With thirty thousand new boots on the ground, Kabul is set to become the primary focus of Obama's strategic agenda. But is this the right choice? Pillar, former national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia, argues that a just intervention has devolved into a worthless quagmire, while Iraq War veteran Nagl believes al-Qaeda must be vanquished in the borderlands of AfPak...
More at The National Interest.
Comments
Is the following analysis correct?
1. We recognize today that the United States -- in its role as the global governor -- faces a global insurgency problem.
2. As in the case of the insurgency in Afghanistan (and insurgencies generally?) these problems can be normally be traced back to bad governance practices or difficult goverance choices.
3. Because of its bad governance practices/difficult governance choices, the United States, like President Karzai in Afghanistan, faces a crisis of legitimacy.
4. This because, like President Karzai, the United States is often seen as not representing the interests of very large segments of the populations that it governs.
5. Herein, the United States, like the currrent Afghan leader, is often accused of political corruption (bribery, extortion, cronyism, patronage, etc.) for personal gain. The United States, of course, being accused of this on an international scale.
6. In correcting insurgency problems generally, one of two paths is normally taken:
a. Major military and police operations are mounted, so as to force the affected populations to conform to the bad governing practices/difficult goverance choices already in place or
b. Major changes are made in the way that governance is done. Specifically, problems re: political corruption are addressed and corrected; thereby, (1) better providing for the needs and interests of the effected people generally, (2) securing the requisite legitimacy for the governing entity and (3) reducing or eliminating the need for military and/or police involvement.
If this analysis is correct, then which of these approaches ("a" or "b" immediately above) is in the United States' (and President Karzai's) individual and own best interest?
I tend to agree with Pillar, but if we are going to fight the Taliban I suggest we abandon police keeping and nation building as the cornerstone of our strategy.
I think part of the problem with COIN and nation building is that we are determined to make Afghanistan conform to our plan. This makes things difficult for us.
The better approach would be to give up control and work with Afghanistan as it is. We work with it by forming alliances. We approach Afghan groups asking the simple question. Do you want our help defending yourself from the Taliban? If they decide they want our help or are interested we proceed in forming a deal and relationship. If not we leave them alone, but they take a risk. They risk themselves to the Taliban and the anti-Taliban forces. By making a deal with us, we can provide them arms, food, supplies. We can help them make connections with Kabul government and other anti-taliban tribes. We may be able to provide some help in coming to their aid if they are attacked.
I guess what I am proposing is just go back to old school tactics, which seem to have always worked pretty well throughout history, including at the beginning of this conflict.
Perhaps this analogy will assist:
When one's government is in-charge of and generally "runs" a certain rural, urban or metropolitan community, this government is often faced with certain common problems, such as, areas of: poverty, squalid living conditions, little or no business development and few jobs, drug trafficing and other criminal activity, and gangs/gang-warfare, etc.
Failure by appropriate government officials and agencies to adequately address these problems often leads to these difficulties expanding and encroaching into the more-productive areas of the community and, thereby, adversely effecting the lives and well-being of the community at-large.
Today, the United States and other strong and rising powers are generally seen to be "in-charge" of and "running" a world that is often identified as the "international community."
This much larger "international community" has many of the same types of problems as those identified above re: smaller communities; except that these problems are, of course, of much larger scale (ex: failed states) and greater consequence (ex: Al Qaeda).
As in the case of the smaller communities above, failure by appropriate officials to adequately addresses the problems of this much larger international community can, has (9/11. etc.) and will continue to adversely effect the lives and well-being of the international community as a whole. (Especially as this more productive part of the community seeks to -- exponentialy -- expand.)
Is this the context (interdependent and rapidly expanding "international community," run by strong and rising powers, with problems common to communities generally but on a much larger and more consequential scale) that we should be using when we discuss such things as Afghanistan, "quagmire", Al Qaeda, etc?
If so, then whose argument (Nagl or Pillar) prevails?
MAJ Kotkin:
The overarching vital national interest of the United States has recently been defined as: "An international order that reflects our values ..." (Sec of State Rice: Rethinking the National Interest, Foreign Affairs Magazine Jul/Aug 2008).
In pursuing this overarching national interest, the Bush Administration identified "democratic state-building" as a new and urgent component of its foreign policy agenda.
The Obama Administration has shifted somewhat from the approach, adopting "diplomacy and development state-building" as one of its core pillars.
Both approaches seek to make those societies that are least like us become more like us and, thereby, cause them to become more available for use by today's strong and rising powers.
Thus, neither ideas of Nagl nor Pillar are the source of my comment.
Rather, the dynamics and foreign policy objectives -- articulated by the past and present presidential administrations (re: such things as national interests, state-building, etc.) -- frame my question above.
