Overhauling the Army for the Age of Irregular Warfare by Andrew Krepinevich, Wall Street Journal
On Jan. 29, the National Commission on the Future of the U.S. Army released its report on a wide range of issues confronting the Army. Its more than 60 recommendations addressed details as specific as the proper ratio of attack-helicopter battalions between the active Army and the Reserves. Yet for all its good work, the commission neglected to tackle the Army’s biggest problem: its declining ability to wage the kind of protracted irregular wars that America’s enemies increasingly prefer to fight.
The roots of this problem lie chiefly in the social choice the American people made following the Vietnam War to abolish the draft and field the military entirely with volunteers. That decision has become so expensive that it now threatens to limit U.S. defense options.
The shift to a volunteer force seemed logical at the time. A Cold War Army of volunteers would stand guard in Europe and Korea to deter aggression. In the event war came, the National Guard and Reserves would be mobilized and the draft reinstated if necessary. Following the Iraq war that began in 2003, however, the Army found itself in protracted conflicts against irregular forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. These are the new “Vietnams” the Army’s civilian masters said it didn’t need to plan for again…
Comments
I have a lot of disagreement with this author. As a Vietnam Vet we could encounter local VC, Main Force VC, and/or NVA. When we worst-case that situation, we task-organize for the NVA, who were not exactly Taliban in Toyotas. I am so tired of all the theory of irregular warfare. Why would we fight a protracted irregular war that our enemy prefers? We need to fight wars our way, on our terms. Let the enemy try to react to us. This guy is playing to a potential enemy's strength. Our Special Forces and drones can't go up against regular units any more than Vietnam Special Forces could go on the offensive against North Vietnam Regulars. This author advocated Special Forces as strike teams while at the same time criticizing their pacification efforts. By 1972, 90(+) percent of the Vietnamese were under GVN control. That sounds a lot like success to me. That success came because our enemy could not cope with our operational or pacification efforts.