Update: And from "on the scene" at an U.S. Army Unified Quest pre-wargame event, Spencer Ackerman of Wired's Danger Room writes Army Brains: Kill PowerPoint, 'Counterinsurgency'. Also by Ackerman on UQ: Army Asks Itself: Shouldn't We Be Diplomats?
Comments
<b>Bill C.:</b>
Given our results to date in various FID endeavors assisting them with their COIN problem, our record is poor enough that one could say that we have indeed often been ordered to tilt at windmills...
<b>Dennis M.</b> is correct in that if the Armed Forces are ordered to go, then go they must and tilt they will, dragging Sancho with them. Sancho, of course, is wise enough to realize the futility in the effort but still he goes and does his best as Dennis said.
However, <b>Bernard Finel</b> is correct in this:<blockquote>"It is, in short, a myth that COIN has elevated our ability to think about conflict by bringing politics back into the mix."</blockquote>As he is in his overall thrust; there's a better way to do this stuff...
I also suggest that the belief that either Korea or Viet Nam were attempts to put military force on a plane above political considerations is due to political legerdemain. Both were poorly thought out efforts in futility. Both were political from day one and were driven by <u>domestic</u> politics (as were Afghanistan and Iraq). Most of our wars have been so driven; few have been prosecuted wisely by those civilian masters who provide political direction.
Our political and electoral system does not lend itself to long range strategic planning. Most -- not all -- of our civilian strategists in positions to actually influence anything are of questionable knowledge and competence and the US Armed Forces <i>certainly</i> have a "Can-Do" attitude (my weekly understatement...). That means that the Armed Forces are going to go after Bill C's windmills.
As Dennis said:<blockquote>"...even if the military at large thinks that missionary-type operations are unwise or irrational does not mean that the body-politic won't commit forces to those types of operations.'</blockquote>A combination of unknowing politicians, domestic politics, a relatively thoughtless Congress and a military that cannot really say no -- not thast it often wants to do so -- mean that is correct. We're likely to go places that are, at best, ill advised.
We do not do strategy well; however, we do policy reasonably well on occasion. We need a policy that says we do not take sides in others internal disputes. We need a policy that improves our international intel, accords primacy if foreign affairs to DoS and gets the combatant commands out of it, that sends in the SF early for FID efforts and avoids commitment of the GPF to other nations. We need a policy that places military action at the bottom of the list rather than at the top.
The Army did not do that well in Korea, it didn't do well in Viet Nam and it has not done that well in Afghanisatn or Iraq. It eventually gets it right -- but that's because as Bernard said:<blockquote>"COIN as practiced today by the United States is an attempt through operational sophistication to rescue strategic incoherence."</blockquote>and the Kids out there actually trying to do it manage to rescue their nominal betters from embarrassment and always try to make it a little more coherent...
<b>Bill M.</b>Gets it right:<blockquote>"... she criticizes those who claim that COIN can't be waged humanely, but she doesn't demonstrate that it can be. I'm not aware of any "humane" counterinsurgency efforts. In all of them there was killing involved. Don't confuse maintaining legitimacy and following the rule of war with humane, it isn't. Then she tried to use George Washington's comment about being prepared for war to preserve peace, but he (especially GW) didn't imply we should be prepared to engage in other countries' internal struggles."</blockquote>War is never humane, period. If one commits an armed force to an operation, then force is almost certain to be used. Nothing wrong with force, I'm all for it -- but it should be used wisely. We have not to date used it that way. The GPF will never do the FID thing well -- nor should it do so.
We're capable of being smarter than we have been and of discerning the difference between Giants and Windmills. Sancho deserves better also. ;)
Thus, if our civilian leaders have determined that our endeavors in the 21st Century will be tilting at windmills, then is it not the job of the military to decide how best to accomplish the tasks that it will most likely to be called upon to conduct -- within the context of this determination to tilt at windmills -- which has been made, not by our military, but by our civilian leaders?
It is reasonable to consider COIN within the context of this "tilting at windmills" analogy?
Bill M.,
Basically, you said what I was trying to say much more eloquently: Balance is what is necessary. However, I would only point out that even if the military at large thinks that missionary-type operations are unwise or irrational does not mean that the body-politic won't commit forces to those types of operations. That is another reason to be prepared for COIN, along with FID and other more conventional types of missions.
Bernard,
All I would say in response to your argument that nobody has forgotten the link between politics and military force is that our reaction to Vietnam (and Korea, to a lesser extent) sure did seem like an attempt to put military force on a plane above political considerations. There is a difference between making decisions on purely military issues in order to keep an alliance together and allowing political considerations to limit the extent to and the manner in which military force is applied.
