This city is starting to feel a lot like Baghdad. Tall concrete blast walls, like those that surround the Green Zone, are seemingly everywhere. Checkpoints supervised by U.S. soldiers have been erected on all major roads leading into the city. Residents are being urged to apply for new identification cards that require them to have their retinas scanned and their fingerprints recorded.
As U.S. and NATO commanders mount a major effort to counter the Taliban's influence in Kandahar, they are turning to population-control tactics employed in the Iraqi capital during the 2007 troop surge to separate warring Sunnis and Shiites. They are betting that such measures can help separate insurgents here from the rest of the population, an essential first step in the U.S.-led campaign to improve security in and around Afghanistan's second-largest city...
In Baghdad, the use of checkpoints, identification cards and walled-off communities helped to reduce violence because there were two feuding factions, riven by sect. Because the city had been carved into a collection of separate Sunni and Shiite neighborhoods, U.S. forces were able to place themselves along the borders. Both sides tolerated the tactics to a degree because they came to believe U.S. troops would protect them from their rivals. The conflict in Kandahar is far murkier. There are no differences in religion or ethnicity: Nearly everyone here is a Sunni Pashtun. There are divisions among tribes and clans, but they are not a reliable indicator of support for the Taliban. And many residents regard U.S. forces as the cause of the growing instability, rather than the solution to it...
More at The Washington Post.
Comments
Reference "Many of us find it very odd that the locals fight less for their security than the 'bad guys' who cross the border to inflict 'Talib' radical ideology."
Maybe our assumptions upon which the idea that "the locals fight less for their security than the 'bad guys'" is based are just plain wrong... Let's define security in an Afghan context first... in this case, security from whom?
We automatically assume that the Talib are the bad men and the government and ANA the good men. Maybe the government folks we have empowered do not adhere to our adage "to protect and serve the people" and are more likely to accept the notion of "to protect and serve the Great and lesser Khans (state and local administrators)". Not that there is anything wrong with that... it is what it is... and no amount of sweet talking is going to change this governance culture anytime soon.
It is actually quite simple:
1. The central army (ANA) protects and serves the Great Khan.
2. The provincial security forces (police) protect and serve the governor.
3. The district security forces (police) protect and serve the district and local administrator. The difference in who controls the forces i.e. the Great Khan controls the ANA and the local administrator controls the local police may be one of the reasons why the locals trust the ANA more than the local administrators sword. If the locals do not rebel against the Great Khan his soldiers are unlikely to be turned against them... the local administrator on the other hand is more likely to use his security forces (Sword of Damocles) to keep the locals in line.
4. The loyal body guard protects and serves the strongman (administrator).
5. The villager with a rifle and sometimes his Talib ally protect the village and valley against the district administrator, governor and if need be the Great Khan himself.
The local strongman and his loyal bodyguard create security/stability by building coalitions. Building coalitions and managing said coalition is an art form separate and distinct from our template approach to state-building.
Breaking the rules of a given coalition has its consequences as is likely the case in the assassination of the governor of Arghandab, who some believe was killed for "stealing" from his alliance partners... When this happens, we raise our arms in disbelief, pull our hair, gnash our teeth and lament the fact that "we were getting played the whole time."
What world are we living in? Wake up predators, it is time to harass!
Just a thought.
r/
MAC
Iraqi had an active and relatively well trained Army having fought Iran for some 8 years plus the Desert Storm.
When Bremer was told by the yet to known individual to disband the Iraqi Army, the insurgency came to be.
Some 400,000 Iraqi soldiers instantly became un-employed and radicalised to American presence.
That said, Afghanistan never had an active relatively well trained Army. Therefore, attempting to mirror some of the lessons of the Iraqi Army as compared to the Afghan Army may seem a challenge on its face.
The question is ..how is that the training initiative for the ANA and ANP began in 2003..some 7 years ago..has not resulted in meaningful progress. In fact, ANA "soldiers" have murdered US and British trainers, including 2 training mentors from Dyncorp last week.
Many of us find is very odd that the locals fight less for their security than the "bad guys" who cross the border to inflict "Talib" radical ideology.
Until the balance changes and the locals really want to protect themselves, then not much progress...at least in our time line for progress will occur.
And lastly, the Afghan's see the US and its coalition partners use CAS, indirect fire and airborne assault/evacuation....the Afghan's will not have that kind of battlefield support once the US/coalition departs which will result in severe limitation to the ANA.
Paktia/Khost Provinces-2003