Updated IC Gray Zone Lexicon: Key Terms and Definitions

Key Takeaways

Scope Note: This standalone graphic responds to the requirement in Public Law 117-103 that “The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall develop a lexicon of common terms (and corresponding definitions for such terms) for concepts associated with gray zone activities.” This lexicon provides a common reference guide of country-agnostic terms and is intended to standardize terminology used by IC components, particularly analytic components. Terms contained in this lexicon do not supplant US authorities, policies, operations, or other actions, and they do not supersede any US legal definitions, for which individual agencies should consult their respective Offices of General Counsel.

The IC defines the gray zone as a realm of international relations between peaceful interstate diplomacy, economic activity, and people-to-people contact on one end of the spectrum and armed conflict on the other, and gray zone activities as coercive or subversive actions to achieve objectives at the expense of others in contravention or in the absence of international norms. We assess that gray zone activities and campaigns are likely to increase in the coming years and become a dominant feature of great power competition and international relations more broadly because of eroding or nonexistent norms; emerging, evolving, and expanding domains; and perceptions of their comparative advantages.

• The IC previously has not agreed upon definitions for the gray zone or for all associated concepts. To develop this lexicon, the NIC reviewed a range of academic research and all-source intelligence, consulted with leading external researchers, and led structured analytic exercises with IC experts to establish a baseline and scope.

• This lexicon is intended to add precision to IC analysis and provide a common foundation for debate, analysis, and messaging. It prioritizes clarity, consistency, and universality but does not cover all terms associated with states’ and non-state actors’ international behavior, including technical terms or those commonly understood. Unless there are substantive divergences, this lexicon complements other US Government lexicons. The inclusion of a term does not indicate that the IC necessarily classifies it as a gray zone activity, a determination dependent on circumstances; some terms are included for context.

During the past 15 years, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia increasingly have sought to achieve strategic objectives by concerted action against others in areas considered the “gray zone”—a term popularized in the 2010s by Western researchers. The IC assesses that in the coming years, these gray zone campaigns and activities are likely to increase and become a dominant feature of great power competition and international dynamics generally because of the combination of eroding or non-existent international norms; emerging, evolving, and expanding international domains; and authoritarian leaders’ perception of their comparative advantages and fewer risks. In particular, recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have demonstrated, particularly for revisionist foreign leaders, that gray zone campaigns can be both a complement and a viable alternative to armed conflict and diplomacy. The IC assesses that some US partners and non-state actors also are likely to employ gray zone activities. In some instances, states will employ such activities outside of discernable campaigns, further complicating both analysis and policy responses. Because of the covert nature of many gray zone activities, intelligence collection and analysis provide unique insights into actors’ intent and enable attribution.

•    Old Concept, New Name. The use of coercive or subversive instruments of power—beyond diplomacy and in lieu of war—to achieve objectives has been a feature of statecraft since Chinese and Greek theorists described it in the fifth century BCE. During the Cold War, US diplomat and strategist George Kennan predicted that long-term competition would be characterized by “an extension of armed conflict by other means,” which he described as an enduring norm of international relations. He used “political warfare” to describe “the employment of all means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.”

•    Routine Behavior. Kennan’s influential policy memorandum on political warfare focused on institutionalizing overt and covert US efforts to contain and weaken the USSR. Current PRC, Iranian, North Korean and Russian leaders view some of their actions now described as “gray zone” activities as routine and legitimate tools of statecraft, and publicly and privately ascribe similar behavior to the United States. PRC and Russian strategists, whose translated theories were interpreted by Western researchers in the 2010s as reflecting official gray zone doctrines, focused instead on perceived Western strategies and advocated potential counters. PRC and Russian leaders, in particular, continue to believe that Washington is threatening their states by supporting proxies, conducting provocative military and information operations, and using economic coercion, and they often consider their actions to be mimicking or countering US gray zone activities.

•    Broad but Differentiated. Theorists and practitioners have used the term “gray zone” to describe diverse activities ranging from Iran’s targeting of US officials for assassination, to Russia’s election disinformation, and China’s militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea. However, we consider the “gray zone” distinct from related terms such as hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, and strategic competition.