Best Practice or Best Strategy: Can New Counterinsurgency Doctrine Win Future Wars? By David Ucko, ISN
Two weeks ago, the United States Army and the Marine Corps updated their counterinsurgency doctrine, last published in November 2006 before the ‘surge’ in Iraq. The publication of the new doctrine has raised fresh questions about the role of counterinsurgency in campaign planning and strategy. Was the 2006 field manual in some way responsible for the subsequent stabilization of Iraq? If counterinsurgency succeeded there, why did it not meet expectations (some might say ‘fail’) in Afghanistan? And will the doctrine published last week allow for better results in campaigns to come? ...
Comments
Circa summer 2004...2LT Me gets an email from CO saying "see attached, give the Company a class on it next week". Two days later 2LT Me walks into the CO's office and says "but Sir, according to this directed briefing, and its massively broad definition of terrorism, the US Army is a terrorist organization that uses violence to achieve political ends". After a brief discussion CO says "you can add but you can't subtract slides".
Briefing day........"so, gentlemen, this slide has the definition of terrorism, which is what we fight against".
PFC raises hand, I call on him, and he says incredulously "but Sir, isn't that what we do?!". I said "well, if you just take this definition then yes, but there is more to it"....
Now you can imagine what kind of tortured "deep thought" followed from a 22yr old 2LT tank platoon leader that basically tried to make "Terrorism" a term of art for the Dept of Defense that means anything that isn't a country that wants to fight us.
10 years of deployments and Washington DC insiderism later, sitting at the Pentagon, I still don't know what the damn word means. Or rather, apparently it means any non-state actor that wants to fight us or someone we like. Perhaps terrorism is just a tactic, and just like genocide, to do it is to get on our bad side. But then, we might need something a little more refined of a definition if it has a $5B budget line.
I score Iraq a defeat and expect Afghanistan to become another one. Looking into the future is a dicey business but the chances of US success in further COIN campaigns depends on what kind they are:
1) Occupation of a middle sized state with many ways to easily cross it's borders i.e. Iran. Probable fail 3-4x worse than Iraq. There are millions of Iranians who would fight and have access to better technology than the Iraqis is quite a bit larger and has more diverse terrain.
2) Support of a host nation trying to become more efficient, fair to all ethnic groups and honest. Rebels limited to internal support. Probable success at a minimal relative cost if US troop numbers are kept in the hundreds.i.e. Philippines 1940's.
3) Number 2 but with a neighboring state actively aiding the rebels. i.e. Afghanistan 1980-89. Probable fail with US troop numbers increasing in direct relation to that failure and US public opinion souring.
4) Number 2 or 3 with corrupt host government which will not mend it's ways i.e. Afghanistan 2002-today. Probable fail as US public opinion sours.
The lessons of recent history: Help only those who really deserve it. Use local troops as much as possible. Keep the US footprint as low as possible. If the problem is a neighbor then deal with them at the national level.