Karzai Announces Peace Talks with Taliban - VOAKarzai: US in Peace Talks with Taliban - WP
Lashing Out, Karzai Says US Talking to the Taliban - NYT
US Contacted Taliban about Afghan Peace Deal - LAT
Karzai: US in Peace Talks with Taliban - BBC
As Karzai Confirms Taliban Talks, Attack in Kabul Kills 9 - AP
Gates: Headway in Taliban Talks May be Months Off - Reuters. BLUF: "It could be months before efforts to broker a peace deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban bear fruit, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in an interview aired on Sunday."
Comments
RCJ:
Again you sidestep the basic contradiction in your position. All this talk about relinquishing control and "IAW their culture" sounds very wonderful, but then you turn around and decide that the outcome of the process, pre-ordained by us, must be reconciliation and shared power under an inclusive Constitution. How is this consistent with relinquishing control and allowing Afghans to act IAW their culture? Is there anything in recent Afghan history to suggest that reconciliation and power sharing are compatible with the existing political culture?
The only way the contesting parties in Afghanistan are going to agree to reconciliation, power sharing, and an inclusive Constitution, with any sincerity at least, is if we control the process. In that case, it's unlikely that the agreement would last once we were gone.
You seem to proceed from the assumption that the Taliban are fighting for inclusion and will be satisfied if they gain inclusion, and that only Karzai needs to be pressured to accept reconciliation. What basis is there for that assumption? Why would you suspect that the Taliban have any interest in reconciliation and inclusion, except as a step toward eventual control?
I don't think we're enabling Karzai to avoid reconciliation, I think we're enabling him to avoid defeat. I don't think the Taliban are fighting for inclusion, I think they are, to use the American Idle expression (I have a teen daughter), "in it to win it". If we're looking at this "IAW their culture", reconciliation isn't a likely outcome, and exclusion is a given: the fight is over who will be excluded by whom.
We may be able to force Karzai and the Taliban to sit down together, but we can't make them trust each other. We can't decree what the outcome of those discussion will be, certainly not if we ant to maintain any illusion of relinquishing control and allowing action IAW their culture.
Parties that don't trust each other only agree to enter into contracts if there's an outside party that all contracting parties trust to mediate contract disputes impartially and effectively... generally, the law and the legal system. Hard for the parties in Afghanistan to do that, because no such enforcing party exists. The US may try to mediate a discussion, but we're not going to be around to enforce compliance with whatever agreement emerges.
Let's not kid ourselves: the goal of talks with the Taliban is not to produce a lasting reconciliation and shared power... or if that is the goal, it's a hopelessly unrealistic one. The goal is simply to give us an exit point. If an agreement lasts long enough for us to declare a win and extricate, it will serve its purpose. When the parties involve turn on each other and start fighting again... well, we'll deal with that when it happens. When, not if.
Bill C.
Perhaps, but even if we had sought impose a very "traditional" Afghan government, that drew its rise to power and continued legitimacy from our presence and support, do you not think the same insurgency would have resulted?
The taliban have no legal means to compete for relevance in the eyes of the Afghan populace. Many say "good, those guys were evil!" Perhaps, but guess what? No one else can compete either without Karzai's blessing. If Ahmad Shah Massoud himself descended from heaven on a winged horse, he would be forced to once again become an insurgent in his own land if Karzai opposed his desired to participate legally in government.
The Karzai regime has poisoned the political waters, killing all competition, good or bad, leaving us, and the Afghan people, only with Karzai and the Northern Alliance. My solution to this is simple.
Step 1. Reconciliation that brings all of the stakeholders legally and safely together to debate IAW their culture how to open economic and political competition legally and equitably to all Afghans. How to do so in a manner so that no one group can rise to dominance over any others. How to do so in a manner within the means of Afghanistan to implement and sustain on their own.
Step 2. Then, IAW provisions in the current constitution, call a Constitutional Loya Jirga and capture the results of that debate into a new guideline for the future of ALL Afghans.
Step 3. The Coalition packs its bags and 95% of it goes home.
This is only difficult because we:
A. Have a very flawed understanding of insurgency and counterinsurgency derived from centuries of exerting controlling influence over others.
B. We fear what will happen if we give up control of the outcome.
We can do this. We must do this. I listen to the growing political debate, and they argue the wrong issues and fear the wrong things. We have mis-defined the problem and apply inappropriate solutions. We, not the Afghan people, must evolve. Only then can we move forward to more important things for everyone involved.
Cheers
Bob
"This is not an issue of old vs new; East vs West. This is an issue of THE CURRENT INSURGENCY in Afghanistan. When did that begin and what kicked it into high gear???"
