bringing in the advertising dollars.
For now, put away the tar and feathers and let the investigation take place. We are too quick to believe bad news about senior leaders.
Bill
<blockquote>A scenario that is offered up because something similar may have happened to some friends is just that, a scenario, and I'm sure there are other scenarios that could be offered up one way or another. Public speculation is quite unprofessional, to say the least.</blockquote>
Touche! There is always that scenario where a subordinate finds a superior's order morally/legally questionable and legitimately coincidentally gets hit with an investigation afterwards. Something about post hoc, ergo propter hoc.
Although it's easy to get drawn into the obvious issues in the article, what I found interesting was the command climate which is CLEARY caustic.
Polls, exit interviews, surveys, etc... time and again quote junior officers leaving because of what they call "poor senior leaders" and yet again, here it is.
The Army is losing quality junior leaders because of reported incidents such as this, only those never see the light of day, much less the cover of the Rolling Stones.
Whatta mess.... will the Army never learn? Of course, that's a completely rhetorical question because retired GO's select new GO's and those GO's hand pick those (nearly clones of themselves) to be our future GO's.
Retirements looking better every day.
The perpretrators of this mess were FA30 folks(who are coordinators and not trained practitioners of PSYOP) and not MOS 37 (who are PSYOP/MISO folks operating under the authority given by USC Title 10 Section 167j). This whole debacle just goes to show how broken, disjointed, and confusing our Strat Comm, PD, IO, influence, PSYOP, MISO, etc efforts are. Truly sad.
There is a bit of risk management that General Caldwell may not have thought through carefully enough in utilizing his psyop people for a background work-up on his visitors, if in fact that is all that it was.
That risk was once this episode came to light, because at this juncture in time, the General should have known it always does, and as innocuous as he may have seen it at the time, which it may very well turn out to have been, it will probably now serve to only add toward the growing skepticism on Capital Hill, and among the American public, toward the conflict in Afghanistan.
Totally disagree with Dave and the above Anon. I believe, along with LTC Holmes, that LTG Caldwell's order crossed the line into illegal intelligence collection on US persons. A scenario almost exactly like this happened to friends of mine, and when they resisted, they were also magically slapped with 15-6s. Fortunately, after it came out that it was a personal vendetta, they were quietly reprimanded (for nothing) and were allowed to go on with their lives.
I've had enough senior officers pushing subordinates around when they refuse to do illegal things. And I don't think any "investigation" will bring the truth to light.
When you think about all the things that are competing for a politician's attention and how little time they may have to absorb what you think they need to know about the things only they can do (in this case champion for, or provide more resources) then ensuring you have matched the message to the receiver makes sense and is is the best use of their and your time.
As far as I can tell the only person conducting PsyOps is Hastings.