'Unprecedented' Challenge in Countering Adversarial Propaganda, Official Says
Lisa Ferdinando
DoD News, Defense Media Activity
The United States is facing an unprecedented challenge in countering the propaganda of adversaries who recruit and easily spread misinformation through the Internet, a top defense official told a House panel yesterday.
While there are many benefits to being in a cyber-connected world, there is also a "dark side" that adversaries are taking advantage of, according to Michael D. Lumpkin, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict.
"The scope of our current challenge in the informational space is unprecedented," Lumpkin told the House Armed Services Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee.
Joining Lumpkin at the hearing were Army Maj. Gen. Christopher K. Haas, director of the force management and development directorate for U.S. Special Operations Command, and Air Force Brig. Gen. Charles Moore, deputy director for global operations on the Joint Staff.
Immediacy, Wide Reach of Social Media
The military has a critical role to play in countering adversarial messages, Lumpkin said, noting it is a contributor of unique capabilities and a partner to the whole-of-government effort led by the State Department.
The U.S. Special Operations Command's Military Information Support Operations, or MISO, force provides a critical capability in supporting the needs of the military and the overall strategic messaging effort of the State Department, Lumpkin said.
"The rise of [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] and the ability for other state and non-state actors to conduct recruitment operations and spread propaganda almost certainly and with minimal cost highlights the dark side, one that requires the whole-of-government response," he said.
Unlike television or radio broadcasts, social media and other Internet communications allow for interactive discussions "anytime and in almost any location with virtually unlimited reach," Lumpkin said.
"Social media and other communications technologies have enabled the virtual and, in some cases, actual mobilization of dispersed and demographically varied audiences around the world," Lumpkin said.
The communications allow non-state actors to "reach across the globe with multiple, simultaneously targeted and tailored approaches to motivate or manipulate a spectrum of audiences," he said.
Limitless Reach
Preparing the MISO forces for current and future conflict is an important role for the U.S. Special Operations Command, Haas said.
Citing what he described as the "extensive propaganda efforts employed by both ISIL and Russia," Haas said the role of the U.S. Special Operations Command in manning, training and equipping is especially critical.
While significant improvements have been made over the last decade, challenges remain, he said.
To address capability gaps, U.S. Special Operations Command is developing a plan to expand MISO training into social media use, online advertising, web design and other areas, he explained.
Global Military Information Efforts
MISO forces are currently deployed to 21 U.S. embassies, working with country teams and interagency partners to challenge adversary information and support broader U.S. government goals, Moore said.
The military information forces use existing web and social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to support military objectives by shaping perceptions while highlighting ISIL atrocities, coalition responses to ISIL activities, and coalition successes, he said.
MISO personnel have the training and cultural understanding to assess enemy propaganda activities and propose unique solutions that support U.S. military objectives, he said.
Moore said MISO efforts in the Central Command area of responsibility are focused on challenging violent extremists. In the European Command's area of responsibility, he said, the efforts of military information forces include "exposing Russian mistruths and their concerted efforts to mislead European audiences as to their true intentions."
Also at the hearing was Matthew Armstrong of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the independent federal entity that oversees government broadcasting including the Voice of America.
Moore said European Command is looking to expand its engagement with the Broadcasting Board of Governors to further improve information dissemination capabilities.
Comments
This is the perfect example of what I am trying to get many to understand--this has been ongoing since 2004 via the net and social media and not a single attempt by the US to push back.
Repeat this enough times and anyone in the ME will believe it.
From yesterday carried across the ME on a number of "friendly" jihadi social media support sites.
USA-led Coalition released a new #video of bombing #Hawija prison with tens of prisoners inside it.. #ISIS #Iraq
What is the proof this was #ISIS prison in #Hawija? Anyone can setup a similar hollywoodic movie anywhere in #Iraq..
Our response...nothing.....when in fact it is easy...speed using the same media, using truth to shape the narrative--it is that easy.
