Fiscal Reality and the American Way of War by Col. (Ret.) Dr. Douglas Macgregor, Infinity Journal.
In this Infinity Journal exclusive, Douglas Macgregor asks, what is the strategic meaning of America’s military drawdown? He explains the rationale for a reduced footprint overseas and the resulting demand for “high lethality/low density forces” in American military power.
Comments
scottjk:
You write:<blockquote>"In sum, Dr. Macgregor basically categorized the experience of the last 10 years as irrevelant, castigated the Army and Marines as generally incompetent and unprepared to stand up against a "real enemy," and predicted they lacked the intellectual and warfighting acumen to change themselves into something that relied on combat power disproportionate to their numbers."</blockquote>Re: the first item, if that is not largely true, we haven't learned much -- which I think was his point. As has often been noted, we can afford to lose small wars even if doing so is stupid and inordinately expensive -- thus becomoing unaffordable -- while we cannot afford to lose a big one...
On the second point, my observation having been in both services in peace and war, is that there's a lot of merit to that accusation, certainly more than there should be or needs to be. It seems to me that the last item, an ability to rely on combat power disproportionate to numbers is precluded not so much by intellectual or war fighting acumen -- though shortfalls in those factors are a very minor part of the problem -- as by Congress and societal pressures that dictate purchase of expensive hardware versus better, more intensive training and a meritocratic method of selection for promotion while at the same time denying the institutions the ability to actually <i>be</i> meritocratic due to pressure for 'fairness' and 'objectivity.' I have yet to see any objective way to measure tactical (and much technical...) competence. Micromanagement coupled with ignorance is not conducive to innovation...<blockquote>"So - I don't know what to do with Dr. MacGregor's concerns about the Army being unable to organize in a manner in which the combat power they generate is disproportionate to their numbers. It seems to be what they are regularly accused of doing..."</blockquote>Could that be because it is a fair or at least valid accusation? The last time the US Army tried to be truly innovative and leverage combat power versus mass, the Pentomic era of the late 1950s, the Colonels (and the procurement system...) couldn't cope with it so it died a very quick death in a little over five years. It is notable that Colonel McGregor's last big suggestion, to organize the Army by Brigades rather than in Divisions was done is being fought tooth and nail by many in the army -- too many rice bowls destroyed, makes Two-buttons superfluous. That does not speak well of the institution or the legislature that funds and 'oversees' it.
Leaving the parochial aspects of Colonel MacGregor's article and your reply for you two to argue, I think one point he made was this:<blockquote>"it seems far more likely that the "real enemies" the Marine Corps will face on a daily basis will come from "right to protect" actions, crisis response, and limited contingency operations."</blockquote>That may be the common wisdom but while the scenario may be valid, it is neither necessary or desirable. There are other ways to do those things, better ways than expensively and with little thought deploying the Army's GPF or MEFs to nations where they will almost invariably do more harm than good.
Recall that for many years, the Marines excelled at small punitive and at least quasi strategic raids in support of long standing US national foreign policy goals, open commerce and navigation with no major threats. We used to tolerate minor threats, we can again provided the Politicians and budgeteers in DC stop using them to justify stupidity. A look at a more distant past then the last 10 -- even last 50 -- years may be advantageous.<blockquote>"It would seem to me that these last realities are the ones that really require analysis - with today's fiscal realities, how will American (sic) continue to conduct its demonstrated way of war?"</blockquote>In the end, you both end up with the same question -- is our demonstrated way of war a flawed approach and is a better way desirable?
He says it is. I agree, you may differ...
I am unsure if Dr. Macgregor really explained what the strategic meaning of America's military drawdown is, or really expanded and defended the need for "high lethality/low density forces." It seemed to be a bit of polemic directed at convenient strawmen rather than analysis and thoughtful commentary.
In sum, Dr. Macgregor basically categorized the experience of the last 10 years as irrevelant, castigated the Army and Marines as generally incompetent and unprepared to stand up against a "real enemy," and predicted they lacked the intellectual and warfighting acumen to change themselves into something that relied on combat power disproportionate to their numbers.
I find the last comment the most flabbergasting - having been raised in an environment of maneuver warfare, German penis-envy, and Vietnam critiques, that last thing the US Army was ever accused of was being good at the tactical level. The conventional wisdom ran thus - they won in Europe only because they had more stuff than the Germans and they won tactical victories in Vietnam only because they relied on supporting arms vice rifles. Indeed, at the beginning of OIF and OEF, the Army continued to come in for criticism because it was TOO focused on fighting the conventional fight - a conventional fight based largely on facing superior Soviet numbers in the Fulda Gap and relying on supporting arms over the rifle.
So - I don't know what to do with Dr. MacGregor's concerns about the Army being unable to organize in a manner in which the combat power they generate is disproportionate to their numbers. It seems to be what they are regularly accused of doing...
Regarding the Marine Corps, he seems to think both that Tarawa remains the model for amphibious operations and that the Marine Corps needs to be a second land army. Well - the Marine Corps traditionally is NOT a second land army, and only has been in that role when forced to by a few, large, national emergencies. And second, the vast majority of Marine amphibious operations are not assaults against defended beaches. The Marine Corps is supposed to be a medium-weight expeditionary force employed in that manner - while it must be prepared to contribute to the challenging area denial/anti-access threat, it's natural "place of rest" is in the mid to lower end of the conflict continuum - a force of today, ready to deploy today.
Which brings me to the "real enemy." The one thing that those in uniform have to deal with, that so many people seem to forget, is that they actually have to face "real enemies" decision makers place them against - not the ones they'd like to fight, not the ones they'd like to avoid.
So while it is great that generations of soldiers sat facing the Soviets in the Fulda Gap, other soldiers spent a lot of time fighting with "real enemies" elsewhere, in far different environments. And while I suppose it is worth the time of Navy and Marine Corps planners to consider what two MEFs, on line, storming the Chinese mainland might look like, it seems far more likely that the "real enemies" the Marine Corps will face on a daily basis will come from "right to protect" actions, crisis response, and limited contingency operations.
It would seem to me that these last realities are the ones that really require analysis - with today's fiscal realities, how will American continue to conduct its demonstrated way of war?