Elkus and WILF are Wrong!

You are reinforcing my attempted point, and that was that the security forces suppressed the insurgency, which then creates conditions for a whole of government effort to defeat (terrible term, but for now it will do) the insurgency, whichh seldom happens. I don't disagree with most of Bob's arguments, I actually think in many cases they're sound, BUT they do NOT apply to every situation. Furthermore, they're more useful for policy makers than for units tasked to conduct FID/COIN. I'm solely focusing on what I believe is a misuse of the military (with the exception of SOF)in Afghanistan. A military strategy is insufficient to achieve a desirable victory, but often a military victory (denying hope of an armed victory to the insurgents) is required to get to the longer term desirable political victory.

Overall I think the lesson is we need to be much more cautious before committing general purpose forces to this type of conflict, and if we do commit them, we need to give them militarily achievable objectives (not transform the flintstones into a modern democracy in the next three to four years). Having worked in the Philippines in the 80s, helping to train their military to fight the communists, it was clear to many of us from an ethical view that the communists were the good guys (since they weren't tied into the international communist movement in any signficant way, it was simply an identity to battle an oppressive government), yet it was in our national interests at "that time" to support the government, which supported the presence of our bases at the time, which was critical to the larger strategic picture. Maybe now Bob is right in that we can select partners we align with ideologically, but I suspect strategic reality will continue to get in the way of our best intentions. In that case, how do you defeat an insurgency that represents the interests of the people? While I prefer not to support an effort like this, if so ordered I would suggest suppression, since government reform isn't feasible.

I've never used the word "mass" in describing the role of the populace to my knowledge, so lets not take the discourse into an area of violent agreement. It was a handful in one region that baited the King of England into a series of hamfisted actions that ended up costing him America. Yes that handful had a larger base of support, but I would be surprised if there was ever a majority of Americans who wanted independence enough to fight the King for it. The fact that a majority wanted to go back to British rule shortly after the Revolution provides testament to that. Only the Constitution saved us from that growing sentiment.

The military is in a tough spot. Civil leaders break things, then they demand the miltary fix them for them. Look at Kent State. Two groups of draft dodgers sqaure off. One group with educational deferments, and the other a bunch of priveleged few who were able to wrangle Guard billets once their other deferments expired.

This is why it is so important that the military set aside its bias and come to a clear understanding of such conflicts. In particular, SOF and USSOCOM has a duty to be the credible voice of understanding on insurgency. That is a voice that has been too silent. Too busy hunting terrorists to bother ourselves with ensuring everyone else understood the nature of the conflict we are in. We need to fix that. Guys like you will be critical in making that fix.

(Laughing) I figured Ken had been lurking out there, sagely shaking his head in wise bemusement...

Actually I would like to make a concession and offer an insight for comment.

First, the concession. I break insurgency into three broad categories.

Revolution, to change some aspect, policies or the very design and makeup of government through illegal political action by some segment of the populace subject to that governance.

Resistance, the continuation of conflict by a populace against some foreign power or their puppets carried on after the government and military are no longer willing or able to fight.

Separatist. Efforts by a geographically oriented segment of the populace to break some section of a country off to form a new country under new governance more acceptable to them.

Of these it is Revolution that is virtually never warfare and should be treated as a civil emergency by the government. Resistance, however, can indeed be a continuation of the inter-state war it grew from, and the country is not truly conquered until the populace will is broken and subdued. Separatist is like revolution to begin with, but once a break is made and a new government formed becomes a civil war and is much like interstate conflict. Such a conflict may transition to revolution or resistance depending on how events unfold.

But here is the keen insight: What is the measure of a "Win" or a "Defeat" in insurgency?? Most measure this through the perspectives of the combatant parties. The government wins or loses, the insurgent wins or loses. Yet often things remain just as bad or get worse regardless of which combatant party prevails, and the conflict typically begins again in short order.

Consider this. Victory is when there is net gain across the populace in regards to how they perceive their condition, governance and opportunity. This may happen when the insurgent prevails, or it may happen when the government prevails. Which party prevails is not indicative of if the conditions improve across the populace or not.