PEMSII or any other Staff process in MISO simply does not take this into consideration anywhere in the countering of the info war process.
Government Trolls Are Using "Psychology-Based Influence Techniques" On YouTube, Facebook And Twitter | Zero Hedge
http://buff.ly/1kEg4Gp
While this article is from the "friendly side" the "unfriendly side" uses the same exact TTPs. Refer to the NYTs extensive article on the Russian government sponsored "troll factory".
A perfect example of just how we have so badly lost the information war.
In late 2007, AQI posted two interesting documents that many just flew over and never even broke the radar screen.
1. the first document was the recommended purchase of a US off the shelve public encryption software to be used for overall communications via chat rooms and between members --while the software was in English the individual was walked through the software with key Arabic translations on how to use the software.
2. the second document was how to setup a global internet info war concept with individuals and or groups that would allow for a global decentralization of their info war efforts
THEN this today breaks the surface as something "new".
Complete AQ article on encryption.
* Use Mujahideen Secrets
* Don’t use TrueCrypt
* Contacts at Telegram, SureSpot pic.twitter.com/kDIcxPj0F2
This "weaponization of information war" has been going on for a long time now and yet still everyone talks, develops processes, develops new organizations and yet the users of UW still keep on winning......why because we never have attempted to fully understand UW.
Ever notice how quiet it has gotten around the discussion on a national level strategic UW strategy?
To drive the point home even more--this was released by Vesti a typical Russian media outlet shortly after the major Putin speech in Sochi this week.
Vesti: "130 opinion-makers will go back from Valdai to 30 countries.
The RU position on key issues will be, if not closer, at least clearer"
What is scarier and totally not talked about here at SWJ and other sites is--and let's just use the "Russian info war" side of the house....
Who are the "narrative creators, spreaders and influencers" of "weaponized information" inside the US?--especially the "influencers"--both US citizens and others that are in fact accepting money from Russian sources and are being willingly "used" by Russia.
NOW that would be an interesting discussion to have here at SWJ as several "influencers of the Russian narrative" have posted articles here at SWJ over the last year and no one seemed to pick up on them.
In the actual daily 24 hour grind of "weaponized information" one must mind and respond.
To not respond immediately is in fact (in the 21st century media world) agreeing with and supporting the "narrative".
Control the "narrative" and you control/influence the 24 hour news cycle --"control/influence the 24 hour news cycle" and you "influence entire civil societies". Nothing has changed from the Dr. Goebbels days--just the technology and speed.
That is the basis of the Russian "weaponization of information" in order to win wars fought one level below open combat.
MISO cannot do that.
Here is the current inherent inablility for the US DoD, NATO or even the EU to respond to just about anything that the term "weaponization of information" refers to.
The West and that includes DoD somehow feet that "processes", Staff planning and the "whole of government approach" will in the end be successful.
Hate to say it--the train has long, long, long ago left the station and we in the West have actually lost the "weaponization of information" war and believe me it is a true ongoing daily war for the minds of entire civil societies.
It is great that there is PMESII, DIMEFIL and LMNOP and I can sing a song about all these processes and their various inherent single points of failure but that is a different story--they are to slow and inefficient in addressing the 24 hour news cycle that drives this form of UW.
By the time a Staff works through say PMESII--the "narrative" may have changed five times and yet the Staff is still on "narrative one".
In all of the EU, US and NATO announcement concerning this problem no one has addressed the simple fact "it costs money" and no one is willing to invest that kind of money year after year after year for the next oh say 15 years.
Remember Russia alone has invested 700-800M USDs each year for the last ten or so years and has built a news media chain in over 126 countries and is still expanding. AND the 2016 budget has dropped from the planned 800M to 600M due to falling oil prices otherwise it would have been an nice cool 800M USDs.
We are so out of touch with the "weaponization war" yet we stumble and bumble along thinking we are getting at the problem with countless articles, conferences, meetings, new ideas and theories, new defense contracting positions and even newer DoD organizations and YES new Staff processes.