I'll take a stab at this:
The current insurgency in Afghanistan began when the "West" arrived and overthrew the Taliban government and, seeking to capitalize on this opportunity, attempted to impose a "Western-style" political, economic and social order on the Afghan people via such things as the Karzai government. The anarchial conditions that followed allowed leadership -- both inside and outside of Afghanistan -- who oppose such aggression -- and oppose this normative vision of society (the Western one) -- to rally their supports, organize and become more effective in their effort to counter same (what they saw as a Western effort to transform and assimiliate Afghanistan).
Thus, "way of life" wars.
Dayuhan,
Where there is trust men shake hands. Where men recognize the stakes are so large as to tempt even honest men to take undue advantage, they sign contracts. Afghan people have proven they have the base trust necessary to form such an instrument, but it is not in the interest of the current government to do so as it forces them to share with those who we have helped them to exclude.
Arbitration and Mediation. You have heard of this, right? Aptly called "Alternative Dispute Resolution" in the law, as it is a way to achieve a solution without going to trial. Similarly this is the role I propose. Alternative to violent conflict. Someone must indeed force Karzai to conduct this process, and someone will need to ensure the right people are allowed to participate in safety. Currently we enable him to avoid reconciliation. But the solutions attained in this process must be theirs. Can we allow one party to dominate another like we did last time? No, we cannot if we really believe we have the vital intersts here that so many profess. Or, we must be willing to simply walk away and let the people sort it out. But it will be the little people who suffer in that final option, particularly those who have trusted us most in programs like VSO and ALP. The fat cats will take the money and run and wait for the next foreign intervention to ride to power yet again...after all, this is Afghanistan.
Bob
People enter into contracts because they have some level of trust already, either in the other contracting party or in the ability of a legal system to enforce the contract or penalize one who breaks it. In Afghanistan, who's going to enforce the contract or penalize any who break it? Contract law works because it's enforceable... if it's not, the contract is pretty meaningless. Who would enforce an Afghan Constitution.
<i>For the US, we must begin by realizing that this is not ours to control. For the Afghan people they need to realize they must break the cycle of oppresion and oppressed and endless insurgency. A constitution provides that frame work, but the framework can create insurgency (as we see now) or help to prevent it if done right. It must be their product and tuned to their culture, but within that it must be designed to create trust</i>
Again, the same contradiction. You want the US to "realize this is not ours to control", but the solution you propose can only be advanced if the US takes control... Karzai and the Taliban are not going to sit down and design a power-sharing Constitution on their own. If the US forces this "solution" - a quintessentially American solution - on the Afghan parties, what relevance will it have to them, and what chance will there be of any of the parties obeying whatever document emerges?
This is not an issue of old vs new; East vs. West. This is an issue of THE CURRENT INSURGENCY in Afghanistan. When did that begin and what kicked it into high gear??? This is a country that has always been a contest of Pashtuns vs the rest, shifting alliances and wide swings of power and influence as the excluded teams have jumped into the camps of a long line of foreign invaders to ride their coat tails to power over their former oppressors. This is Afghanistan.
Today is no different. The Northern Alliance rode our coat tails to power, and then, with great craftsmanship, leveraged our fears, focus on hunting AQ, and lack of interest of what kind of governance they built in Afghanistan so long as it was supportive of our efforts there, to build the current oppressive ponzi scheme of patronage WITH THE CONSTITUTION WE HELPED THEM WRITE. Now, I am a bit of a geek, I admit. I have studied our own costitution and the rich history of how and why it came to be the way it is. I have also studied the many Afghan constitutions over the past 100 years or so and in particular the most recent one. I do this in the context of my training and experience as a Special Forces officer and my focused study into the nature of insurgency and the context of all the many insurgency campaigns waged all over the world. I think this stuff is interesting. One of the most intersting aspects are the biases infused in all of this body of work by colonial "counterinsurgents" and by military "counterinsurgents" and by governmental "counterinsurgents" and by the insurgents themselves. There is just too much power, influence, and inertia of perspective in play for any clarity to emerge from any single perspective.
But the fact is (IMO) that the current constitution of Afghanistan vests all patronage in a single man, and that no amount of local engagement can overcome that mass of centralized, super-sized, corruptive influence the rests unmolested and protected upon it.
The fact is that under the current constitution no opposition party has any legal means to challenge this current government that was shaped and formed, and is now protected, by our external efforts.
How can the segment of the populace once represented by the Taliban legally compete for economic or political influence under the current constitution?? What is the segment of the populace who do not recogize the legitimacy of the current regime supposed to do when given no legal means to influence this system under the current constitution?? What is the average Afghan man who objects to a massive foreign presence in his homeland (and often in his very home) supposed to do in response??
I suspect that Gian Gentile, Ken White, Dayuhan, Bill Moore, myself and many others who come to this site to debate these things all have one thing in common: If we were born Afghan Pashtuns of a tribe or family not blessed by Karzai we would all be Taliban or dead. This is the only choice (other than submission) under the current constitution, and these are people who do not understand "submission."
