Today, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) John F. Sopko delivered remarks at New America in Washington, D.C., marking the launch of SIGAR's fifth lessons learned report.
The report, entitled "Counternarcotics: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan," examines U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan from 2002 -2017.
Remarks Summary
-- Opium cultivation in Afghanistan reached a record high of about 328,000 hectares in 2017. That’s about 1,265 square miles, or almost twenty times the land area of Washington, DC.
-- That record opium crop could support production of up to 900 tons of export-quality heroin.
-- The value of 2017’s opium output was between $4.1 billion and $6.6 billion, or equivalent to 20 to 32 percent of Afghanistan’s entire gross domestic product.
-- Opium poppy production may provide the equivalent of up to 590,000 full-time jobs—a number substantially higher than the entire strength of the Afghan army and police forces.
-- The amount of opium seized over the last 10 years is equivalent to about 5 percent of the estimated opium production in 2017 alone.
-- Afghanistan’s narcotics sector continues to fuel insurgent violence and foster corruption throughout the Afghan government. The opportunity to profit from the opium trade has resulted in alliances between corrupt government officials, drug traffickers, and insurgents.
-- The human suffering, criminality, corruption, and financial support to the Afghan insurgency tied to narcotics pose an existential threat to the whole costly effort to reconstruct and stabilize the country.
Report Key Points
-- From fiscal year (FY) 2002 through FY 2017, the U.S. government spent roughly $8.62 billion on counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Despite this investment, Afghanistan remains the world’s largest opium producer, and opium poppy is the country’s largest cash crop.
-- No counterdrug program undertaken by the United States, its coalition partners, or the Afghan government resulted in lasting reductions in poppy cultivation or opium production.
-- A key strategic U.S. interest in Afghanistan was to reduce the amount of funding insurgent groups received from the opium and heroin trade. However, the primary metric for U.S. counternarcotics efforts was levels of poppy cultivation, which did not effectively assess efforts to cut off insurgent financing.
-- As of late 2017, these financing estimates underpinned assumptions about the potential benefits of a costly air interdiction campaign that carried risks of civilian casualties. Without a clear understanding of how insurgents benefit from and participate in the narcotics trade, it is difficult to measure the campaign’s effectiveness.
-- Given the difficult security and economic environment in Afghanistan today, particularly in many of the largest opium-producing regions, the Afghan drug trade will likely persist for decades.
-- Counternarcotics objectives were poorly integrated into the design and implementation of development programs, and were not sufficiently considered within the wider context of U.S. security, development, and governance strategies.
-- The emphasis on eradication was based on weak data and misguided assumptions that inflated policymakers’ expectations of what was possible and detracted from efforts to target eradication in areas with greater livelihood opportunities.
-- U.S. advocacy for aerial eradication, or spraying, damaged U.S.-Afghan relations.
-- Alternative development programming was often based on a poor understanding of why poppy was grown and failed to address the multiple economic roles played by poppy in rural Afghanistan. This contributed to the displacement of people and relocation of poppy cultivation to areas outside government control.
-- U.S. agencies and implementing partners often failed to consider and mitigate the risk that alternative development programs could contribute to increased poppy cultivation and drug production.
-- Specialized Afghan counterdrug units developed promising capacity, but were hindered by corruption within the larger judicial system and lack of high-level support from the Afghan government.
Full Report: https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/
Full Remarks: https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/
Report Photos: https://www.flickr.com/photos/