Hikmatullah, a tall Pashtun farmer dressed in turban and white cloak, looks slightly bewildered as a US Army officer offers him tea and bread and questions him about what he wants from life. A crowd has gathered around them on the steps of the local bakery, young boys and old tribesmen gawking to see what the fuss is about. Hikmatullah says that he's a happy man with five children and that what he wants most is security. From the quizzical look on the farmer's face, perhaps he's wondering: Can these pleasant, tea-drinking American soldiers really be the same people who are assaulting Taliban fighters in this region of eastern Afghanistan?
The answer is yes. Even as US forces show a gentler side with their new stress on people-friendly counterinsurgency, they continue to conduct devastating attacks on the enemy. It's this mix of hard and soft that's the essence of the US battle plan here, but this reality is not well understood back in America. The Washington debate about the Afghanistan war -- pitting advocates of a broad counterinsurgency strategy against those who favor a narrower counterterrorism approach - has sometimes been misleading, at least in terms of what actually goes on here. The fact is that US forces are doing both missions every day and night - and indeed are becoming increasingly effective at each one...
More at The Washington Post.
Comments
CPT Davis and All: When we say IO (information operations) what do we really mean? Are we talking about electronic warfare (e.g., jamming and electronically and even kinetically attacking radiating targets [e.g. radars]) or are we talking about military deception or about public affairs or about civil affairs or about operational security (OPSEC) or about computer network attack or Psychological Operations? Do we really mean "influence operations" when we say IO? What I think we really mean is to influence target audiences and the discipline that is charged with that mission is Psychological Operations. I mention that because we (and I include myself in the same boat) just loosely throw around IO as a catchall phrase. If it meant influence operations I could accept that but when infomration operations means al of the above I think its value is diminished. But most importantly I think we fail to recognize that it is Psychological Operations that has the capability, expertise, and tools to influence foreign target audiences.
This article was interesting because it discussed many relevant points concerning today's employment of Information Operations. It tied the use of IO in relation to current operations in Afghanistan. It was unique to see the author discuss the relevance of "human terrain" and the focus that this current fight has on the population. It was also relevant to see the continuing debate about the way forward in Afghanistan. Is this going to become a Counter-Terrorism centric strategy, or are we going to continue with a Counter-Insurgency strategy as the focus? The author contends that what already exists is a mixture of both.
One point of interest was the possible perception of the U.S. sending mixed messages to the population of Afghanistan. This is very relevant since we place a lot of our focus on the population. It is imperative we are clear with our messaging and the method for delivering those messages. I think a lot of this will be decided with more certainty once the strategy for the way ahead in Afghanistan is determined.
It is too bad that Ignatius opened with those first two paragraphs. The rest of the piece - to my great surprise - is pretty good. He finally explains that the either-or of COIN v CT is a false dilemma and explains that we are already doing both (among other things).
As for the first two paragraphs, I think he is trying to prove too much by attributing far more significance to a very insignificant event. With the first paragraph in mind, let me test just how insightful his observation is and how well it bodes for our future operations in Afghanistan by making a few word substitutions that do not alter the substance of his words...
<em>"[Mossadeq], a tall [Iraqi] farmer dressed in [a dishdasha], looks slightly bewildered as a US Army officer offers him tea and bread and questions him about what he wants from life."</em>
That was me in Iraq in 2005. That wasn't exactly the cusp of victory.
<em>"From the quizzical look on the [Taxi driver's] face, perhaps he's wondering: Can these pleasant, tea-drinking American soldiers really be the same people who are assaulting [criminal gangs] in this region of eastern [Baghdad]?"</em>
That was me in Iraq in 2003. Again, not really the cusp of victory.
Assuming that my experiences are not significantly different from those others, what does this tell us about the significance of Ignatius's observations? I say that his observation was of an insignificant event that hardly demonstrates anything new. But, to be clear, I was shocked to find myself nodding in agreement with most of what he wrote from the third paragraph onward.
If ever Viet Nam engendered deja vu swept over me, it was in reading the Ignatius piece. Does he really believe that US soldiers drinking tea with Afghan farmers-- through interpreters for God's sake--is going to lead those farmers to conclude that the governemnt in Kabul is something they should support?
The whole thing was grotesque.
Jim M
Graduate of the State Department's Second Nine Month long Vietnamese language course---June 1960