A small sampling of several recent discussions at the Small Wars Council - for our many lurkers - take the plunge - registration is easy and the price is right...
U.S. Captains Bear Weight of Iraq Strategy
... At the word "viceroy", my ears pricked up. This is very much the sort of thing that I have been watching and waiting to see develop in the U.S. Army and USMC. If the US Army and Marines were to take only one thing away from Iraq (and to a certain extent, Afghanistan), it would be this: that even (especially) the subaltern, or junior officer, would become fully self-aware and self-confident of his role and status as a de facto proconsul, the agent and executor of his nation's policy and strategic interests. This growing self-awareness and self-confidence of the junior and field-grade officer classes is very "Imperial", and in a good way....
FM 3-27.75 The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills
... There was an oped in the Washington Post (I think) last year by a serving soldier who pointed out that the term "warrior" contributed to the divide in America between the civilian and the military in that it had an elitist almost intentionally separatist connotation.
Like you I am probably old fashioned and simple minded about such things. If i was at a dinner party at my sister's house in El Cerrito California (right next to Berkeley) I would be proud and comfortable to tell people I am a Soldier; saying I am a "warrior" however would make me squeamish and uncomfortable.
So why then does our army continue to use such a misguided word? I don't think the Marines call themselves warriors, "just" Marines. So why can't we be just "Soldiers?"
Having read Rob's excellent post, I went back to Dr. Ucko's article and gave it another look. As I was reading, it struck me that much of his argument is based on an historical survey whose population is one.
Dr. Ucko, along with many, many others, have claimed that the US military has 'historically' turned away from counterinsurgency as soon as possible and returned to the study of conventional war. This, they argue, is a subject our generals are much more comfortable with - with the added benefit that conventional warfighting produces much bigger budgets, quicker promotions, more toys for the boys, etc. I believe this is a false premise based on bad history.
Firstly, with a few exceptions of relatively short duration, the regular military forces of the United States were organized, trained, and funded for employment in Small Wars until just before the Second World War. They were never - never - prepared to fight conventional wars until the balloon actually went up. In the 1920's and 1930's, it was the rebels and deep thinkers who argued we needed to buy bombers and tanks, to think about the impact of mechanization or to train for amphibious warfare. From 1783 to 1935 or so, peacetime armies were small, and employed largely in counterinsurgency, civil support, or stability operations. Training for 'conventional' war was the exception, not the rule, and rarely done above the regimental level...
Infantry Unit Tactics, Tasks, Weapons, and Organization
I have thouroughly enjoyed these threads and associated links. This stuff has interested me for many years.
Here is my proposal for light inf. platoon org.
Platoon HQ Capt.Pl.sgt.
2x sig.
Weapons squad (6 men) 2x 8.6mm Lapua Magnum rifles (2 pers.)
1x 60mm commando mortar (3 pers.)
1x squad leader
2x section (each 20 men) 1x Lt. with IW
1x section sgt. with IW
3x 6man squad: 1x leader with IW
1x 2ic NCO also no.2 on gun
1x 7.62 Minimi (FNH or Mk48)
1x IW with UGL
2x riflemen with IW
(squad leader leads 4 man rifle group and 2ic
leads gun group)
This gives the platoon 6 rifle squads of 6 pers each, with a total of 6 7.62 LMGs. No 5.56 LMGs or 7.62 GPMGs at platoon level. (kiss)
This section is small enough to chop and change without affecting the 'band of brothers' bonds too much. Everyone knows each other...
What Does the Military do in COIN?
OK, so the clue is in the title.
a.) I am extremely sceptical of the "80% political" aphorism applied to so-called COIN.b.) I do not believe -- and my short time on this board is reinforcing this view, - that COIN is a valid area of worthy of discrete study, and separated from conflict in general. It's like talking about policing from a purely counter-narcotics or traffic viewpoint.
So, I submit that the military contribution to what we choose to call COIN is primarily providing security for the activities (government, police, normal commercial and social activity/reform/change) and facilities that the insurgency chooses to target, as part of their campaign aims.
I would welcome views that contrast or conflict with my own.
Organizing for COIN at the Company and Platoon Level
Yes, but I have no issue with the paper's conclusion, that there is a direct link to unit discipline and abuse of civilians. In fact, there's a direct correlation between unit discipline (I'm not talking about spit shined buckles, but strong leadership enforcing important standards) and almost any unit's success or failure tactically. I'm sure the NCO's on this board would confirm that.
... You can't convince me that the USAF having control of the UAV's from Nellis is a good thing. The USAF may have developed some cool doctrine, but its UAV ops are anything BUT integrated with the ground force. I imagine this is the reason the army decided to get its own (rotary) air force, like the Marines - soldiers get left hanging to dry otherwise in the USAF priority scheme.
This has been a decade and a half in the making, and the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars have provided the tipping point. The British Armed Forces in general, and the Army in particular, have almost completely burned out: too many commitments, too few resources, and weak military leadership. Not to mention Government policies. There is a real danger of an institutional breakdown in the not-so distant future.
14 weeks of initial training? That's only enough to cover Recruit training; there's no time for real Infantry training, and that takes at least 3 more months on top of that 14 weeks to get right. This is very disturbing, sending partially-trained troops to war.