With Exercises in Asia, US Army Searches for Relevance by Anna Fifield, Washington Post
… It’s not war, or even a very close resemblance to war. But in a region of the world where there are enough territorial disputes on the islands surrounding Japan that battle sometimes feels possible, this is an exercise that reveals two military forces looking to redefine their mission. One is American, the other Japanese.
On a recent fall day, with fresh snow on the mountains here on the northern island of Hokkaido, American and Japanese soldiers were learning how to work together with different equipment, different capabilities and different languages.
The Orient Shield exercises, the latest iteration of which were held on this Japanese military base, ended Friday.
They are taking place at a time of immense change for both militaries: the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, as they are officially called, are gearing up to take on a bigger role in the region and expand their capabilities…
Comments
Likewise might we say that Rome under Constantine deployed its forces according to its own perceived interests, and not according to who most needed its help?
Herein, the abandonment of the "frontier" -- and those needing help there -- being:
a. Not in Rome's best interest cir. 500 CE and
b. Not in the U.S.'s best interests today?
This suggesting that the common problem, re: Constantine then and the U.S. today, is in not seeing the frontier (today: the Middle East; the Russian borderlands) -- and the people needing help there -- as of critical strategic importance?
Nobody is proposing that we "remove the greater part of the army" to Asia as part of the pivot... it was from the start intended to be dominated by naval and air forces. The "tranquil states" of Asia for the most part seem quite amenable to these deployments, as they see a real threat to their tranquility coming from China.
The US, like everybody else, deploys its forces according to its own perceived interests, not according to who most needs its help.
Where exactly are these countries where "leaders have relied on foreign protection to enable them to remain insensitive to the reasonable concerns of their evolving populations"? This construct seems much overplayed to me: the autocracies of the Middle East need no assistance from the US to "remain insensitive to the reasonable concerns of their evolving populations". They do that very capably on their own.
The danger of that construct is that it suggests that the US has the power to make these regimes more sensitive to their populaces. That is of course a complete illusion.
Thus, in the name of "self-determination" (or in simply "saving money"), we court a new "Dark Ages?"
("The Dark Ages: The period of intellectual darkness and economic regression that occurred in Europe following the collapse of the Western Roman Empire.")
Thus, if such a "grand strategy" did not work for Constintine and the Romans cir. 500 CE, for what reason might we think it will work for President Obama, the United States and the rest of the more-modern world today?
<blockquote>Winning battles is not winning wars. Yes, we have won many battles over the post WWII era - one is harder pressed to find examples where we have been able to convert tactical victories into strategic successes.</blockquote>
You can't win wars if you refuse to fight any battle. We certainly did not win in Libya by bombing and relying on other nation's SOF. Did they fix it themselves afterwards? If Israel had not bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, who knows what we would have faced in 1991? We certainly did not win in Desert Storm because Saddam Hussein remained in power and the no-fly zones failed to remove him plus oil was not flowing from that vital source. We <strong>did</strong> win in Korea, and Cold War Germany and Japan as evidenced by our allies powerhouse economies contrasted with the communist versions in Korea and Germany that are/were some of the poorest in the world.
One reason we did not consolidate gains in South Vietnam was a Congressional law prohibiting bombing of the North's conventional attack in 1975. Our "battle" against the similar Easter Offensive of 1972 was highly effective just as we could have squashed ISIS had we retained airpower in Iraq instead of withdrawing entirely. If we had never fought in Vietnam or Iraq, other surrogate Asian wars and Hussein aggression could have spread sans any Western and allied interference. If we had redrawn Iraq and Afghan borders post OEF/OIF, we likely would have converted tactical victories into strategic successes. A counterfactual with more troops on the ground for stability operations likely would have secured infrastructure and our supply lines, limited the influence of ethnic militias and cleansing, and facilitated training of separate Sunni, Shia, and Kurd militaries/police forces with separate governing bodies.
