Comments
Grant,
You're spot on. The results are all mixed. Hard to tell if we are measuring the right metrics in the right context etc. And many of the "new" things that are showing some promise are really just repackaged and minor variations of old things that didn't work before. Although, some might say they are improvements, not variations or repackaging.
The biggest difference between now and last year and the 8 years before is Patreaus with more troops. He is good, and with more troops, we reduce the balloon-effect of pressing and then leaving. With more troops the RC's can press and stay or move ANA or ANP in to stay. You guys never had adequate support. Now they are close. I wouldn't say they have enough to convincingly succeed, but they have enough to show progress.
Bottom line for me: AUG 2010 began a new period in OEF-A to provide the Afghans a reasonable opportunity to govern themselves, and 2014 is a fair deadline for the Afghans to respond positively. So for all those who want to pull out, I'm with you, in 2014.
"one- the military asked for more than double what they got. Two- they are still asking for more"
If I remember correctly the number Gen McChrystal requested was 25-40K... he got 34K with a 10% increase without having to once again get presidential approval (~3K). That with the NATO increase of 5K. Those numbers combine are 42K. They didn't ask for twice what they got... they got above the top number they asked for.
I have seen nothing of them asking for more. What I have seen is that they are deploying the troops authorized in the extra ~3K. If you have any references for that claim then please share.
"In 2007 in RC-E we cleared areas, put ANSF in, and then had to re-clear them months later."
That supports my argument that we were not conducting COIN. I love the analogy earlier about placing your fist in a bucket and then taking it back out. You can do all the clearing operations in the world but unless you hold the terrain and enter the building phase of COIN you are wasting effort. In 2007-2009 this was the norm in Afghanistan though. The difference now is that we ARE holding the terrain. That is what the increased troop levels in Afghanistan are intended to allow us to do.
"we weren't just living on the FOBs- we were locked up inside of them"
I assume this is referring to 2007? If so then I agree. We had full control of that real estate... but nothing really beyond the wire. Now we have FOBs, COPs, FBs, and CPs littered through the valleys. This is part of the ink blot approach... There are areas that we don't have FOM but we have started somewhere and are expanding from that.
I kind of agree on your point about the RCs; however, right now ISAF is the primary counterinsurgent. The importance of simultaneously building GIRoA/local governance capacity is the ability to transfer that responsibility to them once we have reduced the insurgency to a manageable law-enforcement level. So the restructure of the RCs will help us do that, IMO.
"The reintegration effort is probably the 6th such effort with a new name."
Yes but this is the first one that I have seen that allows the fighters the ability to provide security to their village. Previously we have reintegrated a few members and worked them back into society as unarmed noncombatants only for the TB to either intimidate them back into the insurgency or kill them. This was the major flaw in the previous systems.
I completely agree about the metrics... metrics are VERY important but most people do not even know how to use them. "Increased TICs? Must mean the insurgents are gaining momentum." Not necessarily. It depends on the contexts... if the TICs are o/a the "FEBA"(if you can call it that in COIN) but TICs on the blue side of the FEBA are significantly reduced then that would indicate progress; however, increased TICs well within the blue side might indicate the opposite, again depending on context. You have to look beyond the "on paper" metrics and look at the "big picture."
In 2008 what I saw left me very pessimistic about our future here. But what I see now has really reversed that.
Dick: the progress that has been reported is based on an interpretation of metrics. Most of these metrics deal with growth (in numbers) of ANSF, growth in governance metrics like polling data and replacing "bad" officials with good in key districts within Helmand and Kandahar, and growth in development metrics like people employed in key districts in H and K. There're also metrics based on violence- although interestingly more violence and less violence are both interpreted as "progress".
The bottom line: I know very few people who thought any of this was sustainable. Pouring money, troops, and attention into a key district simply led to the insurgents leaving the area temporarily (we called it the water balloon effect- squeeze one area, and another area would bulge), GIRoA/ISAF puppets being put in place who the people didn't trust, and a temporary welfare state being created until the Coalition money stopped flowing. Of course there are some short-term positive metrics, but we've seen this before- specifically I can recall Ghazni in 2007: for one month that place was great- it was our focus that month. As soon as we shifted focus, the "insurgents" came back.
