Understanding how insurgencies may be brought to a successful conclusion is vital to military strategists and policymakers. This study examines how past insurgencies have ended and how current ones may be resolved. Four ways in which insurgencies have ended are identified. Clear-cut victories for either the government or the insurgents occurred during the era of decolonization, but they seldom happen today. Recent insurgencies have often degenerated into criminal organizations that become committed to making money rather than fighting a revolution, or they evolve into terrorist groups capable of nothing more than sporadic violence. In a few cases, the threatened government has resolved the conflict by co-opting the insurgents. After achieving a strategic stalemate and persuading the belligerents that they have nothing to gain from continued fighting, these governments have drawn the insurgents into the legitimate political process through reform and concessions. The author concludes that such a co-option strategy offers the best hope of U.S. success in Afghanistan and in future counterinsurgency campaigns.
Read the full monograph: Resolving Insurgencies.
Comments
"Wicked problems" are, I think, another attempt to slam some sort of scientific or quantifiable framework on things that are almost by their nature neither. I don't care for the term, either. But YMMV.
In terms of history, in most cases there is that great temptation to look back and judge from our higher vantage point without taking into account what was known at the time and (even more important, perhaps) what was believed at the time. Vietnam is a good example of this, but it also links back to the American penchant for acting as if there was no usable military history prior to World War II (with the exception of the Civil War, of course). Vietnam was in many ways the result of lessons wrongly learned from Mao's rise in China, Korea, and a skewed view of the Soviet Union's ability to "control" China. And the DR certainly wasn't our first COIN endeavor. IN fact, it came fairly late in that experience arc, and we steadfastly refused to learn much from it (just as we had other efforts). You want an example of civilian/military effort conflict? Look no further than the Indian Wars and the tug-of-war between the Indian Bureau and the Army for control of policy (which waffled back and forth for some years prior to 1871 or '72 and periodically was reopened until the end of the 19th century).
History isn't always written by the victors. It's more common that it's written by those with agendas. All one needs to do is look at the various "waves" of Vietnam history to confirm this. And it's telling when you look at what isn't typically covered by those histories (mainly 1967...where many of the operational patterns were set and critical perceptions solidified, although there is also minimal attention paid to 1969 and 1970 with a few exceptions). Unit history is thin on the ground here as well, which is interesting considering the much-trumpeted nature of the war. Without that level of examination, it's much easier for faulty perceptions to take root and blossom.
But I digress. I still remain concerned that the Army (and by extension the American military as a whole) will again lose the battle to retain lessons learned from our recent conflicts. It's a fight we have lost with great regularity since the formation of the republic.
With respect to the 'history' of the Viet Nam imbroglio (better than the 'wicked problem' phrase...) it is best to leaven the 'history' written by the fellow travelers and the useful or otherwise idiots from both sides of the political spectrum with each other. Few get much of it correct, they are traps for the unwary -- it is far too easy for one to find what one might wish to find in them...
You may be correct in asserting viet Nam was not a military defeat -- I personally do not agree but admit that's subject to interpretation and is effectively a judgement call. You are I believe correct in many of the criticisms of our strategy or lack thereof in that war. However, you are not correct in asserting that <i>"Our deployment there was to protext and preserve OUR will onto the people."</i> It seems to me you're basing that Statement on Kennedy's very foolish decisions early on -- and in that sense, you're certainly at least partly correct and I would remain silent. The "deployment" (specifically the Kennedy based expansion of the ongoing effort) per se, could be so categorized.
With respect to the entire effort that was the Viet Nam War though, that statement is far from correct, it is in fact even misleading. Eisenhower's support of the French and the later partition was fortunately kept in check by Ridgeway's firm resistance to any major effort or imposition of 'our will on the people' and Johnson's insane commitment had no intention of projecting our will onto the people of Viet Nam. As was true in the Dom Rep, the locals were ignored and the 'halting' of the spread of communism was the driving force. Occams Razor...
You make the same error of prejudice -- not bias -- on Viet Nam that you made on the Dominican Republic. You want to see the US projecting its values properly as you see that so you presume that earlier foreign interventions were made to project such values and in Viet Nam, that was just over done. Kennedy may be guilty of what you charge -- Lyndon Baines Johnson was emphatically not. In both cases we were not nearly as sophisticated or complex as too many seem to wish to believe. Having said all that, we are as usual in agreement that our interests need to align with our resources, that we should not try to impose or values -- or equipment, means and methods -- on other nations.
