Tenay Guvendiren sent us and all wishes for a Merry Christmas and a Happy New
Year. She and LTC Scott Downey penned two articles in Small Wars Journal
about their experiences applying intel in a countersurgency . Though they
were specifically in Iraq, their take-aways are broader. BTW, they were
learned under General Petraeus' campaign plan whose approach is now in effect,
mutatis mutandi, in Afghanistan. So we highlight those two works
again; if nothing else, for food for thought for those currently in the
fight.
Putting the Priority Back into PIR -- Linking Brigade/Regimental Combat Team
Priority Intelligence Requirements to Desired Effects and Campaign Plan
Decision Points, 12 April 2009.
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Collection Management in the
Brigade Combat Team during COIN: Three Assumptions and Ten 'A-Ha!' Moments
on the Path to Battlefield Awareness, 10 November 2008.
Comments
Thunder2W;
I would go even further and state that the core problem lies in the simple fact that Ft. H is good at training skill sets for the individual but fails at teaching collective staff training meaning teaching complete intel staffs just how in the fact they do work.
Just when they seem to finally get COIN and that to a limited degree we are turning the battleship around in the Hudson river and telling them to go back to the world of deliberate and dynamic targeting, TVAs, TSSs, target synch matrixes, intel synch matrixes, wargaming, and ISR synch tied to the scheme of maneuver when they still cannot get ISR right for COIN.
What is your question exactly? Yes, short dwell times have had an adverse impact on all training, not just MI training. M1 or M2 gunnery has suffered as well. The difference is that Soldiers are not engaging BMPs or T-72s down-range, they are doing intel.
Going off of the timeline CPT Guvendiren and LTC Downey provided, 1CD had from JAN 05 from NOV 06 stateside that could have been used for training. I believe nearly 2 years of unit being stateside can accommodate a JICTC rotation (1 week), F3EAD training (4 days), CoIST Training (5 days), or any of the UGS, Cultural Awareness, HUMINT, Prophet, BATS/HIIDE, or Battlefield Forensics Mobile Training Teams (all about 1 week long) to go to Ft. Hood and conduct valuable training.
The question is, what are S-2 shops doing when they are not deployed in lieu of training? From what I have seen across multiple divisions is that S2 shops are doing arms rooms inspections, processing SF86s, updating SCARs, PMCSing equipment, and being fielded new equipment (ASAS over RWS, DCGS-A over ASAS, the next step will probably be Palantir to compliment or replace DCGS).
Having new and improved intelligence equipment does not have as great of an impact as actually improving MI Soldier's skills in the intelligence process. Intelligence professionals need to realize that the ASAS, DCGS, or whatever system is just their "rifle". Is there more to being a successful infantryman than shooting well on the range? Yes. It doesn't matter if an 11B has a M4 or s M1 Garand, basic infantry principles still apply. Those basic intel principles are not being taught anywhere except in the combat zones. Combat zones should not be where Soldiers (MI and non-MI) learn from their mistakes. Mistakes are too costly in combat.
So to answer your statement, yes, short dwell times have a negative impact on the amount of training that can be conducted CONUS. But there is still ample time for training to be scheduled and conducted in between deployments. Units are not taking advantage of the training available when they are not downrange.
Anon 1: your statement confirms my comment. Simple tasks (by 96B/35F AIT standards) like developing PIRs, from Commander's Intent not CCIRs, is something that 35F30s and 35Ds should be able to do. I want to emphasize that PIRs are derived from the Commander's Intent, not the CCIRs. PIRs are a subset of CCIRs. Also, you stated that BCT S-2 shops cannot do this task; why not? It goes back to Ft. Huachuca teaching the buttonology of the systems like DCGS-A to their students at the cost of teaching the intelligence process, like developing PIRs.
AIT for 35Fs today is only two weeks longer than what it was 10 years ago when everything was done on acetate and butcher block paper. Basically instructors have 2 additional weeks to teach Soldiers while having about 10 additional weeks of training in the curriculum. IOT teach to successfully teach the systems, the intel process is being sacrificed.