If the biggest obstacle to ISAF is GIRoA- then we definitely should not be conducting COIN (I would agree that the biggest obstacle to ISAF "conducting COIN/CT" is GIRoA- but not that ISAF's biggest obstacle is GIRoA). If ISAF's biggest obstacle used to be the Taliban government and is now the current government- sounds like to me we need to do some UW instead of COIN...
James:
I disagree with you that we finally have the military numbers needed as of AUG '10 for the strategy we are advertising. For one- the military asked for more than double what they got. Two- they are still asking for more. Three- ISAF supposedly needs so many more trainers that they are willing to put the securing of additional NATO and EUPOL personnel as a higher priority than actually following COIN tactical principles. The "Key Terrain District" concept comes from the fact that we don't have enough forces to secure where we need to- so we've had to pick some "key" ones and concentrate on those. So to say we finally have enough is ignoring what ISAF is currently doing/saying, assuming we have the right strategy and we just needed more guys- and that we now have the right #. That's a lot of assumptions and I think there's plenty of proof that the # still isn't "right" for those in charge.
I wasn't in all areas of Afghanistan- so your experience may have been different than mine. In 2007 in RC-E we cleared areas, put ANSF in, and then had to re-clear them months later. In RC-S we just cleared and re-cleared. We stayed on FOBs and didn't do much with the ANSF. GIRoA wasn't interested in "our" war and Kabul was dangerous. The North was relatively calm and the West was calm because the Italians weren't interested in "our" war either. The South was violent, but so was the East.
Today- other than Kabul being much safer (although you wouldn't know it from our FORCEPRO posture)- my experience has been exactly the opposite of yours: we weren't just living on the FOBs- we were locked up inside of them and partnering was mostly very shallow (there were definitely exceptions, but if you include the police- we've got lots of "uncovered" ANSF units). A few districts in RC-S and SW were exceptions- but they were definitely the exception and not the rule.
Anything to do with RCs making structural progress gives me pause: I viewed the RCs as entities that almost guarantee future Coalition presence since little on the Afghan side matches the RC structure.
The reintegration effort is probably the 6th such effort with a new name. I think it is way too early to tell if the new one (APRP) will be any different than the past ones. To be fair- some changes have been made- but it remains to be seen whether it will bring about lasting change. Early signs are mixed. The "Local Afghan Police institution" is another entity with a new name- I think the fourth in the last year alone? Again, way too early in my opinion to make an assessment on this. GIRoA isn't a fan of that "institution" and neither are our European allies. If we more than triple the number of villages under that program I would be very surprised if we have the same level of quality/oversight/success as we've had with the others.
Lastly- using metrics to measure progress is so "McNamara-esqe" I can't believe I keep hearing it from our leaders- didn't anyone read Summer's "On Strategy"? and the failure of our metrics to do anything for us? I understand using metrics to show the politicians and media that things seem to be trending a certain way- but we actually have come to rely on them as well (and use them to "prove" progress- as opposed to give us feedback on what we may be doing wrong). We are now an "Army of Whiz Kids". No matter what the metrics show in AUG of '11- the reality on the ground won't- in my opinion- be an aggregate of those metrics. We'll see what happens when we start to pull out. If some areas fall to local power brokers (including the Taliban) and AQ doesn't automatically come back- then I'd submit many of the assumptions backing up the logic of our metrics is flawed.
Grant Martin
MAJ, US Army
The above comments are the authors' own and do not represent the position of the US Army or DoD.
Anonymous asks me "Please describe ISAF "UW" operations."
You kinda got me there, but I think I can tap dance my way to an answer.
I said a mix of those things to include UW, but regarding UW, I should've been more specific. When you look at what SOF is doing in the rural villages, termed Village Stability Operations (VS0), tactically they are using UW techniques to organize and train local defenses. These units have been legitimized by GIRoA as the Afghan Local Police (ALP). The operational outcome of VSO/ALP is more FID, but the methods are more UW.
"Well if you read what American commanders from company up to Division and higher have been saying about what they were doing since early 2004 then yes actually the operational framework of counterinsurgency has remained essentially the same."
Horseshit!!! That is as close to COIN as Nickle is to Silver. Yes it might have been a framework of sorts but the US and international community as a whole has NEVER committed the necessary forces by either the military or civil service components. We have simply used COIN terms to justify the current actions of the time. We finally as of Aug 10 have the military numbers needed.
