In his assessment of the Afghan conflict, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, painted a dire picture and is recommending an infusion of U.S. forces on top of the sixty-eight thousand Americans already allocated. But six months after unveiling a new objective for the Afghanistan-Pakistan region - focused on protecting the public and preventing al-Qaeda from reconstituting in Afghanistan - President Barack Obama is reportedly reconsidering the U.S. commitment to the fight amid mounting Democratic opposition to a surge of U.S. forces. Six analysts - Peter R. Mansoor, Andrew J. Bacevich, Amin Tarzi, Thomas E. Ricks, Candace Rondeaux, and John A. Nagl - offer a range of strategic choices for U.S. planners in Afghanistan.
Peter Mansoor - Provided the Afghan government can gain legitimacy, and that it can be a government that the Pashtuns and other peoples that fuel the Taliban can support, then in the long run we can gain our objectives in Afghanistan and defeat the Taliban insurgency. But you have to ask that question first. Provided that such an Afghan government develops, because clearly the current government is not wholly legitimate...
Andrew Bacevich - Washington has gotten itself all tied up in knots over the wrong question. The issue that really cries out for attention is not what to do about Afghanistan. The question that cries out for attention is: eight years into the so-called 'long war,' does the long war make sense as a response to the threat posed by jihadism? And from my point of view, the idea that fixing Afghanistan will provide any sort of antidote to the threat posed by jihadism is simply absurd...
Amin Tarzi - We are not very clear now on our objectives. The objectives as stated to the Afghan side are confusing them. In my view, the objectives have to be very clear, and the goals have to be achievable. We need to achieve them because the issue of confidence, the time on that is running out...
Thomas Ricks - Can we achieve our goals in Afghanistan if they don't get the troops that [McChrystal] has asked for? No, [but] it is not clear you can achieve your goals even if you get the troops. The president laid out in March what the strategy was, and all McChrystal has done is said, 'Okay, if you want to implement the strategy, here are the resources required to do it.' Now the president seems to be saying, 'Well, I'm not sure I want to spend that many resources...
Candace Rondeaux - Three important factors will have to be considered in shaping the strategy for Afghanistan. First and often least discussed is the impact of the U.S. military presence on regional actors. Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, and India each have distinct regional and global interests that must also be taken into account when weighing the calculus of a further troop surge in Afghanistan...
John Nagl - There are always other options, but I personally believe that the counterinsurgency campaign has the best chance of success. For it to succeed it will have to be resourced to a greater extent than it has been to date. We need additional troops to build a bigger Afghan army faster, but we also need additional troops to provide a latticework, a framework of security within which those nascent Afghan security forces can operate...
In full at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Comments
The dilemma we find ourselves after eight years in Afghanistan is not one of partisan politics. The side of the aisle that the President sits on is a moot point with this seemingly never ending conflict. The question we must answer is how committed are we. There are three reasons why a troop increase may not be the best decision with the political end that we are trying to define.
1. Strategic theory calls for the leadership to define a clear end state. I would submit that Afghanistan poses a similar problem set we struggled with for many years in Iraq. We may be failing again to define a clear end state. Depending on which newspaper, blog, or cable news source you watch, you may get a different answer. Are we there to defeat Al Qaeda, assist in establishing a functional government, reduce the heroin producing poppy industry, or prevent jihadists from gaining access to Pakistan weapons of mass destruction? Sometimes it seems that the answer to all of those questions is 'yes. However, our means to those ends is yet another troop surge.
For those that have served in these contingency operations, we can attest that adding additional troops is not always the right answer. In this respect, this is where the comparison between Iraq and Afghanistan is in stark contrast. First, when we surged in 2006 in Iraq, we increased our troop presence to over 150,000 troops. In comparison, today we are asking our president for an additional 40,000 troops in a country that in topography alone should be calling for more like three times that increase.
In the end, I submit that the recent surge request fails to meet the desired ends of the aforementioned end state questions. "To be or not to be, that is the question." Are we in or out? When discussing the troop increase request, maybe the question to ask is not the total number but the total number of war fighters that will be partnering with Afghan police, military, and political leaders to assist them. Twenty thousand patrolling troops followed by twenty thousand enablers still does not balance the ends to the means.
2. American leaders need to approach nation building with culture at the forefront of their thoughts. As like Iraq, the budding government of Afghanistan is not going to be the "well-oiled machine" that our government is. Arab culture is far different than Western culture. They dont view the world in the same frame that American and other Western societies use. In the hierarchy of interests of an average Afghan citizen, the call to the nation is at least third on their list when speaking to allegiance. Most Arab countries view the order of their allegiance to family first, clan, tribe... .and somewhere down the line, you may find the government. However, allegiance to a perceived corrupt government is not even close to a tribal leaders priority. We should be cognizant of this as we struggle to find the nationalistic pride that we have enjoyed since our independence was claimed over two hundred years ago.
3. Reading todays strategic documents such as the QDR and QRM, you would understand that our nation is approaching these problems from a "Whole of Government" mentality. I couldnt agree more with this concept. As we approach changing a political government to mirror a Western form of government, wouldnt you want highly educated bureaucrats to lead the young political ministries in the newly formed government of Afghanistan? Or would you want a cavalry battalion commander who for the predominance of his career focused on how to close with and destroy his enemy on a conventional battlefield. Obviously, this statement is a bit tongue and cheek; However, we continue to answer the dilemma with only one of our national instruments of power: the military. Truly approaching this from a "whole of government" frame will serve multiple purposes. First, the military can focus their abilities on what they are truly trained to do: winning our nations wars on the battlefield. Second, having civilian leaders committed to this fight in extended tours to build the various government ministries will truly define how committed we are to the success of this country. Adding civilian leaders to the process in extended tours will provide the professional development to the Afghan government that they truly need. Using Soldiers and Marines to fulfill these requirements is an expedient answer to a much tougher question: How truly committed are we?
In the end, the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and their Families should be the focus of this discussion. Service members (SMs) have all taken a solemn oath, and I do not see that professional military commitment ending anytime soon. SMs will support the President and government, but my only hope is that when decisions are made, our leadership can answer that one question: how committed are we? If we are committed, then we should pour every amount of leadership, monetary assets, and other resources into the success of the region. Otherwise, let us call for victory after the next election and focus on the other standing issues across the globe.
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department
Of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government
Can we win in Afghanistan without more troops? NO. Can we win in Afghanistan if we do not reform the Karzai government and the Afghan National Police? NO. Can we win in Afghanistan if we do not make great progress on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line? No. Can we win in Afghanistan? Yes BUT we have to make serious changes in Strategy and Tactics. A COIN strategy will only work if the Afghan Government makes GREAT progress. We cannot secure the urban population without getting troops off the FOBs, beging more aggressive along the AFPAK border and having a presence in key villages and districts. This is a huge undertaking yet the prospects fo a radical islamic victory are catastrophic.