Consider the most studied and most misunderstood insurgency of Malaya. The British "won" but got sent out of town packing at the same time. The insurgents "lost" but their primary objectives were achieved. The real winner was the populace of Malaya. Greater equity existed across the ethnic groups, and both the domination of British colonial rule and Chinese influenced communist rule were "defeated."

Now consider the Philippines. Many government "wins" but nothing has changed to improve the net conditions across the populace. So in fact, there has never been a "win" in the Philippines, and so the insurgency continues.

In Iraq the jury is out. It all depends on how the new government acts to ensure that the entire populace profits from their new political situation.

Afghanistan? Well, we are still there so the resistance continues against the US; and the Northern Alliance continues to deny those associated with the Taliban any economic, social or political opportunity, so the Revolution between these two sides continues as well. We end the resistance by folding our tent and going home. Karzai ends the Revolution when he finally realizes that a Northern Alliance only government is not a viable option. It is only viable this long because we have enabled it to be. I don't know if the Taliban or Northern Alliance will prevail, but under the construct we have put in place it is highly likely the populace as a whole will be a loser in this latest round. That is avoidable, but only if we change our understanding of the conflict and the nature of our focus there.

Another cold thought: If it is morally justifiable to bomb cities in Germany in support of ground combat operations in North Africa; is it morally justifiable for insurgents to bomb cities in America in support of ground combat operations in Afghanistan?? Worth considering for the "war is war" crowd.

Cheers!

Bob

"When you come to a fork in the road, take it." Yogi Berra

Adam takes the same fork as FM 3-24, and thereby finds himself in the same intellectual cul-de-sac of limited options. He chooses to only observe the aspect of insurgency that manifests as violence against the state. This not unlike studying ice bergs, but only taking into consideration that portion that rises above the waterline, with little regard to what supports it from below or where it came from in the first place.

FM 3-24: "1-1. Insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) are complex subsets of warfare."

Adam Elkus: "First, organized armed rebellion is a form of warfare. War involves the large-scale use of armed force for political purposes. The fact that the combatants are indigenous does not change this essential fact. There is a reasonable argument to be made whether all forms of rebellion itself count as warfare. The French 1968 student revolts were not war, nor is Anonymous’ hacktivism “cyber war.” While I have analyzed Mexican drug cartels from a military perspective, there are reasoned objections."

I prefer to take a more holistic perspective. Insurgency comes from somewhere, it exists, and it goes somewhere. It has a lifecycle. Certainly in certain situations and in a certain stage of the lifecycle it absolutely looks a great deal like war and warfare. Military texts and histories naturally focus on this narrow aspect of insurgency, and equally naturally this provides a very narrow, limited perspective that may provide great insights as to how to defeat an insurgent, but very poor insight as to how to resolve the actual insurgency.

The simple reality of life is that the type or degree of violence is the least important component of determining what an appropriate response best designed to resolve the problems that gave rise to violence will be. As an example most should be able to relate to, consider the case of a man who is physically assaulted by a 19 year-old.

In the first case, the assailant is a stranger in a neighborhood far from his own. The man can return violence for violence; engage the police, press charges, etc, all with little concern for follow-on consequences.

In the second case, the assailant is a neighbor or co-worker. Certainly the same options are available, but the consequences are very different. Both will have to continue to live with the effects of the solution employed, and there is a much greater likelihood that some pattern of behavior of the man who was attacked in some way contributed to the actual assault.

In the third case, the assailant is the man's son. Again, violence is violence and all options from case one and two are certainly available, but the roots of causation and the duration and degree of follow-on consequences are far, far different.

This last example is the one most like insurgency; the first example is more like distant war, and the middle more like civil war or war with a neighboring country. But any father who wages war on a son who has felt compelled to act out in such an extreme way is no father I would hold much respect for. Defend himself? Certainly. But the force applied would have to be "reasonable" to the situation, and what is reasonable is very different in all three examples.

But none of this is of concern when one takes that first fork and determines that "war is war." Game on, causation be damned, consequences be damned. Just defeat the enemy.

