On the night of December 1, shortly after Barack Obama announced plans to send 30,000 more U.S. troops to Afghanistan, retired Lt. Colonel John Nagl appeared on MSNBC's "The Rachel Maddow Show." Maddow was dismayed by Obama's new plan, which she called "massive escalation," but, when she introduced Nagl, a counterinsurgency expert who has long called for a greater U.S. commitment to Afghanistan--even if it means raising taxes and expanding the military--she was surprisingly friendly. And, after Nagl spent the segment praising Obama's plan, which he said would throw back the Taliban and enable more civil and economic development, Maddow may have remained skeptical--but she was also admiring. "It's a real pleasure to have you on the show, John," she said.
Had someone like Bill Kristol given that same assessment of Obama's speech, Maddow might have tarred him as a bloodthirsty proponent of endless war. Which is why Nagl is one of the administration's most important allies as it tries to sell the United States on a renewed commitment to Afghanistan. A former tank commander in Iraq and co-author of the Army's landmark 2006 counterinsurgency manual, Nagl has become a fixture on television and in news articles about Afghanistan; he's even made an appearance on "The Daily Show." With the authority of a man who has worn a uniform in combat, and the intellectual heft of a Rhodes Scholar, he has helped to persuade many liberals that pursuing a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan is the only viable path to success...
Much more at The New Republic.
Comments
2004 was probably the timeframe that GEN Petraeus, John Nagl, Nate Fick, Andrew Exum, et al, all saw the light and had their epiphany and (re-) discovered COIN. Sure Petreaus and Nagl wrote about Vietnam (and Malaya) in the dissertation but they were not COIN advocates or as some say COINdinistas until probably after 2004.
"Washington is already planning for a more counterinsurgency-oriented future--witness the latest Pentagon budget, which shifts billions of dollars away from high-tech weapons systems designed for fighting a great power like China, toward equipment like aerial drones and armored personnel carriers."
While technically true, this statement is so misleading as to be disingenuous.
Also: "if Afghanistan doesnt turn around soon, [the COIN squad] may find themselves wondering whether its time to go back to the drawing board."
What does this really mean? In terms of the strategy in Afghanistan? How it is resourced? How it is implemented? Or is it about COIN theory in general?
Talk like this risks confusing a possible failure in Afghanistan with the bankruptcy of counterinsurgency as a concept. Therefore, it also risks throwing the baby (the great amount of conceptual learning that has occurred since 2004) out with the bath-water (everything that is wrong about the current predicament in Afghanistan).
Don't the proponents of COIN in Afghanistan also stress that it requires a "whole of government" approach to implement it? If so, doesn't this mean that it will not be implemented? We do not have the capacity for a large "whole of government" effort.
If it cannot be implemented, then what are we attempting? I know what we're <em>calling</em> it, but what <em>is</em> it? And one follow up to that: what evidence or plausible theory suggests that it (whatever it is) will succeed?
<b>Gulliver</b> has an excellent point re: failures. I believe there's a message in that...
<b>Bill C,</b> I hope you're correct on the first point though history says we almost never take advantage of such learning opportunities.
Your second point is an idea shared by some. I believe the majority of the US populace will not succumb to that fallacious -- even terribly flawed -- logic. Again, History indicates that success is slight to none (in this case of transforming whole societies by any exterior power). Indeed, it shows far more adverse than positive results from such attempts. See Gulliver above...
There is no need to tinker with force structure. Mostly due to fear that even though it is only reasonably effective, the possibility of a less effective structure is dangerously likely. It is always a mistake to predicate one's force on the war of the day; tomorrow may bring a very different problem. Add to that there is really no new factor...
"The ARFORGEN process may be the way it is now done -- but how much of that 'process' exists to justify FORSCOM (a Command that never needed to exist and contributes little -- trust me, I've been there...)." -- Ken White
Gee, if that's the case maybe we should take FORSCOM and TRADOC and merge them into the same organization, which we could then call the Continental Army Command. Then we could start working on making the ARFORGEN model functional, which could be done were we to have more organizations to work with than our current number of brigades. This we could do by converting our brigades into battle groups! Who says history don't repeat itself?
