Losing by "Winning": America's Wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria by Anthony H. Cordesman – Center for Strategic and International Studies
The U.S. has now reached the point where the third Administration in a row is fighting wars where the U.S. often scores serious tactical victories and makes claims that it is moving toward some broader form of victory but cannot announce any clear strategy for actually ending any given war or bringing a stable peace. Once again, a new Administration seems to have focused on the tactical level of conflict and called this a strategy but has failed to have any clear strategy for ending the fighting on favorable terms.
More than that, the new Administration seems to have accepted the legacy of the previous Administration by largely abandoning the civil side of each war. It is dealing with major insurgencies and civil war as if they were limited terrorist movements. It has no clear civil-military strategy, plans for stability operations, or options to create the level of governance and development that could bring a lasting peace. It has no grand strategy and is fighting half a war…
Finally, the U.S. should consider two broader options.
First, trying to create some kind of broad international effort that could be coordinated by the World Bank to offer conditional aid for serious economic, governance, and political reform. The United States does not have to be the leader in "nation building." Having a more neutral and international body do so – with specialized expertise – may be the best answer to not fighting only half a war in the future. One thing is clear, however, there really is no purely military answer to any of America's three current wars, to dealing with the causes of terrorism, and to dealing with other conflicts like the fighting in Yemen or various Sub Saharan states.
Second, the U.S. needs to build on the military lessons of its current wars in shaping its commitments to future "wars" that involve terrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns. Finding the best combination of train and assist efforts and the use of airpower is one critical lesson, and one that will allow the U.S. to focus on other strategic priorities like Russia and China. the most critical issue, however, may be to define the conditions that really do merit U.S. intervention. One way or another, the U.S. has become involved in three "failed state" wars. Backing real strategic partners is one thing. Letting hope triumph over experience is quite another.