USFF Hosts Bold Alligator 2012 Main Planning Conference

Phil, thanks for the informative clarification. As for determining the requirements for having an amphibious capability I think you already addressed that, the hard part is identifying the context. I was very happy to hear the team is looking at making adjustments based on new and emerging technologies that we have (or soon will) and that a potential enemy may employ. I suspect some of these technologies will be a significannt game changer.

Bill M,
Over the last decade, even with the large Marine Corps commitment to both Iraq and Afghanistan, the Navy and Marines have been dutifully generating, training and deploying Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs--three amphib ships) which embark Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU). The MEU is built around a reinforced rifle battalion, a composite aviation squadron (helicopters, MV-22s and AV-8B Harrier jump jets), and a Combat Logistics Battalion. The ARG/MEU is a very "handy" tool--responsive and multi-mission capable. ARG/MEUs have been employed non-stop, either reinforcing operations ashore in Iraq or Afghanistan, or providing crisis response to a myriad of littoral challenges (Libya, Lebanon, Somalia).

While we have sustained our capabilities to operate ARG/MEUs, what has been missing for the last decade is our ability to put together a larger amphibious force that can land and support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB--consisting of a Regimental landing Team, Marine Air Group and Logistics Regiment), in the face of a competent threat both on land and at sea. As the ESG-2 press release indicates, Bold Alligator features an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) of multiple ARG strength (7+amphibs) and a full Carrier Strike Group (CSG). Working at this size is not only a quantitative jump from the ARG/MEU, but also a qualitative jump in the planning and execution challenges. Enough has changed in terms of potential threats, but also the organization and employment concepts of other Fleet elements and the joint force, that conducting a large amphibious exercise now is almost an experiment compared to how we would have done it even 10 years ago.

There are many who question the need for our amphibious capability, or rather what capacity we need to maintain. We can argue about capacity. However, I think we cannot depend upon getting an invite everywhere we may want to operate. We cant depend upon an air-only forcible entry capability. We cant depend upon stand-off strike to win campaigns. And we cant depend on being able to create a benign environment prior to landing from the sea. All that points to having some sort of ability to land, from the sea, in a hostile environment (which is not the equivalent of landing in the teeth of a planned defense).

In response to Daves comments, I think the Sea Services get caught in the "Tarawa repeat" argument because we havent put enough thought into the likely campaign context for an amphibious operation.

The "storm the beach" heritage from the Central Pacific is a direct outgrowth of the unique requirements of that campaign. Many islands and Japanese-held areas were bypassed (we dont hear of the Battle of Truk, or the assault on Rabaul), but those that had to be taken provided few tactical options other than a frontal attack at the tactical level. The challenge facing MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific lent itself even more to bypassing Japanese strength (although there were still many bloody battles in "mopping up" those bypassed elements in direct contact with Allied ground forces). In Europe, the issue was finding a landing area close enough to campaign objectives to be useful, but far enough from the most heavily defended beaches and Axis reserves. All of these examples featured a varied level of "assault" in the immediate landing area, but all were built on an ability to choose from multiple areas, based on our offensive capabilities.

There are many tactical issues to consider that have broader impacts. Having a certain level of "assault the beach" capability is what facilitates having the choice to land where the enemy isnt strong. An adversary must make a choice when figuring out where and when to defend. As important as the landward side, amphibious capability requires the seabase to be able to adequately sustain support ashore--which means sea control, at least locally. We have tended to think of gaining air and sea control as the pre-requisites for an amphibious assault. However, with potential hybrid foes, where some high tech threat (cruise missiles, small boats, rockets) are mixed within a population, and not easily identifiable from a distance, we may find ourselves using a very temporary air/sea superiority to land forces--which then neutralize land-based threats to the sea area.

In the end, an amphibious operation is merely a means (or way) to achieve an end. That "end" or objective must always shape the conduct of the amphibious operation. There are plenty of cases where the requirements of the campaign forced us to accept greater tactical risk in the amphibious assault itself (Inchon, for example). An amphibious operation needs to be able to support the joint campaign--whether that is gaining a lodgment for an extended campaign, or securing areas to support access, reinforcing an ally, or a massive raid of some sort (an amphibious raid being generically defined as a landing with a planned withdrawal, regardless of the nature of the operations ashore). As we "re-invigorate" training towards larger amphibious operations, we really need to do some hard thinking about the whole context and requirements of amphibious capability.

Semper Fi,
Phil

Does article imply (or is it just me) that some of our leaders for a while thought amphibious operations were obsolete and the USN/USMC stopped training on them? If so, that is reason for concern. The vast majority of humanity live in the littoral regions of the world, and sea basing gives us just that an expedient and effective base which to launch and sustain operations from. Please clarfiy why this exercise is new?