Historically governments could be fairly cavalier about such things. In times of old sovereignty was vested in the King, not the people, so to wage war on the people was of little consequence. Or, when one's colonial possessions were challenged or when the puppet regime one had created or adopted for the purpose of managing those colonial possessions on one's behalf were challenged by the actual populace of said land, there were few consequences worth worrying about from simply crushing such rebellions.

The world however is changing, and for the better. Sovereignty belongs to the people, and is only delegated to some government to exercise on their behalf. Populaces oppressed on one side of the globe can communicate with each other and can travel easily to the homes of those who oppress them and express their discontent as directly and as violently as they choose.

Times are changing. It is time for those clinging to outdated concepts of insurgency and COIN to change as well.

In a deeply divided "nation" with a history of conflict among populace segments the government is almost always going to reflect the divisions in the society as a whole. Government derives from the populace and reflects its divisions and conflicts, it's not some independent entity separate from "the populace".

Of course a group that gains control of government in such a society will use power for its own purposes... they aren't going to be somehow transformed simply by becoming "the government", and expecting such a transformation - or thinking we can create such a transformation - is completely unrealistic.

I think what you're overlooking here is that in mych of the world the definition of "good governance" is "governance by us", and the definition of bad governance is "governance by them". It's certainly true that this makes insurgency likely, but it's also true that we can't change it, and should generally not try.

Well, if the Hatfields and the McCoys are throwing down, that is not an insurgency. It is conflict, but it is not insurgency. Such a conflict is however, more like war than insurgency, and war-like approaches would be more apt to work in such a conflict than they would in Insurgency. If the Hatfields defeat the will of the McCoys they may well convince the McCoys to get over it and move on. Government intervention in such a conflict is a risky as intervention in an insurgency by a foreign power. One better not pick sides or there will be consequences. Far better to come in and as even-handedly as possible mitigate violence and help to resolve the root cause that both are fighting over. The law may well favor one party over the other, but often bad law or unequal enforcement of the law is at the root of the disturbance. Inappropriate enforcement of the rule of law in such a case by the state may well transform what began as a conflict between the populace into an actual insurgency as the party agrieved by the state shifts its focus in that direction.

Insurgency is an illegal political challenge to the government. Most definitions require that it also be violent, though I think it far more effective to recognize the entire life-cycle of such a conflict and to define a conflict by how it forms rather than by how it ulitmately manifests over time. To do the latter is to end up treating symptoms and chasing threats.

As an example, many focus on size (is it a large war, or a small war); others on the status of the combatants (are they regulars or irregulars); others on the degree of violence (from protest to holocost). All of that is intersting, but any manner of conflict might take on any of those various characteristics. They do not help classify the problem in a manner that suggests an appropriate form of solution. As Clausewitz advised, "the most important thing is to know what type of war one is in." I would update his caution, to "the most important thing is to know what type of CONFLICT one is in." As not all conflict is war, and to lump conflicts as such will immediately suggest the war-like approaches promoted by students and practioners of war, such as WILF.

Some may find this to be a bit of intellectual hair-splitting, but I disagree. When attempting to understand and appreciate the true purpose for action of a conflict (beyond the propaganda of the parties, and beyond the historic cliche's captured in doctrine and a hundred books written by those on the government side of some conflict) one finds the clues that help them understand what type of conflict they are in from the dymanics that occured long before the first shot was fired or flag burned. From that then naturally falls some broad category of solution set. Within any such set the tactical variations are endless, and any number of approaches are likely to succeed. But if one gets the classification wrong, no amount of tactical action is likely to buy one much more than a few months or years of tenuous suppression.

I would suggest that our goal is not to achieve reconciliation -- and thus, not to resolve these insurgencies -- at least not in any 50/50 give-and-take manner that some seem to indicate is necessary. That is not what we are in these fights for.

Our goal in these affairs is to prevail. For example: To prevail in changing the political, economic and social structures of certain states and societies such that they, their neighbors, and their region might come to cause the modern world fewer problems and offer the modern world greater utility/usefulness instead.

Thus, discussions of any real accommodation of those with other, different and/or conflicting agenda (for example: the Pashtuns?) would seem to be moot.

