From Ending Two Wars to Engagement in Five – with the Risk of a Sixth by Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Presidents propose action, and then reality intervenes. This cycle holds special irony in the case of President Obama. A year ago, it looked like he might end two of the longest wars in U.S. history by the time he left office. As of today, President Obama has involved the United States in five evolving conflicts, and there is little prospect any of them will be over by the time the next president is inaugurated, unless the United States chooses to disengage and lose.
Comments
Edited and added to somewhat:
CSM Bill M.:
Given my thesis above, to wit:
a. That the West (since at least the Clinton Administration and much like our communist counterparts during the Cold War) have been in an expansionist mode.
b. That "they" (Russia, China, Iran, and certain non-state actors) -- much like the West during the Cold War -- have (logically) been in a containment/roll-back mode.
c. And that we now -- much like our communists counterparts then -- have:
1. Much the same problems with our expansionist agenda as they (the communists) did with theirs (to wit: resistance to the alien and profane ways of life that we/they sought to install). And, thus,
2. Much the same "natural" enemies today as our communist counterparts had during the Cold War (the more-conservative/religious/established members of the population). And
3. Much the same "natural" friends as the communists did then (the more-liberal/irreligious/less-ensconced elements of the population).
(Via this self-same logic to understand that those seeking to contain and roll back western power, influence and control today have, in many cases, much the same advantages as we did during the Cold War [as defenders of the status quo] and, thus, much the same friends as we did then [the conservative/religious/ensconced elements of the population] and much the same enemies as we did during the Cold War [the liberals, etc.])
Given this clear and exact role-reversal, then might I suggest that we evaluate the successes, failures and lessons-learned -- re: our post-Cold War expansionist rhetoric and actions -- with the success, failures and lessons-learned of the communists -- re: their expansionist rhetoric and actions during the Cold War.
And specifically compare these with regard to (1) their/our sponsorship of, shall we say, "wars of national liberation" and with regard to (2) their/our use of force (or lack thereof) to accomplish same.
(Herein, these "wars of national liberation," in the Cold War, often being "won" via ways and means other than the introduction of large numbers of soldiers from the communist great power nations?)
Bill C.
Natural political stability/order does not exist in reality, instead a government or non-government power imposes the rules that the people live by. Those that oppose often resist through legal or illegal means, and the power being opposed will either oppress or accommodate those who seek change. We shouldn't fall into the trap of viewing a few thousand protestors in the streets of Cairo for example, as "the people." They represented one political view, while others were content with the existing system, and others wanted to impose Sharia law. It is a bit overly simplistic to assume there is a black and white political solution in most cases.
Moving to your outstanding question on how the communists overcame resistance. Much like the British and French, they overcame resistance in their colonies and proxy states with a sufficient level of force. An option we don't and shouldn't have. Obviously the communists were more brutal, but at the end of the day both employed sufficient force to suppress the resistance where they were successful.
The competitive control theory explains this quite well if you believe most people just want to know what the rules are so they know how to act in a way that they'll be secure and can take care of their families. At least in the post-conflict phase where people are searching for some sort of order. Understandably, an emerging democracy in a country with no history of democracy, especially after a conflict, does not offer that security. It is the hardest type of government to "impose" on others, especially when it runs counter to their culture. We're usually in too much of a hurry to push deep change assuming we should be doing it all.
The communists went several steps further, they purged those who they believed were threats, and re-educated those they didn't kill to consolidate control. They drove the previous culture underground in many cases. These lessons are not helpful to us in a practical sense, but they do offer some insights on how others impose change. We should ask ourselves if we really are on the high moral ground when we intervene in others' internal affairs and impose forms of government on them. Our more radical politicians like Clinton and Bush Jr. believe that democracy is a natural form of government, one that would emerge naturally when we paved the way for it to do so. When it was resisted we were dumbfounded strategically, because our strategy was based on a false assumption that democracy would be embraced.
If the majority of people in nation want democracy we should help them, that is not the same as imposing it. Outside of that we should focus on our protecting our interests.
I agree with COL Jones and CSM(?) Bill M. below,
That the U.S. military cannot solve our current problems in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Problems which I define as states and societies -- and indeed state and non-state actors -- becoming:
a. Organized, ordered and oriented in such a way as to
b. Protect and defend themselves and their individual and unique ways of life (and their associated individual and unique values, attitudes and beliefs) against
c. The post-Cold War assault being made on same by the United States/the western world.
d. Herein, these individual and/or combined efforts being made to (1) stop, contain and roll back the West re: (2) its effort to gain greater power, influence and control throughout the world via (3) its aggressive efforts to transform other states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines.
(Based on my description of the problem above, one can see that I do not associate our problems today with "globalization." Rather, I say these problems can be traced directly to the United States/the West's post-Cold War expansionist initiatives -- which I now suggest begin, not with Bush Jr. and/or 9/11 but, rather, with the Clinton Administration and "Engagement and Enlargement".)
So: To understand "From Two Wars to Engagement in Five With a Risk of a Sixth" -- and, indeed, to understand the current actions being undertaken by such nations as Russia, China, Iran, etc. and the problems related thereto -- from the standpoint of (1) our pursuit of our post-Cold War political objective (expansion) and (2) the defensive response of state and non-state actors thereto (to stop, contain and/or roll back the advance of western power, influence and control).