I refuse to buy the failed logic of "we had to destroy the village to save the village." No, we had to destroy the village to force the villagers to submit to a form of governance that they did not believe in. "Security first" is a military axiom, but insurgency is not a military operation, it is a political operation that governments tend to wage with militaries.
We must start somewhere. For the US, we must begin by realizing that this is not ours to control. For the Afghan people they need to realize they must break the cycle of oppresion and oppressed and endless insurgency. A constitution provides that frame work, but the framework can create insurgency (as we see now) or help to prevent it if done right. It must be their product and tuned to their culture, but within that it must be designed to create trust, and yes, that is indeed possible, centuries of contract law prove that to be true.
Bob
On a purely definitional basis, the OED says the to codify is to "arrange (laws or rules) into a systematic code". In other words, to codify is to coherently present conventions that already exist. To codify is not to create.
No contract has any relevance unless the contracting parties already have some form of agreement, some form of basic trust, and some level of agreement on enforcement mechanisms. No contract can have relevance if the contracting parties do not enter the contract voluntarily. A Constitution in itself has no power and no influence. Its power and influence derive from the will of the parties involved to comply: a Constitution cannot enforce itself.
We cannot impose or create trust. We cannot codify trust, consensus, or rules that do not exist. That doesn't mean trust among the warring parties can't eventually grow, or that they cannot eventually achieve a functioning consensus on how they can be governed. Maybe they can... or maybe they can't. In either event, the process is likely to be long and difficult, and we can neither control it nor impose a "solution" that we think appropriate.
<b>Robert C. Jones:</b>
Question: With a Constitution or a contract, is one codifying trust or compliance?
I think <b>Bill C.</b> has it right. Too many times, a western desire for the rule of law and 'good governance' has run into the wall of "We don' like dat. Xao Lam" and violence ensues.
I very much agree with <b>Dayuhan</b>. Compliance can be ordained but trust must be grown. It can be grown fairly quickly, so it is not always a generational thing but it cannot be directed. In fact, in my observation, attempts to do so adversely impact efforts at trust building.
For example, I'm supposed to trust Gian because he's an Officer; he's supposed to trust me because I'm a senior NCO -- but actually, while we both will pay lip service to that and avoid crossing any behavioral lines, there will be no real trust until we get to know each other and a degree of reliability and consistency is shown. That works. Wordlwide...
As an aside, you continue to attempt to apply the US models to other nations and peoples. I've watched us try to do that dozens of places for most of the past 80 years and with rare exceptions, we have not been successful. What we as a nation did and do rarely translates at all well to other groups of people. Note also that you often mention that we, the US, need to regroup and get our act(s) together thus one could say that our model is generally successful but better options in many areas of governance exist. Caution on that issue may be advisable.
Clarification:
In this contest between those who advocate a more-modern way of life vs those who cherish a more-traditional way of life, I am referring, in this instance, to the INTERNATIONAL conflict caused by the more-liberal "West's" pressing of elements of the more-conservative "Rest;" causing radicalization, insurgencies, attempts at seperation, etc.
I am not referring, in this instance, to the somewhat similar conflict -- modern/liberals vs less-modern/conservatives -- which is on-going presently WITHIN the United States and other entities of the "West."
When fundamental things are at stake, for example: two distinctly different ways of life - more-modern vs less-modern (North vs South in American Civil War?), can such lesser things as constitutions/contracts prove insufficient and matters have to be decided by conflict and war?
Is such the case today; wherein, those clamoring for modernity/liberalism have pushed those who cherish less-modern/more-conservative ways into a corner; causing them to determine that war -- not constitutions or contracts -- is the only viable choice?
Dayuhan,
Wrong. If you wait for people who don't trust each other to magically begin to do so before they can move forward, then it will never happen. People can and do create trust where none exists and they do it every day. You have heard of a "contract," correct?
This is what a constitution is, after all, a social contract. A document designed to create a degree of trust that allows a society made up of a variety of populaces and diverse interests to be able to relax enough to be able to move forward together to a better mutual effect than they could achieve on their own.
For this to work there must be effective enforcement as well. In the US constitution it was set up so that all three branches were manned in ways acceptable to all (no small chore), and then set up to police each other, with the final arbiter being an informed and armed populace to keep all three branches from getting together to put it to the people. This can be done in other ways, but the approach we took continues to work well.
So I will not quibble. You are dead wrong on this one brother. One not only CAN codify trust where none exists, one MUST.
Bob
<i>Then it must roll immediately into a comprehensive constitutional loya jirga similar to the one we held back in 1787. They must codify trust where none naturally exists.</i>
How do you codify something that doesn't exist? You have to grow some trust (has to be grown, can't be created) before you can codify it, and a constitution isn't going to do that.
