In the 1960s and again in the 1980s, the U.S. military experienced a revival of interest in irregular warfare, or IW, similar to the one that is occurring today. In both of the previous periods, the topic enjoyed a celebrity-like popularity in professional military forums until such time that circumstances allowed it to be relegated back to the margins in favor of a return to "proper soldiering."
Both previous revivals produced high-quality doctrine and curriculum in professional-education courses. So why, then, did IW fail to become ingrained as part of the military mainstream? The manner in which a topic is framed can significantly influence the opinion of the target audience. Suggesting that IW is the graduate level of warfare, while clearly expressing the topic's difficulty, fails to recognize the considerable effort that the Army has invested in mastering major combat operations, or MCO. Given the imbalance between the Army's investment in MCO and in IW, it's not surprising that, by comparison, IW appears more difficult and complex. Over the last several decades, old IW concepts have often been reintroduced or reinvented under new names, such as "low-intensity conflict" and "military operations other than war." While there is no question that those concepts are complex, presenting them as new byproducts of emerging and changing world conditions, such as globalization, urbanization and radicalization, brings into question not only the enduring nature of the IW requirement but also whether these conflicts are, in fact, merely anomalies to be weathered. While labels and marketing techniques may be helpful in reconciling our collective discomfort with the topic, they undermine the overall integration of the topic by further entrenching skeptics...
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Comments
We may need to consider that forces engaged away from conventional efforts will require years of language and cultural training - they need the ability to move about with the ease of a local. We have tended to go with technology that is now proven to be self isolating. 7 years in AfPak and 6 in Iraq, how many Soldiers and Marines are being fielded that can speak with fluency the local dialect, understand the tribal culture or even a few chapters in the Koran? I suspect we remain as blind today as in 2002 or 2003. Our isolating fortresses are more mobile - guess that is progress.
Excellent post, Bill Moore. You've hit several issues very accurately.
We need to restore State Department primacy in foreign affairs. We should also recognize that if we have to commit the bulk of the Army to Irregular Warfare then we most often will have erred. That error will invariably be quite expensive in all terms compared to the probable return.
With those two efforts, perhaps we can once again apply the proper tools for the jobs at hand.
While in general agreement with the author, I think heart of the issue lies not with the Army, but within the American psychic.
The historic record is not on our side, as we don't have a good track record with IW. Of course training and education will improve our performance, but I doubt it will ultimately change the outcome in most IW conflicts, because there is no military solution. Funny how we all say that, but we don't understant what it means.
When you employ the Army (armed forces) to conduct IW you're generally letting the elephant loose in the china shop, thus normally making things worse, and after we tire we then go home after a considerable investment in blood and treasure to accomplish what? If what we're doing now is not working, then more of the same won't work either.
Tis may indicate that our doctrine isn't as great as we think it is. Even if it is adequate, it still won't work until we get the supradoctrinal (political strategy) piece fixed. We can accomplish our military tasks with the force we have now, but to what end?
While irregular threats will continue to be a serious threat to our interests (not our existence) for many years to come, that doesn't mean it is a threat that the military can effectively counter. This argument may harken back to the new OSS argument, but I won't touch it for now.
Within sovereign nations we must enable our State Department to take the lead, and that means providing world class political advise and identifying "feasible" political solutions that the military may be able to help achieve.
As students we learn by being taught, and to think, in linear terms.
As Anonymous alluded, IW is slow (on the strategic level). Simply stated: people generally don't do well standing in line, it's slow going, so the velvet rope was invented giving us the ability to twist and turn in a tight space, thereby allowing some exercise while still standing in line.
Sun Tzu felt the need for linear thinking, but also understood it's limits, and talks of linear thinking and adaptive thinking being complementary opposites. Both require the other and create the need for eachother.
Nice article SWJED.
Bottom line from the article:
<i>As it did during the mid-1960s and -1980s, the Army has done an exceptional job of relearning, re-establishing and re-institutionalizing its capability in the IW realm, but at a significant cost. In order for this period of interest to succeed where previous ones have failed, the focus must remain on institutionalizing the subject as a valid peer to other military subjects. IW must become a mainstream topic of the profession of arms rather than merely a fringe specialty relegated to a select few. Conversely, it must not be regarded (by the few) as an elite discipline, with the attendant pejorative view toward other military disciplines. History has shown that insurgency and terrorism will remain a normal part of the spectrum of conflict, often requiring the application of military power in order to preserve or protect U.S. national interests. The new challenge for this millennium is not the threat posed by IW or even how the Army will meet the challenge but rather how the Army will prepare itself for long-term success.</i>
Irregular warfare is slow in information flow and even slower producing results. It can be difficult for many to transition from the big noise defining moment scenario, they most often see as the threat to America, that they feel we should be training for as opposed to IW.
In addition, IW doesn't bring with it the big ticket defense industry hardware/weapons systems that so many that would profess to be "properly soldiering" crave.