<blockquote>"Who says history don't repeat itself?"</blockquote>Gee, Pete -- Not me as I've seen it do just that a bunch of times. ;)
However, CONARC was not a good idea, TRADOC is (mostly) and a FORSCOM like command is needed, no question, it just should be about a fourth the size it is so it cannot get over involved in and with subordinate units.
After viewing FORSCOMs Training Guidance for deploying units last year, I reaffirmed my opinion that they do almost as much (if not more) harm as good. Too many smart Type A people with too much time on their hands; Standard staff problem, Bn to DA -- FORSCOM is, sadly, no exception. Said staffs are the problem with the ARFORGEN process.
Battle Groups worked -- the basic problems were that the concept was ahead of the equipment power curve and the Colonel BG Cdrs were in a great many cases not quite flexible enough to tactically the five companies. The fact that they objected quite strongly to going from a 10-15 Co Regt with three subordinate LTCs to a seven Co BG with CPT subordinates didn't help. :D
You also went wrong on the conversion. A BG was just a big Bn, so all we have to do is eliminate the BCT Hq and make Colonels Bn Cdrs. ;)
The New Republic article we have been commenting on, "COIN Toss: The Cult of Counterinsurgency," focuses significantly on John Nagl and CNAS, and the affinity between these two and the current Democratic Party and present administration.
(Dr. Nagl is famous, I believe, for his belief that America must "transform entire societies" as its 21st Century security mission.)
Why would these closely linked entities (Nagl, CNAS, Democratic Party, Obama Administration) seek to transform whole socieites, how would they do this and to what end?
I am suggesting that Dr. Nagl, CNAS, the current Domocratic Party and the present administration (not Dr. Barnett) would seek to transform certain societies:
First: So that they would no longer pose a security problem to the new world order (now including Russia, China, India, etc., -- and a growing list of others -- as nations, great powers and peoples who are dependent on trade, commerce and market-economies for their very survival) and
Second: Transform these socieites so that they could be configured to more-adequately service and support the market-economy needs of this huge new body of producers and consummers (described above).
How would they do this (transform whole societies such that they [a] do not pose a security problem and [b] can adequately service and support the new world order)?
Partially through the use of COIN/FID/Whole-of-Govt, aid, development, etc., (all being undertaken today -- and all which require changes to military force structure and the civil/military relationship.)
Ends, ways, means? (And a better understanding of current international affairs direction?)
<blockquote><em>Partially through the use of COIN/FID/Whole-of-Govt, aid, development, etc., (all being undertaken today -- and all which require changes to military force structure and the civil/military relationship.)</em></blockquote>
Before we start changing military force structure in accordance with this <del>foolhardy?</del> bold vision of the future, how about we get the "whole of government" thing at least to square one (and preferably get it to about an 80% solution). See the words of Admiral Mullen (<a href="http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=52978">quoted here</a>) below...
<blockquote><em>Other Cabinet-level departments - State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice - have the proper expertise for "soft-power" missions and need to have personnel able to deploy to address these problems, Mullen said. "But in my opinion," he added, "we are a good decade away from creating a capability in our other departments."</em></blockquote>
We can't just count on those other departments to make this transformation at some distant point in the future, count on them to do it correctly, and then restructure our forces on the basis of these hopes and dreams. Large groups of federal civilian employees aren't particularly known for their ability to be break out of their habits, take risks, or be innovative. Many of them like their jobs because they provide predictability and simplify their lives.
Regarding our capacity to pull off a "whole of gov't approach," see some (unofficial) figures <a href="http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=83861#post83861">p… at SWC</a>.
Cole:
<blockquote><em>Is there value in providing heavy BCTs with MRAP/M-ATVs so they can leave their big armor behind if necessary to respond more like Infantry BCTS in complex terrain like Afghanistan?</em></blockquote>
Being a practical guy and not a strategic thinker, I would question the assumptions. Do MRAPs provide any value at all? Would plussing up a BDE with another set of vehicles to train on, maintain, and account for result in a unit that has a longer time window necessary to attain a given readiness status and significantly greater resources necessary to maintain a given readiness status? I suspect "yes" to both and, moreover, at a cost that would throw the value of the endeavor into question.
Also, I missed your <a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/01/coin-toss/#comment-6514">earli… comments to me</a> (which are somewhat related to this issue)...
