Why are the Taliban Resurgent in Afghanistan? By Dawood Azami, BBC
…despite the killing of thousands of militants, the insurgent group has retaken big chunks of the country.
There are three main reasons for this resurgence.
First, the end, in 2014, of the US and Nato combat mission and the withdrawal of most foreign forces from Afghanistan reduced the risk the Taliban faced of being bombed and raided.
The group was further emboldened by the comparative lack of interest from the international community and the diversion of its attention to crisis in other parts of the world, such as Syria, Iraq and Ukraine.
As the Taliban have overrun military bases, district centres and security check-points in different parts of Afghanistan, they have seized more weapons and have been using them in their fight against Afghan government forces. They have also captured dozens of Humvees and police vehicles, which they now drive in areas under their control.
Secondly, the Pakistani military's Operation Zarb-e-Azb, launched in the North Waziristan tribal area in June 2014, dislodged thousands of mainly Uzbek, Arab and Pakistani militants, who flooded into Afghanistan and swelled the Taliban's ranks.
The Taliban also reportedly moved a big number of their own fighters from Pakistan…
Comments
Quite simple: Because the Insurgent is not the same as the Insurgency, and our strategy seeks to defeat the former, but is designed to make the latter stronger in the process.
Our strategy is the same “Humpty Dumpty Strategy” the US employed in Vietnam and Iraq. First we create/adopt a Humpty Dumpty government fundamentally lacking in popular legitimacy with much of the population, but one that we believe will represent our interests in that particular place over the interests of their own population if necessary. Next we set about building a "wall" to set that Humpty Dumpty upon to protect it from that segment of the population that finds its inherent illegitimacy so offensive (often built around a core of that segment of the population that were disempowered themselves by the external great power who created Humpty Dumpty). That "wall" is made up in equal parts of western style democratic governmental frameworks and institutions; development of infrastructure; and creation of security forces in the image of the great power. This wall is never tailored for the culture of the place it affects, but is always built in a manner deemed proper by the builder.
The kicker is that Humpty Dumpty is then given a promise, that if this wall is ever assaulted by the people, we will send "all the King's Horses and all the King's men" to preserve his government.
But the people always assault, and Humpty always falls; and though we do indeed send our horses and men, invariably we weary of the impossible task of trying to put Humpty together again.
This approach guarantees a powerful line of motivation for revolutionary insurgency against the Humpty Dumpty government.
Sending "all the King's horses and all the King's men" guarantees an at least equally powerful line of motivation for a resistance insurgency against the great power.
Attacking the insurgents may suppress the activities of these insurgencies for some short period of time, and in some small space cleared and occupied by the King's men - but also puts even more energy into the two lines of motivation for revolutionary and resistance insurgency in the process.
So the insurgent may appear "defeated" for a short period of time - but the insurgency grows stronger and roars to life once opportunity presents.
So here we are in Afghanistan in the late stages of yet another Humpty Dumpty effort. Of course the Taliban are resurgent. It was preordained by our strategy.