Strategic Insights: A New Era in Civ-Mil Relations: Rendering Advice to Those Who Do Not Want It by Dr. Don M. Snider, Strategic Studies Institute
Recently, one of the most respected voices of those who work and teach in the field of American civil-military (civ-mil) relations, Professor Peter Feaver, provocatively offered the following question:
When it comes to national security, should one advise President Barack Obama on the best course of action or just the best course of action that he is likely or able to accept and implement?
Thus, owing primarily to the Obama administration’s difficult civ-mil relations and what some consider to be ineffective policy implementation, particularly in Syria, this question is now sprouting up in journalistic reporting, academic journals, and in classroom discussions here at the U.S. Army War College. The import of the question for military professionals lies in the fact that it could lead one outside the traditional norms of American civil-military relations. These norms have in general held that the responsibility of senior military leaders is simply to give their best professional military advice – no shading allowed, and most certainly no shading that might make policy implementation less than fully effective. In fact in the Army’s new doctrine of the profession (ADRP 1 – The Army Profession),2 the principles are clearly stated:
Military leaders offer their expertise and advice candidly to appropriate civilian leadership . . . Army professionals properly confine their advisory role to the policymaking process and do not engage publically in policy advocacy or dissent. Army professionals adhere to a strict ethic of political nonpartisanship in the execution of their duty.
Note that Feaver alludes to how future military advice might be shaded, specifically in a direction that will make it have a better chance of acceptance and implementation. The idea is that military leaders, when forming their multiple options or courses of action (COAs), might broaden them to include options that are known to be favored by the civilian leader. Or, conversely, they can simply refrain from rendering advice that they pretty well know in advance will not be accepted, even if it better supports the mutually agreed strategic objectives…
Comments
We seem to have evolved a belief that there should be no disagreement between the civilian leadership and the military, and that if the Commander-in-Chief doesn't always agree with his military advisors, then there's a problem. That's sideways with respect to some of the most successful military-CINC partnerships in our history...Washington was often at odds with the Continental Congress, Lincoln didn't always agree with Grant, and FDR routinely cherry-picked Marshall's and King's advice, to the dismay of both. The conduct of war encompasses not only military actions, but policy and political actions as well -- it's the civilian leaders' (the President and Congress) responsibility to integrate those streams. We ought *never* withhold honest assessments and informed advice because we think they won't be accepted -- that's professional cowardice. We also ought realize that sometimes -- maybe many times, maybe *all* the time -- those other factors will sway the decision.
At the same time, if called in front of Congress, we're bound to truthfully present the same advice given to the Commander-in-Chief, whether he took it or not. That's not the same as running to the press or the Internet to publically vent.