Do We Really Need a Large Army? By Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Post
Armies are like newspapers. They have become 21st-century anachronisms. To survive, they must adapt. For the press, that means accommodating the demands of the Internet. For the United States Army, it means adjusting to a changing security environment. Nostalgia about a hallowed past is a luxury that neither armies nor newspapers can afford to indulge.
So the hand-wringing triggered by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s plan to reduce the Army’s size, while predictable, is beside the point. Yes, those cuts would leave the United States with its fewest active-duty soldiers since the eve of World War II.
So what? …
Comments
The article presents a largely one sided argument that since we're tired of large ground force operations due to what are perceived to be two failed occupation missions, we don't really need a large Army. We may need a large Army, but making that decision based on our collective, and I would argue mostly policy/political, failures in Iraq and Afghanistan is not a strong argument. It is an argument simply based on the mood of the nation today, it isn't based on our perceived security requirements that extend far beyond our borders.
The author writes,
"The principal military lesson of the Global War on Terror affirms what ought to have been the principal military lesson of the Cold War: Force held in readiness has far greater political utility than force expended. Armies are well suited to defending and containing. But invading and occupying countries are fraught with risk."
This logic assumes the next conflict will be like the last, and that the next threat will be another Cold War or GWOT like operation; therefore, the right sizing the Army should be based on these lessons. There are many threats emerging to our interests around the world. Do they require a larger Army than the one approved? I can't answer that, but I don't think decisions should be made from false lessons from the Cold War (let's face it, he didn't mean the Cold War he meant a battle within the Cold War called the Vietnam War) and GWOT. While it can't be proven, it can be argued logically that our large and capable Army did contain the USSR and Europe may be a different place if we didn't have it. It can also be argued that many opportunists seem to be asserting themselves in response to our global retreat from the world stage militarily.
I think a good part of the problem is my Army's poorly framed defense of why an Army is needed. Leaders that have been fighting in two theaters void of strategy seem to be unable to see beyond Iraq and Afghanistan and the only if we had more of this or that we could have prevailed. There are certainly lessons from the past decade of conflict that will be relevant in the future, but a more rational case for force projections and required capabilities needed for the future will require taking a less restrictive view on the future of risk and conflict.
The author is right when he writes the Army hasn't proven to be decisive in the past 10 plus years of conflict and the following description is a gross overstatement that loses credibility as soon as it is printed or flows past our lips:
“The Nation’s Force of Decisive Action.” In the 2013 version, they “guarantee the agility, versatility and depth to Prevent, Shape and Win.”
Going back to the original quote above, I agree an Army held readiness has far greater political utility than force expended to demonstrate the capacity to act if forced. That in itself may be reason enough to maintain a larger force than currently projected. We certainly seemed to have a fair amount of our ability to deter, and as problematic as deterrence may be for bean counters, it is still a lot cheaper than fighting another war.