<blockquote>We really need to step back and be a great deal more pragmatic and develop a greater empathy for the perspectives of others.</blockquote> Redrawing borders and being <strong>temporarily</strong> more Machievellian sounds pretty pragmatic to me. Putting Sunnis in charge of Sunni, Shiites in charge of Shiites, and Kurds in charge of Kurds would have been the ultimate empathy and likely would have led to less time of "occupation" and removed motivation for an ISIS except in Syria. Of course we failed to show empathy for the 200,000 lost Syrians and millions of Sunni refugees which is why ISIS was born. Sunnis oppressed by Assad without any U.S. or coalition intervention ultimately led to moderate rebels not "loving us" which led to radical creations like ISIS and al Nusra. It's clear now that they don't "fear us or others more" when we pronounce no U.S. ground force involvement and inflict only token numbers of air attacks. There is little difference between doing only a little and doing nothing at all.
Winning battles is not winning wars. Yes, we have won many battles over the post WWII era - one is harder pressed to find examples where we have been able to convert tactical victories into strategic successes. Many still see how Bush I ended the first Gulf War as a "job half done" - history, however will judge it as one of the wisest post-conflict decisions we have made as a nation. "Finishing the job" in 2003 opened the doors to the massive strategic set-back we are dealing with now, and the renewed competition to establish new limits of influence in the larger Sunni-Shia competition.
We are so convinced of our moral rightness as a nation that we have a hard time appreciating how our actions and policies are perceived by others. It also leads us to be convinced that any who dare to oppose what we promote are some how evil, rogue or a threat to our interests. We really need to step back and be a great deal more pragmatic and develop a greater empathy for the perspectives of others.
As to my construct of "sovereignty boxes" yes, so some are colonial, others are the results of how major wars ended. Major states like China and Russia are indeed aggressive, but their motivations are reasonable. With far less motivation America was far more aggressive as the 19th century came to an end and we looked for how to expand beyond the borders of North America. We had out grown our box, and every gain in sovereignty we made came at the expense of another. This is just the way it has always been, and likely will always be.
The last thing I would add is that one can occupy by policy and create a very similar resistance effect in a population to the one created by a physical occupation. Germany and Japan are always wheeled out as examples of how if we just stick to it we can turn someplace we occupy into a powerful and successful ally. This always ignores what I call "the lesser of two evils" effect. American occupation and illegitimacy was a far lesser evil than what Russia would have imposed upon Germany, or what China and Russia would have imposed upon Japan. They did not love us, they simply feared others more.
<blockquote>Except, of course, that we are the "barbarians" (foreigners) in this little tale.</blockquote>Except the barbarians in this case were not foreigners but rather homegrown locals allowed to run roughshod over Roman interests who weren't there to stop them. In other cases such as Genghis Khan, the barbarians were foreigners, but in no way resemble any war fought by the U.S. in modern times. In the proper context, barbarians are any group of extremists who use terror and warfare violating reasonable laws of warfare and governance to attempt to impose their will on the majority of reasonable residents. The Romans certainly had their own flaws in Bill C's example but we never sought to permanently take over or occupy either Afghanistan or Iraq which hardly makes us barbarians.
<blockquote>Most of the turmoil we agonize over are natural and necessary internal adjustments of governance. Some of these are within nascent democracies in far east that are refining their path foward in this globalized environment; but most are within autocratic regimes in the middle east where leaders have relied on foreign protection to enable them to remain insensitive to the reasonable concerns of their evolving populations.</blockquote>
How do former ISIS Iraqi radical Sunnis, al Qaeda, and foreign fighters constitute a natural and necessary adjustment of Syrian governance and do they represent moderate Iraqi Sunnis? Nascent democracies like Indonesia and Egypt? How does having a freely elected President Joko in Indonesia square with the authoritarian-heritage leader of their Parliament who wants to remove free elections from the future process of electing Presidents? With 203 million Muslims living in Indonesia, what happens if the Parliament wins and democracy reverts to authoritarianism?