<blockquote><em>... you were probably doing it from a FOB...</em></blockquote>
Nope. Never assigned to a FOB (a point of great pride, incidentally!).
<blockquote><em>... which meant greater mounted vulnerability to get to your AO as well as less constant surveillance and presence.</em></blockquote>
We lived within our sector. With fewer higher-imposed requirements for minimum vehicles/personnel, it was common to split my platoon into one-vehicle patrols with 4 or 5 Soldiers. There was no IED threat at that early point in the game and we never suffered a casualty to SA. I cannot count the number of times that I was in sector alone (with just my terp) or with just one Soldier when meeting with locals.
<blockquote><em>You didn't have MRAPs or M-ATVs. That meant needless exposure of your troops to HMMWV injury and/or loss of high dollar tracked armored assets perceived as more threatening and an occupation force.</em></blockquote>
Again, nope. Thin-skinned HMMWVs with no doors - and no casualties.
<blockquote><em>... planned CERP dollars, civil-military personnel organic to the Advise and Assist Battalion, and state department workers would have reduced your burden and financed your (their) projects.</em></blockquote>
I agree (but would just say that <em>"organic to the Advise and Assist Battalion"</em> is irrelevant). However, given that my comment was merely highlighting the fact that we were attempting to do things now regarded as "COIN tasks" or "COIN best practices" and that the shortcoming was not our knowledge, but rather support and planning from higher, I guess I am led to the question of "so what?" Yeah, money (CERP or any other type) would have been great. That is not something that we recently learned. That is common sense, not new doctrine or an expansion of institutional knowledge. The fact that <strong>a</strong> plan is needed is nothing new either. Ditto civil military personnel. State Department personnel would have been nice, I guess, but where do they come from? There aren't many available.
<blockquote><em>"With a plan, and available force structure such as an MRAP-equipped Advise and Assist National Guard Battalion task-organized with your and other BCTs, the need to divert assets may have been averted."</em></blockquote>
I don't understand the obsession with the MRAP or the Advise/Assist BN. Having <u>any</u> plan would have been a huge improvement. Have <u>any</u> money would have been a huge improvement. How is an MRAP going to help? Why would an advise/assist BN be necessary when we already knew what we needed to do, but simply lacked money, manpower, and time to make it happen?
<blockquote><em>If Marines had planned year long tours like the Army, then they wouldn't have had entirely new companies and command teams learning a new AO and its people twice as often as the Army.</em></blockquote>
I don't think the Marines have necessarily cracked the code, either. There is not much to be said for familiarizing yourself with the AO just in time for redeployment.
Guys/Gals,
Ken, guess I'm confused why we moved Brigade Support Battalions, Brigade Special Troops battalions, Artillery battalions, and Reconnaissance squadrons into BCTs but we want to continue to "ad hoc" the stability forces.
Gulliver, I'm aware that Advise and Assist Brigades are the current structure. However, how would you determine how many such brigades to create during a given ARFORGEN cycle during peacetime? Half the 14 BCTs? One third? All? None until the need arises? Is there value in providing heavy BCTs with MRAP/M-ATVs so they can leave their big armor behind if necessary to respond more like Infantry BCTS in complex terrain like Afghanistan?
We have reconnaissance squadrons and artillery battalions in every BCT that could benefit from MRAP/M-ATVs as well.
Adapt...but plan to facilitate operational adaptation.
Adjust per Von Moltke's "no plan survives contact." But assure the assets are trained and in theater to permit responsive adjustment.
I'm also somewhat incredulous that Ken would believe that sniping and genocide were acceptable in the Balkans. Would things have ended as they did with bombing alone? Did we give up in Somalia too soon? Did we drop the ball entirely in Darfur? Was Desert Storm a success given the no-fly worthlessness that followed and the slaughter of Kurds/Shi'ites with gas?
We don't need to save the world...but we don't need to be isolationists either. We can count on the need for stability operations before, during, and after offense and defense. General purpose forces, as you call them, are simply not always up to task acting alone with the equipment they use in major combat operations. We can never create enough special ops or Marines to substitute for lots of Army BCT boots on the ground.
<b>Bill C:</b><blockquote>Why would these closely linked entities (Nagl, CNAS, Democratic Party, Obama Administration) seek to transform whole socieites, how would they do this and to what end?</blockquote>Why? Because they probably believe that they know the correct governmental methodology and unless others do it their way, said others are wrong.