Now, it may very well be that the way COIN has been practiced by the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan, as you say, serves only to cover up strategic incoherence. However, that is not a problem with incorporating COIN doctrine -- in whatever form -- in the long term. My point still stands that even if you may feel that engaging in future COIN or other stability-type operations is destined for failure, the military may not have a choice in the matter. And even if we don't engage in strictly stability-type operations but are instead committed to something resembling a conventional war, inevitably, many of the principles of COIN doctrine will come into play. So do we just close our eyes and hope for the best? Or do we work to prepare for the eventuality that we will have to engage in some form of nation-building, however limited, in the future?
Transfered from the other debate.
The author of "A False Dichotomy" expressed some supportable arguments, but on the other hand I think she was reaching a bit with some of her observations. Reaching to the point this reads more like a propaganda piece for our COIN doctrine than a serious article on the value of COIN in the national strategy. Those who continue to frame the debate as pro and anti-COIN are clearly missing what the debate is actually about, and that is balance.
COIN is clearly a needed skill set, and one that many military organizations and leaders performed poorly, especially in the earlier stages of the war, so it was "painfully" obvious that we needed the push to "re-learn" COIN and explore irregular warfare. Furthermore, and as the SECDEF stated, these lessons and the associated education needs to be institutionalized to ensure we don't once again lose these hard earned lessons. In general there is agreement with the above, but the rub is when we see a push to view the world strategically as a world full of insurgents that are counter our national interests, so we must transform our Armed Forces to intervene around the world to conduct COIN (instead of FID) to deny safe haven to terrorists. This view is deeply flawed on many levels, and is a missionary view versus a strategic view. One can be opposed to that view without being labeled anti-COIN.
Back to the balance issue, there are legitimate and rational concerns that our extended involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq has degraded our higher end combat skills. The real world is full of threats that are not insurgents, and they are a more serious threat to our national interests than insurgents in another country in the majority of cases. However, if you suggest that in the COINdista crowd youre labeled a heretic. A COINdista has an irrational faith based view of the world where theyre Gods little Angels coming to undue all the unfairness and evil in the world. Disagreeing with this, doesnt make one anti-COIN, simply anti-irrational. Most still understand the importance of COIN doctrine when you have to engage in COIN.
She had a couple of hanging arguments that didnt seem to fit with her paper. She criticizes those who claim that COIN can't be waged humanely, but she doesn't demonstrate that it can be. I'm not aware of any "humane" counterinsurgency efforts. In all of them there was killing involved. Don't confuse maintaining legitimacy and following the rule of war with humane, it isn't. Then she tried to use George Washington's comment about being prepared for war to preserve peace, but he (especially GW) didn't imply we should be prepared to engage in other countries' internal struggles.
Respectfully Dennis, I don't know who you think had forgotten about linking military force to political objectives. You're creating a strawman. COIN did not rescue us from a failure to heed Clausewitz's dictum that "War is a continuation of politics." What it did was muddy the waters by claiming that force and more precisely forces could achieve the unachievable.
COIN as practiced today by the United States is an attempt through operational sophistication to rescue strategic incoherence. It does not restore the link between war and politics. What it does do is apply a handwave that has allowed our leaders to avoid having to make hard choices about political objectives.
As for taking into account politics... the goal of unconditional surrender hardly eliminates the need to consider politics. One could write a book just about how political considerations vis-a-vis the French affected the North Africa landings. Another on operations in the Italian peninsula. Yet another in terms of the development of Anglo-American cooperation.
It is, in short, a myth that COIN has elevated our ability to think about conflict by bringing politics back into the mix.
COIN efforts when led by a foreign military force are already behind the power curve. And worse yet, the best outcome from these guys is to get back to the break-even point where the fighting has stopped but the country is still a basket case. So if there were no other whole-of-government assets to assist the affected nation and keep it from degenerating into open fighting the first time around what do we expect once the military forces leave?
Bernard,
Excellent point. But that is not the military's decision to make. It may be that our future political leaders determine that the geopolitics of a given situation require us to intervene. The military can't simply refuse, telling the civilian leaders that they must have failed "Strategery 101." We may not like it, but there may come a time again when we are asked to fight insurgents abroad and we need to be prepared to do it.
But the broader point of the article isn't that we need to be prepared to fight another Afghanistan or Iraq. It is more that the COIN concept merely acknowledges that military actions are taken in a political context -- something that we had forgotten, having been spoiled by a civil war and two world wars where military actions were not driven by political consideration because the sole strategic objection was unconditional surrender. Despite the fact that those wars dominate our history given their scale and importance, they are not typical. Most wars throughout history have been fought for much more obscure political reasons with much more limited objectives. The politics of the conflict drove how the battles were waged.
All this article is saying is that COIN is a recognition that the military needs to accept that and factor politics into how it wages war at the tactical and operational levels.
Yes, but just because guerillas and terrorists are not going away does not mean the smart response is to go overseas to track them down with large ground force deployments.
One would think such a obviously false syllogism would collapse under its own weight, and yet it seems to live on.
The fact that the bad guys want to fight this way is NOT a good reason to humor them by allowing them to pick the time, place, and mode of conflict. Strategery 101.