What happened in Egypt when the Muslim Brotherhood took power? What is wrong with the King in Jordan and why is it our business to say they are wrong? The same applies in Saudi Arabia and other GCC states and the alternatives in any of those places could have grave implications on future terror, attitude and proliferation of WMD vis-à-vis Israel and the U.S. not to mention energy supplies.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/world/asia/indonesia-joko-widodo-parl…
<blockquote>Then there are those states confined within sovereignty boxes not of their design and long outgrown as fortunes shift with the balance of power.</blockquote>
If colonial borders are the problem in your noted "sovereignty boxes," doesn't redrawing those boundaries following wars in which we succeed make sense prior to holding elections? If it makes sense to have Sunnis ruling Sunnis, Shiites ruling Shiites, and Kurds ruling Kurds, can't we facilitate that with borders aligned with where they live? What happens when we don't intervene and take the politically correct tact of assuming they can work out their problems on their own under previous boundaries? Is that how radical groups like ISIS get formed?
<blockquote>We cannot build an army powerful enough to stop these natural forces, and frankly it is fundamentally un American to even think we should try.</blockquote>
Obviously we can as evidenced by the rapid success of both the initial OEF and OIF with little loss of life. It was the instability afterwards that caused the most problems as we replaced Sunni control of Iraq with Shiite control substituting one oppressed group for the other. Pashtuns certainly had a right to control much of Afghanistan but instead we initially assumed that the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and others could work it out on their own which obviously did not occur particularly with Pakistan favoring the Pashtuns and Iran and India favoring the other ethnicities.
Unless and until we learn to be more like our occupation of Germany and Japan and <strong>temporarily</strong> impose our will on the vanquished to create new borders and rulers of similar peoples, we will continue to have these problems. Also, a complete hands-off approach in the face of conflict that affects us and our allies will not reduce terror or assure free flow of trade and energy. If war is an extension of politics or policy, our civil leaders must learn to make better State Department and DoD policy than currently is being exhibited or was demonstrated following past "missions complete."
Except, of course, that we are the "barbarians" (foreigners) in this little tale.
Most of the turmoil we agonize over are natural and necessary internal adjustments of governance. Some of these are within nascent democracies in far east that are refining their path foward in this globalized environment; but most are within autocratic regimes in the middle east where leaders have relied on foreign protection to enable them to remain insensitive to the reasonable concerns of their evolving populations.
Then there are those states confined within sovereignty boxes not of their design and long outgrown as fortunes shift with the balance of power.
We cannot build an army powerful enough to stop these natural forces, and frankly it is fundamentally un American to even think we should try.
Zosimus, 5th-century CE, historian:
"Thus to save money, Constantine abolished frontier security by removing the greater part of the soldiery from the frontiers to the cities -- cities that needed no auxiliary forces. Thus, while he deprived of help the people who were harassed by the barbarians -- and burdened tranquil cities with the pest of the military -- such that several straightway were deserted."
Likewise today President Obama's "Pivot to the East" would seem to remove the greater part of the Army from where it is needed most on the frontier (the Greater Middle East) and placed it in areas of the world (the Asia-Pacific) where there is no need for such forces.
Thus, President Obama, much like Constitine, would seem to have:
a. Deprived of help the people on the frontier who needed significant help, while, simultaneously,
b. Burdened tranquial states, societies and populations with an influx of unneeded military forces.
In Constinine's time, such a "grand strategy," according to Zosimus, led to:
1. The frontier populations looking to the barberians (much as they are beginning to look to the radical Islamists today?) for protection.
2. Discord in the previously tranquil cities and regions. (A similar fate to those regions of the Asia-Pacific today who will, now, be burdended, unnecessarily and imprudently, with our forces?) And, ultimately,
3. To the demise of the Roman Empires.
Thus, a comparison -- and for the reasons noted by Zosimus regarding Rome -- worth considering re: our current grand strategy?
