Comments
Rob, I think agree 100% that it indeed be an interesting study to look at the actual effects of literacy and illiteracy within cultures from a perspective broader than just COIN.
It would be interesting to see if the results supported the current COIN truism that literacy is the key to success (it well may be in some circumstances but some does not equal all). There was a good discussion here earlier this year on a similar COIN truism that providing employment would undermine an insurgency and some of the information offered would clearly appear to challenge that belief.
It frustrates and annoys me that many see so quick to embrace truisms like these (and my favourite that friendly force casualties will undermine popular support for the war effort to a significant degree) instead of perhaps applying the same degree of rigour to studying these environments as we used to apply to the problems of the Fulda Gap in the 'good old days'. If we do not adapt to the environment, as Bill says above, it is unlikely that the environment will simply adapt to us...
IMO this article should serve as a wake up call on why NATO and others in the coalition have generally failed to date to produce Afghan security forces (with few exceptions) that are capable of competing effectively with the Taliban. There are numerous examples throughout history where the West has provided substantial training, and yet the forces we equipped and trained were defeated in battle by an enemy that frequently had less training and inferior equipment. As I have argued this before, we should approach any FID/COIN mission where were providing capacity building assistance first from the aspect of determining how do the forces were training and equipping fight now (how are they organized, how do they communicate, how do cultural norms affect the way they fight, etc.) and evaluate how their enemy fights and what the shortfalls may be of the security forces were attempting to enhance. In theory if you focus on those shortfalls they should be "good enough" to defeat their foes in battle.
Our current methodology all too frequently (to include SOF) is to go into a FID/COIN mission where we are asked to provide assistance with preconceived concepts based on our doctrine and equipment, which is usually transformational for the host nation security forces as compared to enhancing. This type of transformation frequently fails (not always), because it is not appropriate for their culture. I "suspect" we would be much more effective if we pursued an enhancing approach versus transformation of the host nation security forces, and the other advantage is we could do it for a hell of lot less money and see quicker real results in the battlefield. Im not proposing this as a blanket approach, but instead of using the blanket approach we use now, lets take a step back and evaluate the mission and see what the smartest way to do it is before we blindly try to create security forces in our image.
When an officer from the modern world claims literacy is a matter of life and death, he or she is clearly limiting his perspective to the way modern combat forces wage war which is heavily reliant on technology and real time communications to coordinate operations. As ONeil pointed out, the lack of literacy doesnt seem to significantly limit our enemys ability to fight, because their doctrine doesnt require these skill sets. Do we really need to create a modern military that looks like ours in Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban? The Taliban are not 10 feet tall, theyre actually quite the opposite, yet their method of fighting is more appropriate for the culture (and literacy level) in Afghanistan than ours.
As Bob Jones stated elsewhere about COIN in general, "we need to relinquish control," were causing more problems than were solving by trying to create forces that mirror ours. Focus on enhancing their forces, but let them fight their way instead of pushing western military doctrine down their throats and then wondering why theyre not combat effective when tested in battle.
"perhaps instead of trying to change Afghans to our way of war we need to be looking at how to change our way of war to their way of life...?"
"those illiterate fighters don't seem very disadvantaged"
Both thoughts are worth considering. On the first I think the issue really gets to the degree of centralized control (c2, accountability, reporting, political purpose etc.), decentralized execution (initiative, freedom of action, ability to employ or make use of limited resources like air and artillery, CASVAC, etc.). This facilitates a central authority's ability to employ its force where it needs to be - support it, recall it, sustain it, constrain it, and retask it. This type of security force is not inconsistent with a centralized government.
The question then I think concerns the type of government and the degree of control it should have or requires - this is not a NTM-A/Caldwell question. His mission is to develop the security force that meets the requirements of a government that is already established (at least in some measure) and is supported by U.S. policy.
The second point on illiteracy being or not being a disadvantage - illiteracy is also a means of control. I think there is some good discussion that could be built around the issue of illiteracy and literacy and how it facilitates or impedes an objective beyond the perspective of ANSF force development. Again it all depends on your objective and the conditions that support it. This I think drives your ways and means and frame the discussion of feasibility, acceptability and suitability.
From the NTM-A perspective, literacy and professionalism are significant Lines of Effort toward a centrally employed ANSF capable of supporting its government's policy - which appears to be in line with our own objectives.
Any big red herring...making Afghanistan look like something that is familiar to us will not win this war: inflicting literacy on Afghanistan with the best of intentions will have no more effect than our effort to afflict them with democracy. As someone else already commented on the FB entry for this article, those illiterate fighters don't seem very disadvantaged as they continue against the might of NATO, as they did before against the Soviet Empire, The British Empire and Alexander. perhaps instead of trying to change Afghans to our way of war we need to be looking at how to change our way of war to their way of life...?