In this regard, we understand -- and accept -- that there will be some increased degree of danger, conflict and instability, etc., associated with the pursuit of our contemporary objectives.

This understanding -- and acceptance -- helps to explain the "era of persistent conflict" that we so often hear about today.

Bill,

Actually, history is on my side, not WILFs. The CONCLUSONS captured in history books support WILF, but those are books written by those on the side of the governmental "victor."

As an example, history tells me of several insurgencies that have been "defeated" in the Philippines; and yet that troubled land has been in a constant state of insurgency in one form or another since the Spanish first landed. To "whack a mole" one group here, one leader there, one ideology somewhere else, is merely to suppress each of those specific little outbreaks as they occur. The underlying problems lay unaddressed and unresolved. We see this in the modern history of Algeria, Palestine, and a dozen other places.

The only places where such military action has "produced" victory and true stability is where concurrent to such action the government actually made the modifications of governance necessary to address the concerns of the populace (the Brits in Malaya, the US in the Civil Rights movement), or where the insurgent wins outright and did not then go on to adopt the same bad behavior as his predecessor (the American experience with Britain).

So, where Bill is this history to which you speak? As LTG Fridovich once said about the Basilan Model when labeled as "theory" by naysayers, "This isn't theory, this is practice." So I toss this back to you. What you and WILF propose is equally theory, as it is the theory offered by the military, the government and historians as to what produced the results they deemed to be favorable. I look at those same case studies, those same histories and challenge the offical theory that government suppression of the populace is victory. That makes many uncomfortable, but it does not make them right.

Granted, sometimes suppression is enough. The Tamil Tigers are defeated, the insurgency suppressed. The issues of the Tamil populace are wholly unaddressed and continue to fester. Perhaps they will never attempt again to find the dignity, justice and legitimacy of government they reasonably desire. Perhaps they will simply submit and ultimately accept their fate. Certainly the Native Americans had to ultimately face that hard reality. Perhaps someday the Northern Alliance will equally crush the Pashtuns (though I caution anyone to not put any money on that); or the Israelis will ultimately crush the Palestinians (again, this is not a bet to double down on). Or perhaps those two governments will actually come to recognize that they must govern their entire popualces equally and find the stability that has elueded them both since their equally illegitimate (in the eyes of their insurgent popualces) inceptions.

So history indeed supports my theory, in fact, that is where my theory came from. I didn't invent anything, I just looked at the facts from a fresh perspective. In our emerging environment governments will find that increasingly old suppression techniques are less successful, and that they are harder to achieve, and less durable in length. Larger powers who intervene to change or shape the governance of others to suit their own interests over those of the affected populace will also find that increasingly this is more difficult, less durable, and more likely to result in acts of transnational terrorism.

Governments have a tougher role these days. They must actually govern to the entire populace, and not just play to their base of support at the expense of others.

Why would any rational government want to do this?

I ask, realizing that our current national policy is the (I believe) crazy idea that we are more secure when we make others more like us. This belief has driven all manner of messy affairs over the past several years. Far better that we stop trying to "fix" others by making them like us, and that we also stop enabling despots to stay in power beyond their expiration date. We've made some progress on that last one, but are clinging hard to the first. We should simply encourage governments to listen to and serve their entire popualce in a manner that meets their expectations (or simply mind our own business if we don't have some truly vital interest at stake). Not only is this cheap, easy and less offensive, it is also consistent with our founding principles as a nation.

Setting out to transform others is every bit as dangerous to the US as setting out to preserve some despot in power. We need to avoid both approaches with equal vigor. Excessive meddling leaves the bread crumbs that transnationalist terrorists follow to launch their attacks.

"... to solve an insurgency, one must focus on the internal dynamic that is not war."

But what if the goal of the foreign power IS NOT to solve the insurgency, per se, but, rather, to use the opportunity presented by the insurgency to fundamentally transform the state and society (its political, economic and social structure); such that this state and society might come to cause the foreign power fewer problems and offer the foreign power greater utility/usefulness instead?

Would the employment of the foreign intervening power's military forces for these purposes (state and societal transformation -- not counter-insurgency) constitute, not just "combat," but, indeed, state-on-state "war?"