Bill,
Absolutely. Historically we have had a Congress heavy in Veterans and comfortable in their understanding of the requirements of the strategic environment. Today there are few vets and no one has any real certainty of what this environment brings.
the result? No effective civilian leadership or constraint on the military. The lunatics are running the asylum unsupervised.
I think GEN Odierno has it right in this article, the first step is to have a debate on National Security. Both you can be right based on your perspective on what is important, and my perspective would be different. At the end of the day it is the nation's army, and the nation needs an informed debate to determine what is willing to support.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/top-general-us-needs-to-rethink-how-mu…
<blockquote>An army, in any configuration, cannot deter, contain, fix or defeat any of those situations/issues you describe.</blockquote>
<strong>Libya and ISIS:</strong> These clearly are the most difficult for an Army to affect but land/sea airpower alone is even less effective in achieving the ultimate end of a peaceful Libya, Syria, and Iraq. These also are areas where colonial boundaries create the most problems. Therefore, some combination of redrawn boundaries would accompany coalition ground force involvement to first contain and defeat ISIS from any Iraq presence, followed by negotiated new boundaries in Iraq and an imposed new North and South Syria. Self-governed Kurdish buffer zones would exist in both northern Iraq and Syria with a permanent U.S. air and land presence to facilitate ground raiding as required and provide a launch point for ISR/lethal/air assault/airdrop flights. No permanent coalition presence would exist in Sunni or Shiite governed areas or in Libya where ground raids would occur from the sea and potentially from Egypt. Our military would train Sunni, Shia and Kurd militaries to eliminate the specter of built-in conflict within the ranks of leaders and led in mixed forces.
<strong>Ukraine and Taiwan:</strong> Our Army, as during the Cold War, can deter through forward presence and prepositioning. Today's modified prepositioning would involve smaller armor teams located at multiple points of entry in countries accepting us to facilitate rotational presence of smaller units via Reforger and Pacific Pathways type events. The more countries involved, the more difficult the threat targeting dilemma and widespread the coalition. Anti-access air/missile and SOF raid attempts have reduced effectiveness against such armored forward presence and protected air defenses. New MLRS-launched unmanned aircraft with AMRAAM radar missiles could attack inbound aircraft and cruise missiles while other new missiles could attack ships. Area denial is unlikely once substantial mixes of light, medium, and "heavy" forces with Army vertical lift are in theater. Early island and ship-hopping air assaults, coupled with airlanding and airdrops to the east side of Taiwan and to NATO states would preclude China and Russia from an unobstructed path while providing a tripwire effect.
<strong>North Korea:</strong> The same forward ground presence that has kept the peace since 1953 would continue with rapid capability to thwart any invasion attempt and assist South Korea in stability operations should North Korea disintegrate. If China got involved in either scenario, ground forces would be essential.
<blockquote>The army should stop proclaiming to congress that it can in an effort to sustain war fighting size in the active force during peace.</blockquote>Yet we field million man "occupation" ground police forces in peaceful communities throughout the U.S. We acknowledge that crime never ends just as we must be realistic in admitting that war and conflict at some level is a permanent human condition. There is no permanent peace just as there is no end in crime. We create volunteer part-time fire departments in small communities yet we do not rely on reserve police forces as a majority in any major or minor community because the response time required dictates full time officers 24/7 and "forward deployed." In addition, police do not face major ambushes and IEDs, or long-range and indirect fires on their departments or officers which allows use of lightweight police cars. Armies require armor at varying levels which makes intertheater deployment difficult and time-consuming by both air and sea. Therefore some permanent overseas forward presence and prepositioning is essential to ensure ground force relevance. Sea-based amphibious armor alone is too light, too little in quantity, and too far from too many potential conflicts.