Bill,
I believe you're alluding to Nagl's argument but even with your train of thought, I still interpret it this way:
If, by intending to invest in and open up closed societies through the force of arms and forced nation-building, then yes, Nagl's argument is the more appropriate. We might even successfully, albeit temporarily, eliminate terrorism from a specific piece of real estate in doing so.
But to truly open up an otherwise closed off culture for trade and educational/business/diplomatic cross-pollination as it were, BCTs, Wars on <i>Anything</i>, or corrupt and/or puppet governments won't do it. That requires not the militarized and aggressive Reagan Doctrine with AQ (vs. the Soviets) as its focus, but a balanced approach where the military is *not* used because there are no vital national interests at stake.
My $.02.
If one considers that the broad foreign policy objective of the United States today is to "invest in the strong and rising powers of the new international order."
And that this is to be achieved -- in part -- by the further "opening up" of today's more-closed societies.
This: So that these more-closed societies might be made more available to and more adapted for the uses of these strong and rising powers.
Then, when seen in this light, whose argument prevails.
I'll cast my lot with Mr. Pillar and, in doing so, throw an attaboy towards Maj. Kotkin as a fellow-traveller most interested in disengaging our forces from this interminable and dissolute mess that's nation-building.
When Robert Watkins, deputy U.N. commissioner, adamantly states that the U.N. and THEIR fellow-travellers will have nothing to do with supporting ISAF's mission in Marjah-despite ISAF being the U.N.'s battle-axe, it's apparent that we are again operating at cross-purposes despite our best efforts.
My safety in Oregon isn't affected by our dalliance in Afghanistan when it's Pakistan where both the problem and solution lie. My goodwill toward the afghan people is lost when we hold high the charade that is Karzai and his cronies. That's not in my interest either nor will we change that lil' emperor anytime soon having just stolen the Afghan Electoral Complaints Commission. Thus I don't see where it's our job to underwrite that travesty and have it thusly attached to our legacy.
How will it change matters? Abandonment of Afghanistan (not Pakistan) will leave the emperor with no clothes and considerably more sober-or dead. Either works for me. It will provide the space for Watkins, et al to do their job assured in the security of the ANA or taliban. Again, I care not but let that be his bed of roses to lie in.
Us? Get out, reconstitute our forces, remove a potential target of Iran, and prepare for bigger issues elsewhere-to include Pakistan. I'd much rather take the money saved and rewrite Pakistani elementary textbooks and then permit them to someday do the same in Afghanistan.
God knows the U.N. won't. Thanks.
<b>MAJ Kotkin:</b>
I didn't think either of them made a great deal of sense and I wonder if the fact that Pillar agrees with your long held position on departing Afghanistan rapidly had an effect on your determination of the merits of the positions...
No matter. I agree with you that our "OEF mission" was completed long ago -- I opt for 2002, not 2003.
However, I disagree that we can leave abruptly. We should not have stayed but we did and we now have an intangible need to stay for a while. We have previously discussed that so no sense rehashing it. I mention it only to point out that intangibles are usually as -- and occasionally more -- important as the tangible things. The problem with ascribing importance to them is that such determination is usually viewpoint dependent and it is too easy to forget the opponents viewpoint is every bit as important as yours.
I believe that your perception that we fostered jihad through the ISI is not quite correct; that phenomenon long predates our entry not the USSR-Afghan adventure. It seems you're determined to turn your hind sight on something you're not going to affect in the slightest -- our stay in Afghanistan.
And I thought strategists looked ahead. ;) Effort to avoid future "ungoverned spaces" and futile operations would seem to be your challenge...
Pillar's logic is more solid, hands down. Nagl only comes across as a retired Cold Warrior desperately looking for a Clausewitzian big battle to annihilate al Qaeda on the battlefield wherever it pops up.....even though he dresses it up in modern COIN language.
Gaining Afghan real estate or filling in the overhyped and hyperbolic 'ungoverned spaces' won't win a "war" on terrorism. US intervention was as unwarranted and counterproductive in 1979 as it is now. The initial mission of OEF was complete in 2003 and as much as idealists would have us believe, we didn't break Afghanistan; therefore, its not our responsibility to fix. The problem that's biting us in the a$$ now is that of mainstreamed jihad we fostered through the ISI which subsequently spread across the region. That's the vehicle which the real core of today's problem -- lack of good governance -- is riding and seeking a solution through.
Military nation-building in Afghanistan and supporting unpopular and/or corrupt regimes won't fix that. It's an issue between populations and their governments who we support. Its also completely beyond anything we're doing in scope, intent, or ability in AFG.