"Those who look at the past six months of operations in Afghanistan with an experienced eye can see a very deliberate scheme of engagement to suppress the symptoms of the insurgency there in a manner to meet specific metrics to support a withdrawal IAW political timelines. General Petraeus has his mission and he is executing it. But it isn't COIN; and it really doesn't get us to the Ends set for us by the President either."
What are we missing from COIN in Afghanistan... embedded in the Current Strategy are all the elements of any COIN I have ever read about but I am new to COIN as I only have about 3 years exposure to it. But it has been a passion of mine from then and I have immersed myself in study. So I consider this an opportunity to learn more.
"The President set the Ends as "to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan."
President Barak Obama, 2010"
A statement to satisfy his base. Nothing more.
"I was reading some of the press releases from 2006 and re-reading some of the things we worked on in 2007 and, honestly, you can replace the dates (and many times leave the names in place- but add a star or two) and they look the same as what we are doing today."
Really? Because things are significantly different on the ground now than they were in my last deployment here in '08. The RCs have even been restructured to allow simultaneous focus on Helmand, Qandahar, and RCE hotspots. We have shifted focus significantly to local governance and building village level security. The ANS and ISAF are no long living on fortified FOBs but are now embedded in the villages. They have established a footprint "beyond the berm." Many places that the Taliban conducted phase III insurgency we have seen revert to phase I. Many TB commanders in the TB heartland have began to reintegrate. There is now a Local Afghan Police institution and a means to reiterate TB fighters. So tell me how this is the same as 2007.
The facts as I see them here are that they ground work has been laid as of Aug 10. Since then we have made headway into separating the INS from the population (population centric COIN). We have continued to make headway through the winter months when normal Taliban fighting would traditional stop.
My assessment is that we will see a spike in violence in the spring (this is normal but may be increased due to increased troops and patrols in previous TB strongholds). Come late summer/early fall during the normal peak fighting season we can take a true look at the success of this surge. Increased numbers of TICs do not indicate lower security. We have to look at INS-initiated attack levels and locations. And if you want to use IEDs as an indicator then do not just rely on IED casualties. Differences in IED design and employment can skew these numbers. Look at the actual employment TTPs and locations in relations to CUOPS.
Dick,
OK, I see where you are coming from, and that is a great lay down of the complexity of the many organizations, representing many distinct segments of the Afghan populace that are rising up in illegal challenge to the current government. You are absolutely right, that to tailor a program to defeat each of these would be chaotic.
But here is my point: Insurgents do not create insurgency. Causation for insurgency radiates out from a government in the form of the design and application of domestic policies; and it is how that is perceived by these many uniques pockets in any populace that determine if the conditions of insurgency grow or shrink. When they grow strong enough, someone will step up to exploit them.
As you point out so well, there are dozens of such groups in Afghanistan. This alone is a powerful metric of how widely the current government is felt to be illegitimat, injust, and biased. This alone gives grim testament to the reality that almost universally the people who have such complaints feel that illegal violence is their only recourse. This too points out why understanding the FM3-24 is Colonial Intervention is so important.
Colonial intervention is about suppressing such challengers in order to sustain such illegitimate governments in power. True COIN is intrastate, and is focused on repairing the failures of government.
Does General Petraeus believe it is within his lane to "fix" the government of Afghanistan? To demand reconciliation and the coming together of all stakeholders to craft a new and effective Constitution designed to guard the futures of ALL Afghans? I doubt it. Yet that is what must be done. It is not a military mission and it is not war. It is a civilian mission, it is a civil emergency, and the military should appreciate their role is merely to enable such civil repairs of governance to occur. But currently no one is focused on the main effort because our current COIN doctrine leads us to believe that GEN Petraus is already on it. He isn't. No one is.
Robert,
I agree that what is occurring in Afghanistan is not strictly COIN, but here's my quibble for the sake of argument. So what?
Define the insurgency in Afghanistan. You have mostly criminals in the northwest, drug traffickers in the southwest, Afghan Taliban in the south (although each cell varies from tribe to tribe and valley to valley), the Haqqani Network in the east with a mix of Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban too, the HIG and Uzbeks rebels in the northeast, and various other malcontents throughout. So with that, explain to me what phase this "insurgency" is in right now.