<blockquote>A big army is not the cure to America's perceived problems; but a right-sized, well-trained army is always a good thing to have on hand for those rare occasions when army issues arise.</blockquote>
Since 1941 our big Army and Marine Corps have been a continuous and integral part of our nation's forward-deployed defense. The Army in particular has often been twice as large as today and even during the Clinton era despite the demise of the USSR we retained a 490,000 active Army. Speaking of the Soviets, despite realistic likelihood of tactical nuclear strikes, massive air attacks and indirect fires from tens of thousands of tons of ordnance we employed land-based armor and aircraft in harm's way. U.S. Army presence was very near Soviet satellite borders, and unlike the Pacific, no water separated Soviet armor from a rapid advance against NATO. There was no air and sea-based "offset strategy" that would have worked sans the forward presence of Army armor, MLRS/ATACMS, and attack helicopters.
Today, we have allowed a few think tanks and RMA proponents to convince Congress incorrectly that some new threat exists that has hypothetical ISR kill-chain capabilities that we could defeat and limited tons of explosive power versus what we faced against the Soviets and inflicted on the Iraqis without eliminating their ground threat. Historically, indirect fires have never precluded an Armies armor from accomplishing its goals. That is precisely why forward Army armor and vertical lift must be a part of any defense of the Pacific and East Europe, with safe armor and airpower bases in Kurdish territory as well.
An army, in any configuration, cannot deter, contain, fix or defeat any of those situations/issues you describe. The army should stop proclaiming to congress that it can in an effort to sustain war fighting size in the active force during peace.
We need to be honest about what an army is and what an army does within the military. Equally our political leaders need to be much more pragmatic about what our vital interests truly are, and much more agnostic about how others self-determine to govern themselves. We have been chasing and seeking to contain those who dare to think differently than us since the end of WWII with little to shoe for our efforts. For the 150 years prior to that we were clear that none of that was in our interest and focused on issues that were.
A big army is not the cure to America's perceived problems; but a right-sized, well-trained army is always a good thing to have on hand for those rare occasions when army issues arise.
The truest point of the new Army Operating Concept's belief that the future is unknown and unknowable is that we need all of the above of light, medium, and "heavy" forces, all with varying degrees of Army armor and vertical lift airpower. SF/SOF are fantastic but not the answer unless someone can explain how they and land/sea airpower alone fixed Libya, or could fix ISIS, Ukraine, North Korea, or an invasion of Taiwan once it is a fait accompli. Don't forget the instability afterwards. The stable aftermath of WWII, our deterrence forward presence, and the eventual fall of the Berlin Wall and inner-German border proved that common people can get along if reunited. There is nothing common about the peoples grouped together by colonial and some WWII borders. In the Koreas, the common people could coexist without the influence of external parties and conflicting governing beliefs.
It makes no sense to have an active Army smaller than under President Clinton let alone smaller than before WWII. Peace is not breaking out all over and the potential threats are hardly an exaggeration. You mention constabulary, but peacekeeping is not the primary future mission anymore than it was in the past. But the similarities between our retaining a million man active police forces within the peaceful U.S. and the need to maintain an active Army to "police" other areas where we have vital national interests is unmistakable. RCJ probably would never advocate that we <strong>not</strong> lock up (contain) criminals or stop police from shooting at violent armed criminals due to concerns that their relatives will take up crime. We similarly should not forego opportunities to combat terror and help friends deter aggression abroad (including drone strikes) just because we surmise it might breed more terrorists or ill-will from our adversaries.
MF,
Both you and Robert have what I consider to be valid points. I know Robert favors a smaller Army (and I'm leaning that way as well). What size Army would you recommend and why? What types of units would you prioritize / build / maintain? Light Infantry? ABN / AASLT? Armor? Constabulary units (like the post-WW2 type)?
Yes, I believe these "dangers" to be dangerously exaggerated, and that our equally exaggerated responses actually increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks and have led us to lose focus on issues far more dangerous to maintaining our status in a globalized world.
