We are in another post-Iraq war debate about how to best posture our military investments for the future. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review will center on the critical question about the evolving character of conflict. Exactly what kinds of wars are we expecting to fight, and how should we allocate scarce time and resources to maximize readiness and deterrence while minimizing risk? The not-so-subtle groundswell of resentment, if not outright bureaucratic resentment, coming from Defense Secretary Robert Gates' effort to allocate just 10 percent of the Pentagon's investment account for irregular warfare suggests that this will not be a simple matter.
Today's post-Iraq strategy and forces debate was first depicted in Andrew Bacevich's tart Atlantic Monthly essay, "The Petraeus Doctrine." He portrayed a stark choice between two competing camps in the U.S. military. At one end of the spectrum of conflict, he observed that there was a group which he derisively called the "Crusaders," who were promoting an emphasis on counterinsurgency and irregular threats as the proper focus for our armed forces. At the other end of the spectrum, he identified a competing school of thought, which he labeled the "Traditionalists." Bacevich personalized the ongoing debate by using two prominent contemporary authors, retired Army officer John Nagl and West Point's Col. Gian Gentile, as the polar protagonists.
This "black and white" option set created a false binary choice that is great for media consumption but represents a gross oversimplification and distorted conception of America's strategic options. It also created a caricature of the protagonists who offer much more sophisticated arguments when reviewed closely in context...
Much more at Armed Forces Journal.
Comments
Agree, excellent article.
Also see NDUs Strategic Forum No. 240. (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/index.cfm?secID=24&pageID=126&type=section). It makes the same basic point, but in slightly more detail.
A suggestion made in the Strategic Forum paper caught my attention: "a joint force prepared to conduct two major regional conflits of a hybrid nature is suggested as the best force posture construct to adopt." This sounds like a further evolution of the 2MRC/MTW sizing construct, which will reportedly be ditched in the upcoming QDR.
Considering the emphasis placed on the potentially long duration of conflicts, should a new force sizing construct not include some notion of time/number of rotations in relation to steady state and surge operations?
Tom Shanker's NYT article "Pentagon to Outline Shift in War Planning Strategy" implies that steady state 10 BCTs would be abroad at all times, with 10 more in reserve. Some portion of the 10 BCTs abroad are presumably available to help address the first hybrid conflict (if a "2 hybrid conflict" force sizing construct was adopted). Would half the BCTs be available? The remainder would then come from the reserve (say 5 BCTs). Another 10 would then presumably be planned for the second one. So, the total BCTs needed would then be "steady state abroad" (10) + "reserves for 2 hybrid conflicts" (15) = 25BCTs.
If the Army wants to stick to the 3yrs at home between deployments schedule (which Gen. Casey has said is a top priority), then the total number of BCTs required for such a sizing construct seems well beyond what I understand is planned (unless NG and RC remain operational reserves). Have I misunderstood what Hoffman meant?
Excellent article.
Having trained for years for "the most plausible wars the US might be called upon to fight" and having actually gone to fight in none of those but a couple that were totally implausible, my suspicion is that planning for plausibility is not wise...
That, of course implies that the Traditionalists may have some merit in their position but their goals and desires are likely to have little to no effect on world affairs which will determine, through Politicians who generally do not understand the uses and limitations of armed forces, actual employment of those forces.
Counterinsurgents want specially configured forces to do these special operations. Uh, we have them. In being. Call Tampa. They don't need to be any larger than planned, just used early and wisely. They're pros but if they need help, they can ask for some semi-pro assistance. That will work.
Counterinsurgency Plan B could be to transfer all the Armor and Heavy Forces to the National Guard and Marine Corps Reserve so the smaller active Army and Marines can concentrate to an extent on cultural and language training. Which culture(s) and language(s)? TBD of course. As for insuring the possessors of correctly attuned and trained language and culture are deployed <i>only</i> to areas appropriate to their expertise, we're working on that.
The Division of Labor school will effectively provide two distinct mission forces -- both of which are too small for the missions envisioned, therefor they will have to receive some training to reinforce each other. Better to just train the entire Force for the total spectrum of warfare.
Contrary to Hoffmman's assertion that the Utility Infielder approach may assume that force size and resources will remain high, I believe that approach realizes that the reverse is likely true and therefor the compromises entailed are not only desirable but will be necessary. What is fielded will be a multi-capable medium force and that likely will not be a matter of choice. Since a degree of austerity is probably going to be directed and given the length of time required to shift the bureaucracy, starting now may allow the improvements in education and training to be in place by 2015.
He asks some logical questions on this approach:<blockquote>"How reasonable is it for general-purpose forces to be able to train, equip and be proficient at such a wide range of operational missions and contexts? How can our ground forces be good at many things without losing time and resources for so-called "conventional capabilities?" Are increased resources or a much larger ground force implied? Even more critical, is the new version of full-spectrum operations any different than the 1990s, when nontraditional programs got so little attention? Since full-spectrum operations and the Marine "3 Block War" phrase were prevalent before 2003 but apparently given only lip service, how can defense policymakers now be assured that our general-purpose forces will truly be ready across a broadening spectrum of tasks in an ever increasingly complex operating environment?"</blockquote>
The GPF -- both Army and Marine did train for full spectrum employment in the early 1960s and did it pretty well until they were sidetracked in Viet Nam and then post Viet Nam into a spurious -- and failed (note that word) attempt to avoid such conflicts in the future. These forces can be easily trained if we abandon the flawed task, condition and standard training concept of the 1970s and use the approach the services used prior to the adoption of that too basic approach to training, outcome based training.
We've made the process too elementary in a flawed attempt to produce objective evaluations of performance. Tactical performance will always be an evaluation of the whole and it will likely always be subjective. That means professionally competent evaluators and trainers are required. Thus we simply revise the personnel system to produce and field them. One size does not fit all.
Improving the personnel and training systems, a matter of will, can mean that no larger force is required, that the 'new' version of full spectrum warfare does not recede to the 1990s version (a product of those flawed training strategies) and that required capabilities are not given lip service. It could also provide policy makers with accurate assessments of real capability instead of "Yes Sir" and "Can Do" responses that are indicative of desire and not realistic probability.
The complaint will be made that this will produce the proverbial "Jacks of all trades and Masters of none." To an extent that is correct -- it has also been true for over 200 years that the Armed Forces have more than adequately played the utility infielder role in spite of being equipped and trained for other roles. Think how good they might be if they actually equipped and trained for the role...