It's tough to reconcile the statement that we need to "not be too controlling" and the statement that "it must roll immediately into a comprehensive constitutional loya jirga". How do we force a constitutional Loya Jirga without being controlling? It's not likely to happen all by itself. Even if it did, given the lack of trust and history of conflict, it's most unlikely that either side would view it as anything but a transitory step toward their own goal of exclusive power.
The Taliban aren't fighting for inclusion, they're fighting for power... and if they get it, they will exclude everyone else, as they did before. They had that power, they lost it, and they want it back. Whether we like it or not, there will be a winner and a loser, the winners will become oppressors and the losers will become insurgents.
Shared power is a lovely solution for us, but the contesting parties aren't going to accept it as anything but a transition step leading to their victory, and we haven't the power to impose it.
Dave,
I discussed this with Steve Metz several months ago when he was good enough to review the proposal for a way ahead in Afghanistan that I prepared for the Center for Advanced Defense Studies.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/50971058/Empowering-Success-in-Afghanistan
Dr. Metz's assessment then was much as yours now, that we were shooting for a "decent interval." Certainly it has always looked to me that that has been GEN Petreaus' objective given his apporach to the conflict since he assumed command.
As to Mr. Karzai, he is acting quite rational. First, like all good governmental leaders he is blind to the elements of causation radiating out from his government and blames the insurgency on others. He pins it to the Taliban and to the Coalition. He is right in part, but wrong as to the main problem, but naturally so. Second, we have left reconciliation and negotiations with the revolutionary "Big T" Taliban leadership in Pakistan to him and his government to do while we focused the Coalition on reintegration and defeat of the "Little t" taliban resistance insurgency in Afghanistan. No one seemed to consider the fact that it is not in Karzai and the Northern Alliance-based GIRoA to reconcile. Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazara have long memories of suffering under Pashtun rule (long before there was Taliban), and do not want to let that camel's nose back under the proverbial tent. Far better to rely on the Coalition to "defeat" this threat. We have really let Mr. Karzai down by not crafting a military victory from him.
(Also, IMO one cannot defeat a resistance movement so long as the revolutionary movement is alive in well, it will simply keep regenerating from that strong rootstock. But resolve the revolution, and the resistance will naturally fade away.)
Both Mr. Karzai and the Coalition have a very flawed understanding of this insurgency, IMO. It is those flawed perspectives that shape equally flawed approaches by both parties. But this is a move in the right direction. I have long believed that we would have to force the issue of reconciliation to get it moving forward, so if we are forcing it now I endorse that effort. We just need to not be too controllong and try to ban any stakeholders from participation. All must be there for this to have best effect. Then it must roll immediately into a comprehensive constitutional loya jirga similar to the one we held back in 1787. They must codify trust where none naturally exists.
Cheers!
Bob
Robert C. Jones
Director of Strategic Understanding
Center for Advanced Defense Studies
As an Afghan outsider looking in, the enemy vs. friendly equation seems out of balance here given these quotes:
"Afghan President Hamid Karzai confirmed Saturday for the first time that the Afghan and U.S. governments have begun peace discussions with Taliban insurgents, saying that the talks "have started already" and are "going well," according to news accounts. He said foreign military forces, "especially the United States," are "going ahead with these negotiations."
"In his comments critical of the international presence in Afghanistan, the president complained that NATO weapons pollute the environment and that foreign aid to Afghanistan amounts to far less than what the foreign forces take away. He also criticized Western forces for killing innocent people in Libya.
Karzai has voiced increasing antagonism toward U.S. and NATO forces here, blaming them repeatedly for civilian casualties and suggesting that they are becoming an occupying force.
It would seem to me that if the Taliban insurgency threatens and is fighting the Afghan government, the two belligerents that should be talking are the Karzai government and the Taliban. But the way Karzai is describing things is that the negotiations are between the foreign ("occupying") forces and the Taliban. If it was not for the following quote, I would think that the Karzai position is closer to the Taliban position:
Yet Afghan officials have also expressed concern about Afghan security and stability once U.S. forces begin a withdrawal planned for between now and 2014.
If this a US-Taliban negotiation? Is this a Vietnam redux? Are we looking for the decent interval or healthy interval that Kissinger sought as noted in Walter Isaacson's biography of Kissinger on page 485"
"As it turned out, the main thing that Nixon and Kissinger accomplished was a "decent interval" - two years - between America's withdrawal and the defeat of the government it had committed itself to defend."
...
"Kissinger had used the phrase "decent interval" at symposiums he attended in 1967 and 1968 before taking office."
...
"That September [1971], he wrote a secret memo for Nixon advocating a negotiated settlement."...
"A peace settlement would end the war with an act of policy and leave the future of South Vietnam to the historic process. We could heal our wounds as our men left peace left behind on the battlefield and a healthy interval for South Vietnam's fate to unfold." (emphasis added)