We live in an era of self-determination. Outdated and outgrown sovereignty boxes are being challenged; as are governments that either never had legitimacy with some newly empowered populations, or that have allowed legitimacy to wane in a rapidly evolving world. We can either be a leader of change or be run over by it. So far we are opting for being run over.
So you believe our current problems in Iraq/Syria and East Europe are an exaggeration? China and North Korea mind their own business and play well with neighbors? The threat of terror, cyber attacks (watch today's ABC "This Week" about Russia's "Black Energy") and the proliferation of state/non-state WMDs is a figment of our imagination? Or do all these issues result from trying to end forward-deployed "law enforcement" stability and deterrence operations prematurely and without adequate ground "police forces."
<blockquote>We didn't need a big army to rise to power, what does it say about the type of power we have become if it takes a large army to remain in power?</blockquote>
Given the depression and the fact that the U.S. gained most of its economic, manufacturing, and world power during and after WWII, this question's premise and conclusion is deeply flawed. A large army is not about the U.S. remaining in "power" or forcing its ideals onto others, it comes down to "if not us, what force for good will help protect the under-protected?" As stated in "Fury," "Idealism is peaceful, history is violent." And don't forget Trotsky, "We may not be interested in war, but war is interested in us."
If not for a large Soldier/Marine force, WWII would have been lost and our world influence rendered minimal compared to today. Task Force Smith and our initial failures in Korea were directly tied to rapid drawdowns of WWII ground forces. Sans a large deterrent force left behind in Germany and Asia, those theaters likely could look entirely different today to include the prospect of nuclear wastelands. Without matching or proximate ground forces across borders from one another, the specter of one-side aggression and a resort to nuclear weapons is more likely.
Excessive drawdowns in ground forces following every major war since WWI have led to further war, countless lost ground-force lives, and a recurring pattern of believing war will end or the U.S. won't need to get involved overseas...it's their problem. History says otherwise.
Exaggerated issues each and every one. Also issues that are not solved by maintaining a war fighting army in peace.
We have not handled the post-WWII era of American power very well, and many of our worst decisions were enabled by having excessive Army power in the books.
We didn't need a big army to rise to power, what does it say about the type of power we have become if it takes a large army to remain in power?? Worth thinking about. We didn't get here overnight, it was a slow process that began with Truman and was accentuated by Ike.
<blockquote>We have the luxury of time due to our geostrategic location, tremendous air and naval capacity, and key allies in critical locations.</blockquote>
We have long, vulnerable, easily-infiltrated borders that terrorists and SOF can cross at the time and place of their choosing with weapons of mass and localized destruction of key assets such as centralized stealth bombers and large dense cities. Our shore-located sea ports and airbases have few air defenses and great susceptibility to surprise attack from "container ships."
Our geostrategic location makes reinforcement of "key allies" a prolonged affair made even longer if we must generate and train reserve component forces prior to months of deployment. Relative to WWII we have few intertheater transport ships and landing craft. Compared to the Cold War we have little prepositioning armor in key theaters. Our weight-limited aircraft would need to traverse long distances carrying primarily light forces. Our Marines cannot get close enough to defended shores to mount forcible entries. "Key allies" are likely to see China as a better friend and potential ally if we abandon active duty forward locations and retreat to U.S. bases due to exaggerated fear of long range missile strikes.
<blockquote>Too much Army in peace has enabled a long line of Presidents to launch us on unnecessary, bloody, expensive adventures that have served far more to tarnish our image than to advance our security.</blockquote>
An ally unwilling to share the same risks as host nation coalition forces is an ally that cannot be trusted. Without forward-deployed tripwire and point-of-entry security forces with skin in the game, a long line of future Presidents from both parties is unlikely to do the right thing initially. Isolationism, and appeasement/vacillation when facing crises will reign. Fears of sunk transport ships and exposed troops in the open upon theater arrival within submarine and missile range will deter willingness to provide meaningful assistance to allies.