The answer has been and still is --social media--it has the speed, the low cost and it does the one critical thing so necessary to push back on "weaponization of information"--it confirms or denies "the truth".
I was already in 2005 stating over and over QJBR/AQI was using the internet in ways we have never dreamed of for "weaponization" and we had to push back then via the internet BUT what did we get "a big defense contractor" placed into Iraq with a "great solution" that failed badly after costing the tax payer millions.
Heck I was even using Iraqi insurgent battle videos to train interrogators, and spot insurgent TTPs long before anyone figured they could be used for that---and definitely long before US intel picked up on them--AND was often accused of using "propaganda" and many officers at the time even refused to look at them--this was 2005 and now we are in 2015 with the same exact "weaponization" problem.
We then had not even figured out the Iraqi insurgents were actually attempting to converse with us yet we never "got it".
Example--there was an excellent study done by the West Point CTC on insurgent imagery being used in their videos--probably one of the best studies ever conducted into insurgent video imagery--it was virtually unknown at the Staff levels.
If one is in tune to the social media--right now Russia is in fact spending a tremendous amount of their info war time just responding to social media --especially in trying to discredit them--first with MH17 that shredded eight different Russian "narratives" to now Syria.
They were the ones carrying the info war fight on actual Russian activities inside the Ukraine disproving over and over Russian official statements and exposing fake reports after fake reports--AND where was DoD/NATO/EU--asleep at the wheel.
Social media open source analysis has opened a totally new window on the ability to analyze video, photos and social media accounts and this is key "in near real time"--even to creating new open source tools for those efforts---WHERE was DoD in this particular fight--they were and are using now open source analysis taken from social media to avoid releasing their own classified data.
AND social media is doing this with zero cost to DoD and the US taxpayers.
Social media has been dueling hourly with Russian and now Syrian trolls in ways DoD cannot begin to think about.
Example--Russian trolls even figured out how to "spam" inside a Twitter account which took Twitter Tech Support over ten days to stop.
So we see now the blending of "weaponization of information" into cyber warfare--actually the two most critical elements in non linear warfare.
Where would that "blending" be discussed in say PEMESII or any other Staff process??
So explain to me again just how defense contractors and DoD in creating great new "exciting opportunities for MISO" is going to tap directly into and support the social media side that that has been totally left out of the so called "whole of government approach"?
All I see are "new and exciting" jobs for tons of people having absolutely no direct daily impact on the "weaponization of information" as they are simply "to slow".
It is an always will be about the "narrative", the 24 hours news cycle and social media---anything else is just window dressing and a waste of time.
AND oh....that 800M USD yearly budget used in over 126 countries that I see never happening in my lifetime.
Thus we have long ago lost the "weaponization of information war".
JMHO-----but I am right.
Guilty of recycling my comments:
I just discussed some of these points today during a course with analysts at the NATO HUMINT Center of Excellence in Romania.
My focus involved engaging Russian Propaganda in the Information Environment through intelligence support to STRATCOM and information operations..collecting data and information and turning it into actionable intelligence assessments to "illuminate the lie" and develop and disseminate counter themes and messages. In this aspect there are friendly, neutral and threat targeted audiences.
Finally, there is an aspect of Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO) that is often neglected or misunderstood in deliberate/greater "inform and influence" planning and assessments: Cyberspace Information Collection (FM 3-38); enabled by Cyberspace ISR and OPE. How can you engage and destroy the lie if you a) don't know what it is and b)understand why relevant populations associate with and believe it....??
WE need analysts to tell us what they are saying, why TAs believe it, and recommendations on what to say to counter it (do your historical and sociocultural homework). We also need operators to stop them from saying it (lethal and non-lethal)and to say things after they smash the place up...this should occur in the physical, obvious human,PMESII-PT/DIMEFIL/LMNOP and information enviroment, which includes the electromagnetic environment and cyberspace. If I understand this and so do you, we have a comprehensive approach.