I think there's adequate honesty by most with regard to Viet Nam and Afghanistan. What's missing in both cases is simply a lack of clarity and that is due to the various prejudices and predispositions that the major actors <u>and recorders</u> project or projected. For example, it seems you may have been led astray on the Dominican Republic because of an abbreviated history that was couched to make specific points the author wished and, perhaps not intentionally, omitted pertinent details that can cause a skewed perception of what occurred. Many, perhaps most, 'histories' of Viet Nam, even very lengthy tomes, suffer from the same shortfall.
I do not believe either earlier operation was a wicked problem nor is Afghanistan. The issue in all three cases is not getting honest with ourselves, it is simply fighting through the various political agendas to get that clarity. Those political agendas in conflict are a long term and continuing US specialty and they make strategerizing incredibly difficult. Don't they? ;)
Ken,
All I know about the Dom Rep situtation is what I gleaned from this short article, and my assessment was of those short facts. I am sure reality or a more in depth analysis would lead to a revised position.
As to being wedded to versions of history, you too, my good friend, are wedded to a version of the history leading up to, conduct of, and aftermath of the US involvement in Vietnam. I don't believe it is one that stands up clear-eyed analysis looking back at the totality of the events from the perspective of our current times. I suspect that is always true in history, that histories written during and immediately after some great event will likely differ from assements made later by those who were not directly involved. Good and bad in that, and it is best to study both.
I see us making the same strategic errors in Afghanistan that we made in Vietnam; but those errors are only visible when one can first be honest about our decisions and actions in both of those places. Similarly in a related discussion with Gian yesterday, I see where the Brits initially made the same strategic errors in Malaya, but that they ultimately corrected them. Perhaps the better outcome they achieved is due to any of a million other factors of culture, terrain, tactics, global security conditions at the time, internal and external politics of the players, etc, etc etc.
Certainly all of those myriad differences are in play in every such drama. I attempt to work through all of that to get at the underlying strategic frameworks and look for commonalities and differences at that core, fundamental level.
Vietnam was not a military defeat for the US. As in the fameous exchange between COL Summers and the NVA officer about our never losing any battles and how that was both true and irrelevant. All of that good effort, all of the personal and national anguish associated with Vietnam, and now again with Afghanistan (though granted, Afg is a pimple on Vietnam's backside in nearly every regard other than duration) can be better avoided in the future if we are able to get to a clearer understanding of these events. That is my intent, but I admit, I recognize I am swimming upstream against a powerful current of historical and institutional inertia, and being human I too make mistakes of judgment in that journey.
From where I stand now, however, I see the critical unsurmountable problem in both Vietnam and Afghanistan being the commitment of the US to the exercise of our will, for our interests, through governments of our choosing onto the peoples of both of those countries; and then dedicating our military to the sustainment of the same.
Once that fateful decision is made, the die is largely cast. Perhaps a state of uneasy stability, with occasional small insurgencies to defeat in turn can be maintained. We see that in the histories of the Philippines and many North African and Middle Eastern countries where US and/or European nations have exerted such controlling influence over the years. But even that form of stability is becoming harder to sustain as advances in information technology continue to shift power to the people in that relative balance between people and government. The quid pro quo of "friendly despots" has always been that they serve their patron's interests and control their populaces. Now that they can no longer control information, they can no longer meet that second requirement. When that happens the cost of control goes up.
I believe info-tech advances were the primary factor in shifting the cost-benefit equation to the point where both the British and the Soviet empires were no longer economically viable, and so both let those empires go. Similarly I believe those continuing advances are having a similar impact upon the US's ability to sustain a degree of control over others that we have become acustomed too as well. The costs of such controls are exceeding the benefits. We too will be forced to evolve to a new, less controlling model of foreign policy, and it will probably be much more like what we followed in the Jackson - McKinley era in the mid-late 1800s than like the TR - ? era.
We will need to bring our interests in line with our resources, and the current National Security Strategy lists as "vital" interests we never could afford, and should certainly never seek to pursue.
But getting honest with ourselves about why Vietnam then, and Afghanistan now, were and are such "wicked problems" (I really hate that term) is a critical step in getting from where we are to where we need to be.