All wars are bloody, expensive "misadventures." In recent history with the exception of OIF, the aggression or terror of our adversaries and their surrogates forced us into war. The more we spend consistently to prepare for war, the less essential the need to surge-overspend when finally forced to go to war. The money spent to limit casualties to Airmen and Sailors should also apply to safeguarding Soldiers and Marines. If the requirements of war are addressed suitably in peacetime, deterrence is enhanced and the waste experienced trying to hurry systems to fielded troops is less necessary. If the JLTV program had been envisioned and funded in the procurement-holiday 1990s, we wouldn't have needed to spend $50 billion on MRAPs that do not meet future deployment and logistical needs.
Our image has been greatly tarnished by our unwillingness to do the right thing to secure a Sunni homeland in Syria and Iraq colonial boundaries. As a result, a more radical group of Sunnis did it on their own with no alternative offered by either Assad or Maliki. Our image as a weak friend and unreliable ally to East European interests contrasts with the assistance they provided to the coalition in recent wars. Our leading from behind in Libya and post OIF and OEF instability illustrated that having effective Navy and Airpower active duty assets is insufficient if unwilling to support stability operations and consolidation of gains using <strong>adequate or any</adequate> ground forces after "mission complete."
Small post-conflict ground footprints contrast with large, essential U.S. and worldwide police ground forces. Acknowledgement that law enforcement is an activity without a start and stop date parallels past Cold War acknowledgement that forward-deployed forces deter war and reduce the logistics of deployment and setting theater conditions. We occupied Germany, Japan, the Philippines, and Korea for decades without cowering from the prospect of missile and air attack or the mighty Soviet Navy. Why do we lose heart in the face of a weaker PLAN and Second Artillery Missile Force with deliverable explosive power far smaller than what we and allies have experienced in past conflicts or have inflicted against adversaries with only marginal success until ground forces helped Joint forces close the deal.
Concur. We need to get back to appreciating that the Army is primarily a wartime force that should be lean, well-led and well-trained in peace.
Where Bill and I differ is size. We have the luxury of time due to our geostrategic location, tremendous air and naval capacity, and key allies in critical locations. Too much Army in peace has enabled a long line of Presidents to launch us on unnecessary, bloody, expensive adventures that have served far more to tarnish our image than to advance our security.
It's worrisome that a reporter from a major newspaper uses such small minded rhetoric. Anna claims the Army is searching for relevance through engagement with our allies, yet the Army has always conducted exercises with its allies to improve interoperability and strengthen the alliance. The point is bigger than that, an Army in garrison, just as a Navy in port, maintain their relevance simply by their existence. An Army or Navy in being still deters, and gives our leaders options should the need for military capabilities be needed.
Anna's implication is that the services must be employed and/or tied to a war plan to be relevant, and both concepts are outdated. Tying units to a war plan is a relic from the Cold War that probably needs to go away, we need a much more flexible approach for determining force structure that addresses a wider range of contingencies today, to include peacetime engagement. The point about being employed to show relevance was a mindset developed in the military after the collapse of the USSR. The U.S. appropriately downsized the military, so the reaction by the military was to show utility by deploying forces on a wide range of missions and exercises to show Congress how busy we were. To be fair, the military didn't say hey let's go to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti, but upon return from those missions there was little rest before units deployed on off post training exercises, so the optempo was extremely high, and some units did everything they could to keep their optempo high to demonstrate relevance. Supposedly units that didn't maintain a high optempo were at risk of being cut. Fortunately that belief didn't apply to our nuclear forces or strategic bombers.
There are draw backs to this type of thinking. The first is a propensity for employing the military where it is not required. The second is the expenses associated with those employments. There is a Chinese proverb, "Train an Army for 1000 days to use it for one hour." A success metric of our state craft could be how long we can keep the army in garrison, vice deployed; however, it is pretty clear that in today's world we can't keep the army in garrison even we wanted to, so Anna's comment is even more bizarre.