Security Cooperation and Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment by Dafna Rand and Stephen Tankel, Center for a New American Security Report
Dr. Dafna H. Rand and Dr. Stephen Tankel argue that despite the growth of new programs and authorities to build partnership capacity in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and many other countries facing similar threats, the success of these efforts is often limited by structural and strategic deficiencies. The report makes 10 recommendations for how the United States can better realize its national security interests, including consolidating the many new security assistance authorities and focusing on the specific objectives of a particular program in order to synthesize military and non-military goals.
Comments
From the introduction to FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation:
"With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of containment, the U.S.
National Security Strategy reoriented to confront a wide range of more ambiguous threats."
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_22.pdf
These "more ambiguous threats," one might suggest, relate to our strategy which, post-the Cold War, replaced containment.
This strategy, in general terms, might be called "expansion" or "enlargement;" as was so clearly articulated by then-National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in 1993:
"During the Cold War, even children understood America's security mission; as they looked at those maps on their schoolroom walls, they knew we were trying to contain the creeping expansion of that big, red blob. Today, at great risk of oversimplification, we might visualize our security mission as promoting the enlargement of the "blue areas" of market democracies. The difference, of course, is that we do not seek to expand the reach of our institutions by force, subversion or repression."
http://fas.org/news/usa/1993/usa-930921.htm
Note that although National Security Advisor Lake suggested, in 1993, that we would not seek to expand the reach of our institutions by force, subversion or repression, after 9/11:
a. The "force" gloves came off.
And, today, given our contemporary problems with such nations as Russia, China and Iran (they seek to "contain" us),
b. We are even contemplating the "subversion" angle; this, for example, re: our current discussions relating to such things as political warfare(???).
Thus, much as security assistance and cooperation during the Cold War might have been understood, developed, deployed and success measured against our containment goal and strategy then,
Likewise today might our current security assistance and cooperation efforts be best understood, developed, deployed and success measured against our expansion/enlargement goal and strategy today?
"What does the United States intend to achieve when it deploys security assistance and cooperation?"
"How can the United States attain a return on this vast investment?"
Bill M:
Might Presidential Policy Directive 6 (Global Development) answer these questions?
Excerpt:
"As our National Security Strategy states: Through an aggressive and affirmative development agenda and commensurate resources, we can strengthen the regional partners we need to help us stop conflict and counter global criminal networks; build a stable, inclusive global economy with new sources of prosperity; advance democracy and human rights; and ultimately position ourselves to better address key global challenges by growing the ranks of prosperous, capable and democratic states that can be our partners in the decades ahead.
Development is thus indispensable in the forward defense of America’s interests in a world shaped by growing economic integration and fragmenting political power; by the rise of emerging powers and the persistent weakness of fragile states; by the potential of globalization and risks from transnational threats; and by the challenges of hunger, poverty, disease, and global climate change. The successful pursuit of development is essential to advancing our national security objectives: security, prosperity, respect for universal values, and a just and sustainable international order.
Our investments in development – and the policies we pursue that support development – can encourage broad-based economic growth and democratic governance, facilitate the stabilization of countries emerging from crisis or conflict, alleviate poverty, and advance global commitments to the basic welfare and dignity of all humankind. Without sustainable development, meeting these challenges will prove impossible."
http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/global-dev.pdf
Here is a definition for "development" found in anthropology:
Development is: "... the purposeful pursuit of economic, social and political goals through planned intervention."
Thus: Security cooperation and assistance to be viewed through the lens of our "global development" goals and initiatives? And, thus, through the lens of:
a. Our purposeful pursuit of economic, social and political change in other states and societies? And
b. The positive gains (see the PPD 6 excerpt above) we seek to achieve via these such activities?
This was a very insightful paper that summarized the primary capacity building challenges. The paper also identified recommendations worth pursuing. BPC today is all too often disconnected from strategy, poorly planned at the operational level, poorly executed at the tactical level, and it seldom produces the results we desired the few times we actually identified outcome based objectives. The answer isn’t to quit doing it, but to put some serious effort into identifying and fixing the real problems that to this point have limited our success in this critically important mission area.
The authors of this paper ask a couple of questions that frankly I don’t think most security cooperation planners and trainers can answer.
What does the United States intend to achieve when it deploys security assistance and cooperation?
How can the United States attain a return on this vast investment?
The authors point out that, “Security assistance and cooperation are also too often provided on the basis of faulty assumptions about their utility and impact and with too little attention paid to the recipient nation’s political environment, including the underlying factors shaping the construct and conduct of local security forces.”
Just as importantly, they note our security cooperation and security assistance structural process reinforces our non-strategic approach to capacity building. We in DOD often argue for more capacity building authorities as though that will fix the problem. Somewhat counter intuitively the authors argue we have too many authorities. Each of these authorities are narrowly defined and they have their own pots of money, approval processes, and timelines for implementing. Planners struggle with arranging these various equipping and training authorities in a coherent manner. Thus, what we really need are fewer authorities, but the authorities that remain need to be broader ranging and multiyear authorities to enable State and DOD to develop and execute well thought out capacity building efforts that result on the desired return on investment. Congress worries about losing control, but authority doesn’t equate to approving a concept. Our civilian leadership can still execute their oversight responsibility by approving or disapproving the concepts submitted.
The authors argue we focus on input instead of output, “increase or enhance X capability rather than an identified objective that enhancing X capability is intended to achieve.” They added, “strategic deficiencies result to some degree from the proclivity to view security assistance and cooperation as a quick fix or panacea.” These views can’t be overstated. We often engage in capacity building efforts before aligning ours' and our partner’s goals. To put it more bluntly, we need some assurance our partner will actually use the capacity we help them build to pursue mutually agreed upon goals.
Like the authors, I champion strengthening the enforcement of PPD 23. It is a great policy, but it has no teeth. To many actors are slow rolling it because they feel it threatens their rice bowls and level of control. The policy will not work without strong interagency leadership at all levels enforcing it. The authors recommend using PPD 23 to connect military and non-military roles, which was a large reason the PPD was developed, but who does this? State doesn’t seem have the capacity, and DOD rather stay DOD centric. Considering the amount of money we spend on capacity and its importance to our national security, it would seem a worthwhile investment to develop a hybrid interagency organization or committee dedicated to ensuring PPD 23 is actually followed.