Comments
Let's look at this example of a counterinsurgency narrative as shown on Page I-8 of JP 3-24:
"Protecting the people is the mission. The conflict will be won by persuading the population, not destroying the enemy. The International Security Assistance Force will succeed when the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan earns the support of the people. The host-nation government and US forces mission is to protect the people and establish a stable, safe, and productive environment for the population of Afghanistan. When the diverse ethnicities and tribes of Afghanistan put aside their differences and choose to work together, Afghanistan can
prosper, as the population can then work to rebuild the nation and engage in commerce freely. The people will benefit by enjoying safety, and can profit from the uninterrupted basic services (power, clean water, and communications) and opportunities to exploit the natural resources in ways that cannot be done while fighting continues, as well as benefiting from a fair and just legal system. Supporting the insurgents is strongly against the best interests of all Afghans. The insurgents are simple bullies who seek to use fear to control the population. They kill and terrorize to force the people to follow their will, they seize the people’s goods and wealth for themselves in the name of their cause, and provide no services in return beyond the dubious promise to not harm those who cooperate. Under the insurgents, Afghans will never prosper: they can only hope to survive another day. The terrorists lie that they fight to “liberate” Afghanistan from foreign invaders, but they fight only to enrich themselves. The US interest in Afghanistan is simply in stabilizing the region. The US benefits from the denial of Afghanistan as a safe haven for violent terrorists; Afghanistan makes a valuable ally in an important region of the world; and US industry benefits from a stable Afghanistan, as it opens the opportunity to establish joint ventures with the people of Afghanistan. Free trade of Afghan mineral wealth and American manufactured goods is to the benefit of both Afghans and Americans."
Should one see the above more as a pro-commerce, pro-free-trade, pro-open-markets, pro-open-societies, pro-democracy narrative rather than as a counter-insurgency narrative?
This, because suggesting that one's goal is to, essentially, change (1) the traditional way of life of the population (now to be based on commerce, trade and joint ventures, etc.) and (2) traditional way of governance ("diverse ethnicities and tribes must put aside their differences and work together") being something that is alien to the nature of these people and, therefore, something that is more likely to drive the population into the arms of the insurgents rather than to cause them to support the counter-insurgents.
A proper counter-insurgent narrative, one might suggest, would be one in which the population sees that it is the Afghan government and United States -- and not the insurgents -- who are working to preserve and protect the time-honored way of life and way of governance of these populations, and the values, attitudes and beliefs upon which these more-traditional ways of life and ways of governance are based.
But that does not get us "progress" does it?
Fish or cut bait. Do we want to:
a. Transform states and societies, such as those in Afghanistan, along modern western lines? Is so, we should not expect to be able to do this (1) via the support of the population and (2) via a pro-western way of life/pro-western way of governance counterinsurgency narrative such as that noted above.
b. If, however, we want to defeat certain insurgencies, then I suggest that it must be we -- and not the insurgents --who become the champion of -- rather than destroyer of -- more traditional/alternative ways of life and ways of governance.
Fish or cut bait.
This is interesting:
"In a COIN context, such efforts should directly aim at undercutting the insurgent narrative. They are not synonymous with long-term development efforts that may be carried out by other USG departments and agencies, IGOs, and NGOs. However, counterinsurgents should aim to ensure that short-term stabilization measures do not undercut long-term development goals."
(From page VIII-18, JP 3-24, Para 7 introduction.)
Note here the acknowledgement that our overall goal and objective is to undermine and eliminate the non-western political, economic and social structures of outlying states and societies, and to replace these with modern western political, economic and social structures; this, after all, being what "development" actually means.
And the acknowledgement that the knowledge of this information helps to feed and reinforce the insurgent narrative; who suggest that they -- the insurgents -- are fighting to protect and preserve the preferred way of life and way of governance of the population by acting against a foreign aggressor who is bent on eliminating and replacing -- not only these critical indigenous structures -- but also the time-honored and often sacred values, attitudes and beliefs upon which these such structures are based. Potent insurgent ammunition indeed.
Thus, in sum, we must not -- via our counterinsurgency actions -- confirm for the population what the insurgents are saying about us.
A little late for this, I would suggest. The cat is already out of the bag.