ISAF operations are a mix of COIN, CT, UW, FID, SSTR, counter narcotics, law enforcement, yada, yada, yada... but the overarching focus is to build Afghan security forces so they can fill the role of the previous public safety and security forces that Phase III destroyed or dismantled.
If ISAF tried to build a COIN strategy that focuses specifically on all the various anti-coalition militias in response to all their various phases, you'd have chaos. Chaos during phase II and III is good. Chaos during phase IV is bad. In phase IV the objectives shift from destroying the enemy to building a friend.
The biggest obstacle for ISAF is not the insurgency or building the ANA, it's GIRoA. It's too early to fix right now, but once there's reasonable stability, the donor nations need to push GIRoA to amend the Afghan constitution. Right now it's a democratically elected dictatorship with its patronage system. They need to federalize the provinces so that the provincial governors are elected, not appointed. Same for the district governors. Like I said, it's too early for that now with bigger fish to fry first, but the patronage system is what drives the corruption. But that's another thread.
"friendly force phases" in insurgency are moot. It is insurgent phases that define the situation, and the insurgent can prevail in any phase.
The goal of an intervening force is to assist in reducing the violence and improving the governance to the point where it comes within the capacity of the Host Nation COIN/governance mechanisms. It will still be far from peaceful, and governance will remain flawed, but the causal factors will be moving in the right direction.
The convenional concept of moving through a tunnel from A to Z to get to success is a dangerous obstacle to clear understanding of such operations.
(And appreciating that what we currently think of as "COIN" is really not COIN at all, but rather a mix of Euro/US Colonial intervention TTPs colored by a few years in Iraq is much more than quibbling over words.)
Publius,
You make a good point. I do sound angry about the criticism of the current strategy.
Rest assured, I'm not irritated at the criticism because I'm wedded to the strategy. I'm irritated about the criticism's lack of validity. It overly generalizes and masks important events that have occurred in the past 9 years:
1. We divert US forces to Iraq (2003).
2. Rumsfeld is gone and Gates is SECDEF (2007).
3. Bush is gone (2009).
4. Bush's mistakes in Iraq settle enough to allow the US to shift emphasis and capabilities back to Afghanistan.
5. McCrystal then Patraeus is in (2010).
6. 98,000 US forces RSOI'ed and conducing ops in OEF-A (AUG 2010).
Also, I would disagree with your point that we have made no discernible progress. That depends on your definition of "discernible." Again, the 1230 reports to Congress seem to describe discernible points, if you bother to read it.
I think the plan for Phase IV in Afghanistan has always underestimated the efforts it will require to "stabilize" this largely rural country with a fiercely independent, self-sufficient population that is not looking for any government to help them, not even their own. But we can't ignore the larger problems in that region and the opportunity a stable Afghanistan nestled between Iran and Pakistan would provide us.
Ok, call it COIN, call it CT, call it colonialism, whatever...I think those labels are all interesting but can largely be distractions. To be most accurate, what's occurring in Afghanistan right now is a Phase IV occupation that we are trying to transition. For the first 8 years, we tried to convince ourselves that we were not occupying, we were liberating or something; and we never had adequate forces to properly assume the policing functions an occupying army must assume after Phase III when they have dismantled the existing government infrastructure and their local police and security forces. This is also true in Iraq. The Revolution in Military Affairs got Phase III right, but it low-balled Phase IV, and this is why OIF Phase IV and OEF-A Phase IV have gone so poorly.
I am not a proponent of staying in Afghanistan per se. But the current plan represents a reasonable approach to stabilize the population centers at an Afghan pace with an Afghan face by 2014. If the Afghan pace is too slow, too bad. The deadline helps them realize they only have this limited opportunity to take advantage of ISAF's assistance. After 2014, we can pull out knowing we gave them a reasonable opportunity to govern themselves. If the Afghans fail to take advantage of this opportunity, so be it. That will be the Afghans' problem.
In other words, our end state in Afghanistan as with Iraq as with any Phase IV transition, should be to set the conditions that provide the host population a reasonable opportunity to govern themselves. It should not be the US nor NATO nor the UN's mission to make Afghanistan successful. That is for the Afghan people.