They might seek to do that transform thing as you suggest -- I suggest that if they do, they aren't nearly as historically aware as they should be. I also suggest there might be an excess of arrogance involved...
Not to mention their not being as bright as many would think and with respect to this:<blockquote>Ends, ways, means? (And a better understanding of current international affairs direction?)</blockquote>I'd add invalid ends, a failure to understand ways, means not really available in the numbers or types to do what is suggested the way it is suggested and an obviously poor understanding of current international trends.
<b>Cole:</b>
I see no confusion in the fact that the alleged Plug and Play design of the BCTs -- specifically designed to allow ad hoc taskings -- and the ad hoc arrangement for various stability forces meld into each other nicely -- but that's just me, I guess. YMMV.<blockquote>We have reconnaissance squadrons and artillery battalions in every BCT that could benefit from MRAP/M-ATVs as well.</blockquote>The mind boggles at the thought of an MRAP or even a M-ATV (how AT is that A-T...) being used for reconnaissance. Nor can I figure what the FA would do with them. Ammo carriage -- awfully low payload. FDC perhaps? Dunno.
I am totally unsure what precipitated this comment:<blockquote>I'm also somewhat incredulous that Ken would believe that sniping and genocide were acceptable in the Balkans. Would things have ended as they did with bombing alone?</blockquote>If by that you mean that I have said and still believe there was no US interest in the Balkans, then you're correct but that is far from what you said. I in no way said those things were acceptable -- I said it was not our business, not the same thing at all. It was and is a European problem. Not cool to deliberately misquote people so I'm sure that was just another error on your part. As for the rest of that paragraph from which the quote is extracted, you answered that with your next opening sentence -- "<i>We don't need to save the world."</i> Absolutely correct -- and we could not even if we wanted to do so.<blockquote>General purpose forces, as you call them, are simply not always up to task acting alone with the equipment they use in major combat operations. We can never create enough special ops or Marines to substitute for lots of Army BCT boots on the ground.</blockquote>That's not what I call them, that's what the Army and DoD call them. So does Congress. I just use their term. You can call them anything you wish.
They are capable of acting in any sensible scenario -- IF they are adequately trained. I'd also suggest that as long as we have a volunteer force, we'll never have enough "boots on the ground" (that's a particularly silly media / punditocracy phrase) to do what you suggest.
No, Desert Storm was not a success because had we gone to Baghdad then it would've been twice as cheap and four times as effective as it was 2003-2012 (all figures approximate).
Someone <u>really</u> needs to do a seminar on <i><b>The Limits of Power</b></i> and invite a whole lot of people...
Thanks Gulliver, although the full title makes my head hurt. Good comment about Desert Storm. Started reading the approved TRADOC Army Capstone Concept today which talks a lot about "Operational Adaptability."
Seems like TRADOC prefers "area security" more than "COIN" which I have not seen much of yet in the concept. In fact, I just searched the concept and "counterinsurgency" is used only three times with one being a source. "Irregular warfare" is listed just twice. Stability is listed 25 times.
Seems like lots of changes were made from the earlier version, but COIN does not seem to be popular with Armor officers.;)
<b>Cole:</b>
There is no implication by me that we should not have stability-dedicated forces because we might use them. What I have repeatedly <u>said</u> is that if we have them we will use them; no 'might' to it and no "implication." Using them, is in one sense not a problem. In another sense, the probability of <u>misusing</u> them is quite high...<blockquote>Also caught an earlier statement about Desert Storm being a success because it was short...but it was short because it was incomplete in achieving desired strategic goals.</blockquote>Er, no, that's not what I said. Here it is: <i>"The conclusion I draw from all those </i>(stability)<i> operations is that they are expensive, tedious, constraining and generally do not provide satisfactory results and they should therefor be avoided if possible. Desert Storm is of course the exception -- I wonder why that is..."</i> I said Desert Storm was an exception to tedious, constraining and unsatisfactory result(s) operations, not that it was successful. As far as strategic goals of that operation are concerned, <b>Gulliver</b> has it right, the strategic goals were achieved so it was de facto and de jure 'successful.' It was short and no 'stability ops' were required so it was totally successful in that sense. I just happen to disagree with not going to Baghdad so it was not totally successful IMO -- but then I was not and am not in charge...
