Today, SIGAR released an audit of Department of Defense (DOD)-funded efforts to procure 159 UH-60 helicopters to replace the Afghan Air Force's aging MI-17 helicopter fleet.
Key Points
-- Based on the current UH-60 delivery schedule, it is unlikely that there will be enough pilots trained before all 159 UH-60s are delivered. DOD runs the risk of wasting U.S. taxpayer dollars to purchase aircraft the AAF and SMW cannot fly or maintain.
-- TAAC-Air is at least 16 pilots (or 8 crews) behind the level CSTC-A thought it would achieve by November 2018.
-- CSTC-A originally intended to train 477 pilots, but now plans to train 320 pilots over the next five years. The command may not achieve the 320-pilot target because the number of pilots going through training is already falling behind planned class sizes.
-- According to CSTC-A officials, the command decided to reduce the number of pilots trained as a cost-saving measure. However, based on our analysis of actual training costs, CSTC-A overestimated its cost for rotary wing training by as much as $1 billion.
-- Despite the fact that pilot development is not keeping pace, DOD has yet to establish benchmarks it can use to determine whether it should pause deliveries or reduce the number of UH-60s it will deliver to the Afghans, running the risk that the aircraft it delivers will sit idle in Afghanistan without enough pilots to fly them.
-- CSTC-A assumes that future training classes will have no attrition, even though current pilot training has an attrition rate of about 26 percent.
-- According to CSTC-A and AAF officials, the AAF does not require pilots to commit to serve for a specified period after completing training. The former Commander of the 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan said TAAC-Air needs to assume some pilot attrition when developing a pilot generation goal.
-- TAAC-Air and the AAF have not started to train AAF personnel to maintain the UH-60. As of November 28, 2018, there was no maintenance training course in place.
-- TAAC Air estimates that unit level maintenance will begin in September 2025. However, because it takes 5 to 7 years to develop fully qualified helicopter maintainers, recruitment and training would need to begin immediately for the AAF to have trained maintainers available by 2025.
-- DOD estimates that the cost of contractor maintenance for the UH-60s from 2019 to 2023 will be more than $2.8 billion. This cost is likely to grow the longer it takes to develop the AAF and SMW maintenance capabilities because, according to a DOD official, using U.S. contractors to maintain aircraft is more expensive than using Afghan maintainers.
-- Lack of Afghan maintenance personnel limits the locations where UH-60s can operate because DOD policy bars U.S. contractors from working where there is no U.S. or coalition control. However, TAAC-Air's basing plan includes locating six UH-60s in Shindand, Herat Province, where there is currently no U.S. or coalition military presence.
-- CSTC-A's decision to require that UH-60 aircraft qualification training occur only in Afghanistan has created a bottleneck for pilots who completed Initial Entry Rotary Wing training outside Afghanistan. Some graduates will wait 6 months to a year to begin training. Current CSTC-A officials could not explain the rationale behind this decision.
-- DOD has acknowledged that the UH-60 has performance limitations when compared with the MI-17, which can fly higher and carry more passengers. However, according to DOD, most missions the AAF flies do not need the additional capability provided by the MI-17.
Full Report: https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-19-18-AR.pdf