Small Wars Journal

Innovation in War

  1. Blog
Sat, 09/18/2010 - 9:07am
Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005--2007 (scroll down for download link) - James A. Russell, Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 33 Issue 4 2010. This article analyzes operations by three battalions conducting counterinsurgency operations in Iraq over the period from July 2005 through March 2007: the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (1--7) along the Iraq--Syrian border in the first half of 2006; the 1st Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment (1--37) battalion operating in south-central Ramadi in the fall of 2006; and the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, or 2-1, operating in eastern Mosul in 2005--06. The article argues that empirical evidence presented in these cases suggest, contrary to popular perceptions, these units successfully innovated in war -- a process largely executed organically within the units themselves.

Comments

The common misperception referred to is that US forces did not start to innovate in Iraq until the publication of FM 3-24 and then the arrival of General Petraeus. This article illustrates that actually innovation was initially a bottom up process supported by the chain of command.

Sorry, 11:04 Anonymous posting is mine.

Anonymous (not verified)

Sat, 09/18/2010 - 12:04pm

Permalink

"The article argues that empirical evidence presented in these cases suggest, contrary to popular perceptions, these units successfully innovated in war - a process largely executed organically within the units themselves."

This may be contrary to popular opinion, but I hope it doesn't hold with professional opinion. Taking a step out of the "COIN vs. Conventional" debate, I think if you tracked three seperate WWII US Army infantry battalions from their CONUS training to employment in 1) NW Europe, 2) Central Pacific, and 3) South-Southwest Pacific, you would see that they adapted and innovated based on their tactical situations. The strength of the lean Army division struture, with most "enablers" initially held at the Army level to be task organized out(and the corps being a small, focused tactical HQs), was that the Army was able to readily adapt across these varied environments.