If you want evidence of the progress, read the SECDEF report to congress for the December assessment. It won't satisfy either side though. The results are mixed, but in general, trending positive in many districts. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/November_1230_Report_FINAL.pdf
One interesting factoid for Afghanistan: 22.5% economic growth in 2009. Granted, a third of it is unsustainable foreign aid, but still, a good portion is legitimate growth.
My favorite anecdote on the ANA/ANP:
We deployed a kandak to RC-S in about a week in order to meet a short-notice change in the operational requirements. They hit the range for about three days, we gave them all the equipment they were supposed to already have, and they traveled down pretty much on their own from their HQ location (two days travel). No ambushes on the way. But, the deployment didn't look good because they were rushed, had no movement plan, we had to give them a lot of equipment, etc.
The next kandak had more time- so they had more training and had a movement plan (like many of their plans- it was all ours, they just briefed it). The result? Multiple ambushes along the way to RC-S (same route).
That was a positive metric for us. Why? The 2nd kandak had a movement plan.
These anecdotes can be repeated for so many examples: logistics system being another good one as is the force we are building (more like us, less like the traditional Afghan fighter).
The bottom line is that numbers of ANA and ANP can be spun to be a positive, but because we measure them like we measure ourselves, they constantly look bad to us- so we concentrate on the numbers growth. I'd submit that the truth is somewhere in-between: they are (or would be) very effective at doing what they WANT to do AND their capability is very low (measuring them like we measure ourselves). The question will be whether their leadership (and GIRoA's) will want to deploy and fight them like we have been deploying and fighting them.
But- if an Afghan soldier "falls in the forest" and there's no Western media around to "hear him fall"- will our populations care? Many of us have concluded- "no".
Grant Martin
MAJ, US Army
The above comments are the authors' own and do not reflect the position of the US Army or DoD.
One school of thought is that we should train the ANA to be able to support and defend themsevles. From an outsider looking in we can see large numbers that look great on a spreadsheet. 130,000 ANA Soldiers are trained, equipped and ready to defend Afghanistan. More are on the way. However, an insider looking out scratches their head in amazement. These numbers are great but they can't sustain themselves. Without the Big Green Machine here and other coalition forces, the ANA and ANSF can't support themselves at all. There is no point of sending a BN of BDE of ANA to the fight if they only have enough equipment and support to fight for a few days and then leave the area. Logistcally the ANA and ANSF is years possibly even decades away from being able to support themselves operationally.
A Small surgical coalition force is needed partnered with a training force is needed (and present) In addition to that there needs to be a logistics and supply school house that trains the ANA and ANSF in the methods of supporting themselves.
Grant Martin: Chilling, and I fear all too accurate, observations.
Dick Hoffman:
<blockquote>What you cannot deny is that for the first time in OEF-A, they have over 100,000 troops coupled with over 100,000 ANSF</blockquote>
No, I suppose that is undeniable. I can, however, deny that any of that number represents the right tool with which to approach this situation.
@ Dick Hoffmann: I really wish you'd included Colonel Gentile's setup line: "People are so set on the current strategy that they become bothered and angry by a serious questioning.." Funny, but it's hard not to agree with Gian when I see a comment such as: "Broad, BS statements like "we've been there 9 years and nothing's worked" are patently false."
You don't like "nothing's worked?" How about, "we've been there 9 years and have made no discernible progress"? That better? Or is it your position that we have in fact made progress? If so, I'd be interested in hearing about it.
From my view in the cheap seats, Robert Jones's "colonial intervention" seems far closer to the mark than COIN or CT or any other military buzz phrase. It seems we are indeed waging some kind of bizarre colonial exercise, but not doing a very good job at it. It also seems we're not very good imperialists after all, no matter how our military leadership may wish it so.
IMO, supporters of ongoing operations in Afghanistan, no matter whether they fancy themselves COIN experts or imperialists are in deep denial. The reality is that after nine years of bloodshed and of flushing our national treasure down the toilet, we are no closer to attainment of the fundamental goals than we were nine years ago. There has been no progress.
Afghanistan is a failure. Of course the counterinsurgency "strategy" isn't working. It can't. Wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time. Not to mention wrong host government. The bitter truth is that domestic politics and military pride are the fundamental drivers. You might want to ask a Vietnam vet about these things sometime.