(Thus, very "normal/natural" responses by our opponents?)
In the old days (to wit: during the Cold War), it would have been the United States/the West that stood with the local populations, to stop the threat to their way of life that was posed by the great (communist) powers, who were bent on eliminating same and replacing these with (in the eyes of many locals) the alien/profane way of life favored by the communist great powers.
Today, however, it would seem that the shoe is on the other foot with:
a. "We" (the West) being seen as the aggressors; bent on advancing our own (in the eyes of many local people) alien and profane way of life.
b. While "they" (such nations as Russia, China, Iran and certain non-state actors) are being seen as the defenders of conservative/religious/traditional values, ways of life, etc.
Thus, the problems of the communist great powers during the Cold War -- associated with their efforts at expansion then -- now, due to our similar expansionist efforts post-the Cold War, these self-same problems now become ours. (Many of the communist great power's conservative/religious opponents, likewise, now becoming ours?)
Questions: How did the communist great powers overcome the natural/normal resistance to their expansionist activities, and achieve expansion, in spite of such resistance, anyway? Anything we can learn there (militarily or otherwise)?
There is no "win" to be found in Afghanistan or Iraq through military action - but that was determined by how we began those conflicts, not by how we ultimately conclude our overt military role in either one.
By design, our entry into each place blew out any semblance of government possessing popular legitimacy; and we then installed systems of governance we believed would be best for us that were de facto illegitimate because of it - rather than allowing new systems possessed of some degree of popular legitimacy to emerge of their own accord.
We followed the great power colonial playbook, unadjusted for the realities of the modern globalized world. We then defined the naturally occurring friction to those deeply flawed political situations as "irregular, complex warfare" - and set out to wage a confused mix of "COIN" war to fix them. I am sure that our primary competitors around the globe are quite amused by our self-induced frustration.
There is no military win to be found, but if we reframe the problem in more accurate terms and adjust our approaches and goals accordingly, there is still an opportunity to achieve a political win that serves our truly vital interests (not the expansive, ideological bundle of interests laid out in the NSS) quite well.
But between the good cold warriors and the equally out of touch social engineers who dominate our policy and military decisions, I see little hope that we will make that transition in time - if at all.
This is perhaps the primary way great powers fade, or stumble and fall. So full of our own narrative of a world we arrogantly profess to lead, that we cannot accurately see the world for what it actually is.
Bill C.
Bush and crew certainly made the situation worse, but don't forget the genie was out of the bottle prior to the attacks on 9/11. Tensions were rising well before the Wall came down, but the world order we had an uneasy comfort with started shattering when the Wall came down and USSR collapsed. Amongst this chaos, the processes of globalization accelerated. This increased the power of non-state actors while reducing the power of state actors. Understandably we now live an era of unprecedented rapid change and uncertainty.
Bush used a 20th approach to security when he opted to attack two states to counter a global non-state network in hopes that he could coerce other states to deny sanctuary to terrorists. He believed in leveraging traditional forms of power to stabilize the world because he believed if we used traditional military power to remove evil governments that the people in those countries would automatically embrace our vision of freedom for them. Natural laws in his world view.
I think we are getting to the point where we will accept the need to execute an defensive instead of offensive strategy. A defensive strategy focuses on protecting our interests, and it can and will involve offensive actions, to include war if needed. In contrast, an offensive strategy focuses on taking something from someone else, like their government, their culture, natural resources, their women, etc. Bush's strategy was about transforming outlying states and cultures, so it was offensive in character, and it has created more instability and security risks globally. Our military can't solve most of the world's problems, but if properly employed it can protect our interests.
It may not be possible for President Obama -- or indeed any future U.S. President -- to undo what President Bush has done, to wit: (1) To stir up the fires of freedom and independence with (2) no reasonable, intelligent and/or viable plan for dealing with the numerous revolutionary wildfires that would, thereby, result. (The "They Will All Want to Be Like Us Plan" not qualifying as reasonable, intelligent and/or viable.)
Thus, the genie is out of the bottle, the lid to Pandora's Box is off and chaos and suffering -- as one might expect -- reigns. Herein, the world never to be the same (or better) again?
Thus, a strategy needed that addresses how to -- not reverse things (this would seem equally imprudent/irrational/impossible) -- but, rather, to deal with and make the most of this horrible situation (a situation that is, in fact, of our own creation).
In the old days, such a strategy might be:
a. To let these folks work things out among themselves.
b. To deal with the resulting problems only on the margins and only as they effect us directly.
c. Otherwise, the West simply "holding its water" -- until such time as viable leaders rise to the top and come forward for us to deal with.
Today, however, a more proactive approach would seem necessary; this, due to our dependence on -- and responsibilities to -- the international community, the global economy and the nations and populations thereof.
The problem with this idea is that there may be, in fact, no national or international will or consensus -- and, indeed, no national or international money -- available to use for such proactive activities. This, due to the financial crisis and the loss in confidence achieved on President Bush's watch.
These providing that the old method/mode -- identified at "a" - "c" above -- may, by default, become our new strategy?