We disagree on the value of MRAPS/M-ATV. I think they're broadly useless for much of any thing except moving a few people about in an unwieldy cocoon and that they create bad tactical efforts. Gates may like them and I know some commanders do -- but IMO, those are folks more worried about casualties than they are about doing the mission. I don't like casualties anymore than anyone else but sometimes the job requires a little risk taking. Those that aren't into that should find another line of work.
I strongly suspect the majority of those vehicles will be left in Afghanistan and Iraq and that most of those will fall apart due to lack of maintenance in fairly short order. Multi-billion dollar boondoggle. All because the senior leaders of the US Army were not paying attention in the 1990s. Plenty of better vehicle options were about -- but then, those vehicles weren't invented here...
<em>Also caught an earlier statement about Desert Storm being a success because it was short...but it was short because it was incomplete in achieving desired strategic goals.</em>
This is actually not correct. Desert Storm was an overwhelming success, precisely because it completely accomplished the strategic objectives -- to stop Iraqi aggression, protect Saudi oil, and liberate Kuwait -- and did not exceed its mandate. It's also the reason the international coalition remained so unified and strong.
Now you can argue that those were the wrong objectives, but you can't argue that the operation failed to accomplish them.
Gulliver, if you can say, what does "SFA" stand for? I google it last night and got a McAfee website alert and my computer locked up!
Thanks for the answer on the numbers and allocation of brigades. Still wonder what the Army is going to do with 10,000 MRAPs...especially since they just announced that Secretary Gates will be around another year and wants them used.
Ken,
Sorry, never intended to quote you from anywhere about the Balkans, but caught the implication that we should not have stability-dedicated forces because we might use them.
Also caught an earlier statement about Desert Storm being a success because it was short...but it was short because it was incomplete in achieving desired strategic goals.
The artillery bit was because Artillery Soldiers have been used extensively in OIF as surrogate infantry which is tough to do in a Palladin.;)
Schmedlap, our nation was lucky to have you and yours. Caught your blog comments about training and enjoyed them, as well. But not as much as I'm enjoying the National Championship game!
Cole -- <em>Gulliver, I'm aware that Advise and Assist Brigades are the current structure. However, how would you determine how many such brigades to create during a given ARFORGEN cycle during peacetime? Half the 14 BCTs? One third? All? None until the need arises?</em>
Funny you should ask, because the Army is currently working on figuring that out by surveying the Army Service Component Commands on the demand signal for peacetime/Phase 0/steady state security cooperation. But the intent is to have one SFA brigade per COCOM (with the exception of NORTHCOM), with an additional brigade or two in certain cases depending on requirements.
Schmedlap -- The CIED stuff is similar to MRAP in that it's an expedited solution that was done outside of normal procurement in response to an urgent and unanticipated force protection requirement. (This is sort of confusing, though, because SYMPHONY isn't actually used by U.S. forces -- it's a system that Lockheed now builds on contract from the USG for provision to allies and coalition partners for use in theater. I'm not that current on what U.S. units are fielding.)
Giraffe is sort of a different story: troops in the field needed a system that would do a certain thing, we didn't have anything that could do it and couldn't produce the system that would (which we ARE, in fact, producing now) in time, so we found a foreign system that would do what we needed and asked the Swedes for it. (There's a whole program in the Army called Foreign Competitive Testing that's designed to find non-developmental foreign systems for fielding in the U.S. arsenal, incidentally, though this isn't how Giraffe got found, I don't think.)
But yeah, to come back to your point, the IED threat resulted in a bunch of elected officials and military leaders saying "we need things that are going to protect our troops from this threat" and going outside of normal channels to find them, generally. As Ken said, it was a reaction to the fact that we were sustaining relatively high casualties (by U.S. public standards) to what seemed like an unsophisticated weapon that was unanticipated, so the leadership felt pressure to find solutions NOWNOWNOW. (Remember the whole "up-armored" debate?)
