Small Wars Journal

U.S. Looking for Leaders in Afghan Army

Thu, 04/01/2010 - 10:53am
U.S. Looking for Leaders in Afghan Army - Jim Michaels, USA Today.

... After eight years and billions of dollars spent on building Afghanistan's military, coalition officials have concluded a lack of quality leaders is now the biggest obstacle to creating a fighting force capable of standing on its own...

The commander in charge of training the Afghan army into a force capable of taking over for coalition troops, Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, has ordered that development of leadership skills be a top priority.

"It's more important than equipment," Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top allied commander here, said in an interview. "It's more important than doctrine. It's more important even than ideology."

And it may be the single most important factor that decides whether the Taliban is defeated and the U.S. military can go home, experts say...

Much more at USA Today.

Comments

Matthew Farmer (not verified)

Wed, 05/05/2010 - 6:22pm

The new emphasis on developing leadership within Afghan security forces is a positive step. Long-term success in Afghanistan will depend upon the ability of the Afghan military leaders to train, employ, sustain and adapt their forces to meet the demands of the environment. But leadership development in Afghanistan is much more than simply teaching cadets at the military academy the western military virtues of how to lead from the front, be virtuous, and take care of their soldiers.

In order to be successful and self-sustaining, the cultural norms and values of the Afghan people must inform the leadership model that will guide the leadership of a new generation of security forces. But choosing the right leadership model must be done deliberately, and is not as easy as it seems.

The Afghans could choose to adhere to their current approach to leadership -a leadership model that emphasizes the preeminence of authority and the importance of economic, ethnic and social class. This approach is shaped heavily by the cultural influences of Islam and the traditions of the tribal structure. Despite its cultural consistency, this leadership approach is not really acceptable western decision-makers because it leads to rampant corruption and incompetence, two traits that run contrary to western values.

On the other hand, we could aggressively encourage the Afghans to adopt a more "western" leadership approach - one that emphasizes servant leadership and concepts of gender and ethnic equality. But in all likelihood, this model would not work because it is such a radical departure from the Afghan
traditions or norms of leadership and authority that are found in today's Afghan Army. Too radical a shift risks producing leaders that are not respected by either Afghan soldiers or the Afghan people, but are instead seen as weak.

The 'right' model is somewhere between these two extremes. The current approach to leader development is too close the 'pure west' model and too antithetical to Afghan cultural norms. U.S. advisors should look closely at the diverse Afghan culture and make judgments on what adjustments they can make to the leadership model without sacrificing the ability of the new officers to lead soldiers and maintain legitimacy among the populace. Perhaps, initiatives propelling gender and ethnic equality to the forefront of leadership are not immediately necessary. Putting these less important issues to the back burner will then allow issues more integral to success, such as anti-corruption and leadership from the front, to integrate more easily into the Afghan leadership culture.

Perhaps we ought to consider a radical alternative like placing US officers and senior NCOs directly in charge of select ANA/ Afghan militia units for a definite period of time (3-5 years?). This would allow US leaders to lead by example and for Afghan soldiers to learn through direct experience rather than in a classroom environment. They could then return to the regular ANA force taking with them their leadership experiences.

Clearly this option would require some negotiation with the Afghan government & MoD to split off certain Afghan units to be used for such an "experiment"; and there would be the painful effort to find US leaders that want to serve in such a position. But it may be worth a try.