... Waging a successful counterinsurgency campaign with current force levels could prove impossible. The 10,000 Marines deployed to Helmand province and the 4,000 Army soldiers in Stryker armored vehicles who were sent to Kandahar - all among the 21,000 troops authorized by Obama this year - may be able to improve security in the towns and districts where they are operating. But those are just a few spots on the map; there would still be plenty of populated areas in Helmand and Kandahar with few or no NATO troops. It is to those places, districts to the north of where the Strykers are, and to the west of where the Marines are, that the Taliban fighters have retreated. And it is from those places, military officials believe, that the insurgents will seek to destabilize whatever gains the new US forces make.
In theory, once the districts with the Marines and the Strykers become more stable, and once Afghan police and soldiers become capable of ensuring security, US forces can move on to the next trouble spots. The problem is that creating effective Afghan security forces takes time, and it will not be solved by adding a few thousand more trainers. Without more US troops, those sanctuaries will remain unchallenged and will pose an ongoing risk to McChrystal's protect-the-population effort.
All of which brings some here back to the extremes: Either you go all-in, or you fold...
More at The Washington Post.
What's the Right Strategy for Afghanistan? - Washington Post's Topic A opinions.
The Post asked foreign policy experts whether President Obama should maintain a focus on protecting the population and rebuilding the country, or on striking terrorists. Below are contributions from Jane Harman, Kurt Volker, Gilles Dorronsoro, John Nagl, Ronald E. Neumann, Meghan O'Sullivan and Carl M. Levin.
Topic A at The Washington Post.
Comments
Carl Levin, in the second article, wrote:
<blockquote><em>A counterinsurgency strategy to secure the Afghan population, principally carried out by the Afghan army with support from the United States and coalition allies, is the approach that seems most likely to prevent the Taliban from retaking power and once again harboring those who have attacked us before and would attack us again.</em></blockquote>
That seems to be a very common sentiment. It might even be correct. But here is the question that has been nagging me for months: <em>The approach that seems most likely, <strong>in comparison to what other approaches?</strong></em> What else have we considered?