<em>Plenty of better vehicle options were about -- but then, those vehicles weren't invented here...</em>
This MRAP obsession is strange to me, so this seems only peripherally related to what we're talking about, but: the MRAP is now American-built, but it's based on a South African design (the <em>Buffel</em> APC). When the decision was made to field MRAPs, it wasn't exactly based on the fact that it was "invented here"... because it wasn't.
If I might turn (or return) for a moment to "ends," "ways," and "means."
As a possible starting point, might I ask: What would one say is, or should be, our overarching political objective for this region and why?
Could this be:
***** To make the region more compatible to the needs of the great powers -- and to the needs of great power peace -- both of which, today, increasingly depend upon a world made more safe and, otherwise, more accommodating to the demands of international trade and commerce? *****
If this is correct, what would be (1) the problem sets we would likely encounter and (2) the solutions sets we would propose to meet and overcome these problems and, thereby, achieve our political objective (described above)?
Or are there other, more appropriate and more correct descriptions of what our overarching political objective for this region is or should be -- and why -- and, accordingly, a different articulation of problem and solution sets?
<b>Gulliver:</b>
Seems strange to me as well...
Minor point, our MRAPs owe more to the Casspir and Nyala than to the Buffel but your point that the South Africans were there first -- after they copied the Rhodesian's various vehicles including the Crocodile -- is of course correct.
My comment on it not being developed here was aimed not at the specific vehicles but rather at the US Army mindset that rejects any ideas that do not come from within -- unless, as with the MRAPs, the media or Congress force the issue..
<em>My comment on it not being developed here was aimed not at the specific vehicles but rather at the US Army mindset that rejects any ideas that do not come from within -- unless, as with the MRAPs, the media or Congress force the issue..</em>
I don't mean to quibble, because I think you're generally correct, but the Giraffe Agile Multi-Beam radar (Sweden) is an example of a foreign solution that the U.S. Army deemed best suited to meet an expedited operational requirement. Similar overseas solutions have been found for counter-IED technology, like SYMPHONY (which was originally developed by the British-Canadian firm Allen-Vanguard).
Gulliver,
I'll take your word for it, because the name of that first system is just too bizarre for you to have made up. But are those instances that counter the assertion? Or are they examples of recent, desperate attempts to find <em>anything</em> in response to the IED threat - throwing a bunch of stuff at the wall and seeing what sticks?
<b>Gulliver</b>
Well, quibbling can be fun particularly if you're old, retired and have a good memory and little else to do...<blockquote>I don't mean to quibble, because I think you're generally correct...</blockquote>One would hope. In any event, those items you name and many otyhers were selected through the Foreign Comparative Testing program <a href=http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/targets/palmer.pdf>(LINK)</a>. As you can see that program dates back a bit. The FCT program was directed by Congress in 1989 as a consolidation and expansion of the former Foreign Weapons Evaluation and NATO Comparative Test programs. All of which were Congressional initiatives that the Army (and the other services) fought -- until the benefits finally dawned on them. Thank former Senator Sam Nunn for pushing that one. The Armed Forces didn't really wholeheartedly get with the program until 2001. For some reason, they got interested after that...
That Mickey Mouse stuff out of the way, go back and review the famous Weaponeer versus FATS battle; a classic example of a Building 4 idea against far better technology. Or look at Multicam versus the ACU pattern where I have it on good authority that the decision was made based on the answer to one question; "Which one is Natick's digital pattern?"
I stand by my statement that the Army has long objected to tools equipment and doctrine not developed in house -- though I will acknowledge in fairness that a part of that is often to save money by not paying royalties and, in doctrine, due to several unique features of the US and the US Army. As an aside, in WW II, we just started manufacturing Oerlikon and Bofors cannon without asking and no royalties -- hard to do that in peacetime no matter how good the technology is.
The Army is getting a little better about that 'not invented here' syndrome nowadays. How much of that is due to a younger generation and how much to Congressional pressure is hard to determine. The good news is that it's better.
I mention it often only to remind <i>everyone</i> that excessive service and community or branch parochialism is our worst enemy.
In the July/August 2008 issue of Foreign Affairs Magazine, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice authored an article entitled:
"Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World."
Therein, she articulated the foreign policy objectives of the United States:
"Investing in strong and rising powers as stakeholders in the international order and supporting the democratic development of weak and poorly governed states -- these are the broad goals of US Foreign Policy ..."
