Comments
I think that we may need to understand the current militarism -- and the recent emphasis on building parter capacity -- from the following perspective:
Such is considered reasonable and necessary when one has embarked on a mission to favorably transform and incorporate outlier states and societies -- and/or to assist with such advantageous initiatives undertaken by various local populations themselves.
Massive numbers of police and military forces (both host nation and foreign) may be needed in such endeavors; which essentially require that the attempting party (a) hold the uncommitted elements of the population at bay and (b) effectively deal those that actively resist while (c) separating the population from their old political, economic and social orders and attaching them to new such arrangements and concepts.
The nature of this endeavor, to wit: state and societal transformation and assimilation of same into a foreign sphere of influence, also, I believe, helps explain why this task may take so long, cost so much and endanger parties in various ways.
<em>When it comes to equipping that force, Caldwell accepts only gear that is capable, affordable and sustainable for Afghan forces.</em>
<em>So he got them 1,000 up-armored Humvees and has another 4,000 coming.</em>
???
<em>Caldwell noted that police were dying at twice the rate of soldiers because they had no armored vehicles. So he got them 1,000 up-armored Humvees and has another 4,000 coming. Recruiting skyrocketed and casualties plummeted.</em>
???
<em>That stronger Afghan army and police force will likely expedite an American exit</em>
???
This is what happens when the military engages in salesmanship of its own policies as opposed to attempting to craft strategy and operations to best meet political objectives: your logic starts to mirror that of Pravda in the Eighties and KCNA today...
If you bother to visit police in their stations without a huge entourage and the accompanying Afghan MoI VIPs, you might hear the police complain that all their Hummers are broke. Seems they don't have a maintenance capability, culture, local infrastructure, or motivation to keep up high-tech vehicles with American supply chains like we do. The solution of turning the Afghan police and army into up-armored touring FOBs seems to be a solution that has failed us (not that you'd know from our self-reported/interpreted metrics)- so I am curious that we are transferring that solution to them...
The smart Afghan police never asked for HMMWVs- some general asked for those and we acquiesced against the advice of every Force Management/Ops guru who was asked. They aren't sustainable by the Afghans and they aren't conducive to the tactics they have to employ.
The police were/are not dying at twice the rate of soldiers because of what they drove- they were/are dying at twice the rate because they live among the people (read: insurgents) and thus are easier targets. In addition they are more active in fleecing the people. Oh, and we can add that they aren't trained to deal with localized realities nor paid correctly, nor working in any kind of system that rewards support to rule of law.
The "conclusive" statements are inane: recruiting has always been high enough for objectives- so to say it skyrocketed due to buying 1,000 HMMWVs makes no sense- it skyrocketed because we began paying them more and NATO gave GIRoA authorization to recruit more.
And "casualties plummeting"??? Since when? I thought all casualties are skyrocketing for everyone. Oh- and last I checked <em>attrition</em>- a MUCH greater measurement than recruiting- is still very high. Wouldn't that give a better indication of whether or not uparmored vehicles made any difference??
Lastly, a stronger ANSF won't expedite a withdrawal- unless it is a political withdrawal as opposed to a Measure of Effectiveness metric-based withdrawal. We are attempting to create a mirror image of ourselves- an expeditionary conventional force- when what the ANSF really need to be is a constabulary force. Wake up ISAF!!!
The Afghans don't face an NVA invasion from the North- they face a patchwork-quilt of peoples who have never lived nicely with each other and have just as corrupt a government in place in Kabul as they ever have. We seem to be making the exact opposite mistake we made in Vietnam because everyone has bought off on the Nagl narrative. Contrary to what 3-24 would have you believe, South Vietnam was defeated by a conventional force from the North- not a bunch of internal insurgents.
Afghanistan, on the other hand, will likely be defeated by a bunch of internal insurgents supported by intel and insurgent assets next door- but we are preparing them in our own conventional/expeditionary image... for- what??
In late 2009 a general was told he had 18 months to "fix" the ANSF. His solution was to build their numbers rapidly and equip them/train them/lead them like we were- knowing that would be the best short-term plan. The hope was that the general could sell the politicians on extending the 18 months and we could later work on building long-term capacity.
STRATCOM might be a great thing- but when your view of the political objectives and politically-viable ways and means don't match with the politicians- then STRATCOM becomes a tool to exert political influence. Didn't U.S. generals learn the pitfalls of that lesson in another war???
Gian,
To pile on your antithesis:
The headline in this article interests me: "Caldwell aims to build up Afghan forces."
In my view, no general, especially by name, should be setting such aims. Should be the US President with Congressional approval; otherwise, you're right -- it smacks of militarism (i.e. tends to separate the military from the civil authority that should be responsible).
In addition, it should not be Caldwell and his staff that does the "strat comms" it should be the politicians who advocate the policy. Once the military is engaged in strat comms, it becomes dicey and also smacks of militarism.
Well that depends.
By simple strategic logic-- accepting that the President's core political objective in Afghanistan is to "disrupt, disable, and eventually defeat" Al Qaeda--then the killing of OBL still trumps the work of the good general and building up the Afghan Forces.
Problem is that the American Army has things so twisted up that we have come to place "capacity building" of things such as the ANF above our president's core political objective of al Qaeda.
It is in a most troubling and worrisome way, Militarism.
It is a case of an operational framework of counterinsurgency that has buried strategy.
Based on the tactical principles of coin--or armed state building--that argue that these campaigns take a long, long time (you know, metaphors like "two steps forward and one backward) it seems that senior military and defense leaders in turn want us to stay there for a long, long time too.
For the American Army victory has come to be defined by sticking with the operational framework of coin, and making it work for however long it takes.
Unfortunately wars should not be ended with the primacy of allowing a field army to claim victory in the way that it has defined it. In this matter, victory as a concept is highly overrated, and American militarism is driving the pursuit of victory in Afghanistan.
gian