Cheers,
Bob
<b>Robert C. Jones:</b><blockquote>"It sounds like this was a nation emerging from generations of despotism, and that the people had bestowed legitimacy onto a government in 1962 that was too weak to hold off an illegal challenge by (presumably a minority) that prefered the communist approach to post-colonial governance..."</blockquote>The 1962 elected leftist government led by Juan Bosch took office in Jan 63 and was overthrown by a rightist military coup in Sep 63 which installed a Triumvirate to run the nation. It was not popular and Bosch supporters aided by Cubans and the Cuban subverted Dominican Forces (some, mostly the Navy...) deposed the Triumvirate in Apr 65. Dominican forces were not overwhlemed, key leaders supported the insurgents and kept their troops in barracks.<blockquote>"We came in to support the express will of the people, rather than to express our will onto the people. (but this is just my assessment from the short facts offered in this short history)..."</blockquote>Not even close. Bosch was not fully supported nor was Reid Cabral -- though either of them would have been simply the least bad alternative. The government AND its nominal opposition had little popular support. Neither did the Rebels. The 82d and XVII Corps (virtually no SF involvment) oversaw the violently anti-American Indian UN Rep who oversaw an election and 'compromise' candidate (blessed by Lyndon) Joaquin Belaguer (the long term Despots last puppet Prez pre 1962 :D )was sort of fairly and so-so popularly elected and stayed in office ten or so more years with no problems -- other than pretty hefty suppression of human rights, the occasional disappearance and so forth....<blockquote>"...but the critical factor IMO is always going to be the strategic context."</blockquote>The strategic context was that Lyndon wanted to stop Castro's adventurism in the Western Hemisphere. Period. The Dominican Republic and its people were an ancillary afterthought, if that.
We reinstalled the Dictators folks...
<b>Slap's</b> right. It was a good, efficient and effective operation -- from the US standpoint. We picked up enough Cuban materiel to prove involvement and convince the OAS to sanction them (we also proved the Peace Corps was working with the Rebels but that's another thread). From the Jones theory, Dominican and good governance therein stand points, Power Pack was not at all good...
Re: Viet Nam<blockquote>Our deployment there was to protext and preserve OUR will onto the people."</blockquote>As I and others have written before, that's not correct but you seem too wedded to that version to change...
Slap,
Even from this small snapshot of events, some interesting points stand out, not least of which those in this short scene-setter:
"The Dominican Republic conducted its first free elections in 1962 after the 1961 assassination ended the 30-year domination of strongman and former President Leonidas Trujillo. In the three years after the elections, a constant struggle for political control erupted between communist-sympathizing leftist groups and conservative business and military leaders Aca,!" many with ties to the sugar industry. On April 24, 1965, leftist forces unexpectedly deposed the Dominican leader, Donald Reid y Cabral. Communist-inspired groups of armed civilians, dubbed "Los Tigres," took to the streets throughout the capital of Santo Domingo and quickly overwhelmed the Dominican security forces."
It sounds like this was a nation emerging from generations of despotism, and that the people had bestowed legitimacy onto a government in 1962 that was too weak to hold off an illegal challenge by (presumably a minority) that prefered the communist approach to post-colonial governance. The fact that we intervened to help restore a govenment that the people had selected, rather than to install one of our choosing, or to sustain a long-time, but despotic, ally is key.
We came in to support the express will of the people, rather than to express our will onto the people. (but this is just my assessment from the short facts offered in this short history). That is the basis for good intervention support to COIN. (Actually, we conducted regime change/restoration and FID) The rest of the TTPs described are the icing on the cake, but the critical factor IMO is always going to be the strategic context.
That same year we escalated our deployment of forces to Vietnam. A nation where we had acted to cancel nation-wide elections in 1956 and had then helped to manipulate southern elections to ensure that Diem (our choice) rose to power in the South. Our deployment there was to protext and preserve OUR will onto the people. Such efforts to control outcomes on others did not work then, and certainly do not work now. Appreciating this difference is, IMO, essential to understand in deciding how to approach these situations.
Thanks for sharing,
Bob
Link to US Army homepage article on Operation Power Pack-Military Intervention In The Dominican Republic.
http://www.army.mil/article/37660/operation-power-pack---us-military-in…
Why are we studying what everybody else did or does in so called COIN. Like I keep saying we know exactly what to do we have just forgotten that we know how to do it.