If one were to add the following to her shortened sentence above:
"This will be accomplished by transforming problematic societies and dealing with the resistance that will be encountered in this process."
Could one then get a better understanding of the utility being assigned -- then and today -- to the portfolio of "transforming" instruments, such as: enhanced COIN, FID, development, investment and aid?
From Gulliver at Jan 7 10:12AM post:
"Bill - You may be proving Ken's point:
Despite the success of these insurgencies and/or US apathy towards some, it had little effect on the overall struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (one could suggest that the places where the superpowers were goaded into counterinsurgency response -- Afghanistan for the Soviet Union and Vietnam for the U.S. -- to what seemed like proxy encroachment by their rival -- this marked the most significant geopolitical setback for those states)."
A response:
Gulliver/Ken: I agree.
Likewise today, by being goaded -- yet again --into another counterinsurgency response, the United States could, once again, be courting a most damaging setback to its objectives -- even if:
a. There is no similar great power rivalry today.
b. There is no great power supporting the current insurgency(ies) and
c. The current political objectives of the United States have changed -- to helping provide for the needs of its former great power rivals.
Gulliver said and Ken White concurred: "This MRAP obsession is strange to me"
============================================
Guess I mirror Secretary Gates' concern that the overwhelming casualties of these wars have come from IEDs. And no, the company I work for has no business relationship with MRAP/M-ATV manufacturers.
* In 2003 there were 81 IED events in Afghanistan.
* In 2009, that number has climbed to 7,228 resulting in 6037 casualties.
Read about the wheelchair wounded warrior parades in the halls of the Pentagon to understand there is so much more to the casualty count than deaths alone. Add traumatic brain injury to maiming events, and the problem is even more clear.
Does anybody believe that genie can be put back in the bottle or that this phenomenan is unique to these conflicts? Which is cheaper, 50 pounds of ammonium nitrate, a simple mine or piece of surplus ordnace, or a sophisticated anti-armor missile like our Javelin? The same applies to anti-aircraft weaponry. Will future hybrid foes be more likely to employ Manpads defeatable by jamming and countermeasures or a simple RPG aimed optically at landing aircraft.
"TTP for Counterinsurgency" mentions that there have been 81,000 IED events from 2001 to 2007. Guess that mean we will soon surpass 100,000.
Engineer M113s led heavier armor on the Thunder Runs of Baghdad. Which has more armor, the MRAP/M-ATV or the many M113s still out there? True, you must get out of these vehicles and patrol dismounted. But the AO an infantry platoon can cover is greatly expanded if troops can drive a few miles before they start walking. Frequent mounted route reconnaissances and establishment of checkpoints and mounted OPs can be just as crucial. Mounted overwatch from a tall vehicle with good .50 cal line of sight to extended ranges doesn't hurt, either.
In addition, at Wanat and other battles, the Taliban targeted up-armored Hummers with crew-served weapons early in all engagements. In convoys, well-armed and armored vehicles often are the difference between deterrence or ambush. In COPs with surrounding HESCO fighting positions, these vehicles with .50 cal and grenade launchers could defeat far greater numbers of attackers, and use sensors to prevent surprise. Many supplies and basic loads could be picked up by modified MRAPs from BSB trucks to shorten the less-armored logisticians trip into unfamiliar no-man's land.
I will confess that after checking my copy of FM 3-07.1, that I had no idea what comprised a Security Force Assistance brigade. I'm still not sure, after reading some of it.;) Still believe the heavy BCT needs a less threatening and fuel thirsty vehicle for many operations and the Infantry BCT needs greater armor than up-armored HMMWVs will ever provide. "Security Force battalion" MPs, Civil Affairs, Engineer, Psych Ops, MTTs, and PRT members could still operate and share the big trucks with combined arms battalions. The Army still must use 10,000+ vehicles effectively.
The final bottom line is we will have spent over $30 billion on these vehicles in short order...a sum we cannot afford to discard when these wars are over...especially given the survivability and utility such vehicles could provide with a little imagination and modification.
I will add that I find it highly regrettable that FCS manned ground vehicles were killed due to IED concerns even though a V-bottom kit was already planned and feasible. No such kit is possible with an EFV that is carrying far more exposed Marines once ashore where 99% of the fight will occur.