This problem can be easily solved: increase the training time at AIT and SLC for the enlisted and increase the time at BOLC. Go back to making students prove they know how to do the process on paper before they graduate to doing it digitally. Did we learn how to do long division on a calculator in elementary school? No, we learned the process on paper before calculators were allowed. Simple analogy it seems but I think it is applicable is this situation.
Anon2: there are plenty of CWOs that push the limits of the lower enlisted to see how capable they are and have them improve as analysts; I had a very influential CW2 that did that in my second unit. I was stating that it appeared that 2BCT/1CD did not have the benefit of that type of CWO. I believe that a strong CW2 All Source Intelligence Tech could have saved many of the headaches that BCT had, and subsequently those Jr. Officers and enlisted had to struggle through. (And I am only saying they struggled to learn this because of the 2 papers linked to in this article, I do not know this from personal experience working for or with the unit.)
Not to sound completely negative, but these papers were worthless to any competent intelligence professional above the entry-level point in their MI careers the first time they were printed, and they are not any more important now. As much as population centric COIN emphasizes increased use of intelligence collection, it does not address the problem that collection and knowledge management is generally done poorly by Army intelligence officers. The same cannot be said for the Marines (and this is coming from an Army MI guy with deployments ISO USMC and Army elements).
Population centric COIN can emphasize the importance of intelligence, but until the students being turned out of Ft. Huachuca on the officer, enlisted, and NCO side of the house improve, the answer to needing "better intel" will be to plus up the size of S-2 shops, collectors, and issuing "new and improved" intelligence collection equipment without increasing the quality of the Soldier coming out of the school house. It is not entirely Ft. Huachuca's fault, because it is on the S-2 NCOICs and Training NCOs to ensure training relevant to MI Soldiers' jobs is being conducted at home station so there are not any "A-ha" moments down-range when it comes to something as predictable (at least compared to enemy TTPs) with collection management. There is too much MI training available to Army units between Project Foundry and GWOT/OCO funded training teams for as steep of a learning curve that the LTC and CPT speak of in their papers.
Also, the fact that a CPT and LTC (an O-5 that was a BCT S-2 and not a Division S-2 for whatever reason) authored these papers reflects the lack of trust that exists between MI officers in their NCOs and the lack of strength in MI NCOs. In every S-2 shop, especially at the BCT level, there should be an analyst there to ensure the officers do not have their heads inserted into their own anal cavities. Where was the BCT Master Analyst in 2BCT/1CD? Where was the All-Source Analysis Tech (Warrant Officer)?
These papers merely state the obvious to anyone who is worth their salt as an intelligence professional. I think we have gotten to a point where all that can said about intelligence has already been said. Until the quality, not just the quantity, of the intelligence analysts and collectors greatly increase and MI officers learn to trust the analytical opinions of Soldiers that probably do not have a college degree, there will not be an improvement in the analysis, collection management, or intelligence collection in all Irregular Warfare environments in the conventional S-2 and G-2 sections.
Thunder2W:
Would whole heartedly disagree with your comments---even in 2010 BCT S2 shops in Iraq or Afghanistan are still not able to write good solid PIRs taken from the Commanders CCIRs.
Any suggestions as to why that is? Based on what you are saying every BCT should be able to at least complete that task successfully.
Let's take the reality of collection managers who really do no home station training as they cannot collect on anything and secondly it is a function usually assigned to a lowly 2nd Lt. or the last junior intel officer through the door just prior to deployment.
Any suggestions on how to fix that problem-am all ears.
Thunder2W;
Not so sure where you have served as an Intel type but I have seen Division Cmdrs demanding to be briefed by E4/5s and only selected E4/5s as they had been given a wide ability by their All Source CWO to quasi push the limits of their abilities to new levels---it is an issue of empowerment which the Army is not good at not one of rank or shoolhouse training.