I'm not saying things are going famously there.
I'm just saying they finally have enough troops to give the population-centric COIN strategy a reasonable shot. They've never had this many troops there. And they've stood up a significant ANA component.
So you can say they were doing the same things years before, but they didn't have this many troops doing those same things.
And the reports from the operational commanders say that gradual progress on security is apparent. Granted, governance and development are lagging behind. But the State Department surge won't be complete until July 2011, so it's too soon to judge that as well.
I'm not saying don't criticize. But if you do, make sure you note the context. Broad, BS statements like "we've been there 9 years and nothing's worked" are patently false. And I'm not going to make any broad statements like "victory is around the corner" 'cuz that be patently false too.
What you cannot deny is that for the first time in OEF-A, they have over 100,000 troops coupled with over 100,000 ANSF, and they have shown reasonable progress with Operation Hamkari over the past 4 months.
I was reading some of the press releases from 2006 and re-reading some of the things we worked on in 2007 and, honestly, you can replace the dates (and many times leave the names in place- but add a star or two) and they look the same as what we are doing today.
I don't think just adding the 30k means we are doing it "right" today. Other than that and some "STRATCOM" (propaganda?) emphasis, plus tons of added bureaucracy, rank, and staffs- I'm not sure what we have "better" today than in the 9 years previous. And I didn't see much appetite with really looking at metrics at any point and changing direction. Metrics were used to reinforce the STRATCOM.
But- I don't think this is all necessarily bad. If we are setting the conditions for a politically-viable withdrawal, then maybe that meets the "real" policy objectives (get out starting in 2011). We just need to communicate this to the guys on the ground in my opinion- as many are still trying to do pop-centric COIN, win hearts and minds, intervene colonially- or whatever you want to call it. I don't envy the ORSA guys either that have to assess these activities that might not be logically supporting a withdrawal and somehow spin them to say they do.
Grant Martin
MAJ, US Army
The above comments are the authors' own and do not reflect the position of the US Army or DoD.
"COIN": It is quite possible that never before in the annals of military operations has a concept been so thoroughly abused as this one. After all, the COIN described in FM 3-24 is really "Colonial Intervention" rather than Counter Insurgency.
Those who look at the past six months of operations in Afghanistan with an experienced eye can see a very deliberate scheme of engagement to suppress the symptoms of the insurgency there in a manner to meet specific metrics to support a withdrawal IAW political timelines. General Petraeus has his mission and he is executing it. But it isn't COIN; and it really doesn't get us to the Ends set for us by the President either.
The President set the Ends as "to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan."
President Barak Obama, 2010
Okay, fair enough. That won't remove the base of support that sustains AQ in so many other areas, so the mission will continue, but it is clear what he wants done in AFPAK region. The Means for doing this are ISAF. To find the Ways we need only look to the ISAF Mission statement; and this is where the disconnect from Ways to Ends occurs:
"In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population." ISAF Mission Statement
We go from talking about denial of AQ sanctuary straight into a complex scheme of sustaining in power an illegitimate government that is the primary source of causation for the insurgency. This is good Colonial Intervention, but it is not good COIN, and it does not go very directly toward denial of AQ sanctuary.
AQ's primary source of sanctuary is the Taliban, and the Pashtun populace within the FATA that support the Taliban leadership there. The key to the Ends provided by the President are in the hands of the Taliban.
Frankly, I am not sure how the suppression operations going on currently in Afghanistan or a ramped up CT program either one get us to the specified Ends. I suspect this is but one more false choice in a sea of such false choices.
Dick:
Well if you read what American commanders from company up to Division and higher have been saying about what they were doing since early 2004 then yes actually the operational framework of counterinsurgency has remained essentially the same. A new history out from CSI at Leavenworth and authored by historian Don Wright argues that in early 2004 then LTG Barno put into place a "classic counterinsurgency" campaign. To be sure there were fewer brigades back years ago, but arguably the Taliban enemy was much weaker then too.
But in order to create the perception that success is happening in Afghanistan it requires a point of transformation from when things were being done wrongly (pre -2009 and the arrival of Gen McChrystal)to a point where finally as is often said "the right inputs are finally in place." Of course if there hasnt been any kind of radical shift in terms of operational framework or in the overall quality of generalship then the problem is not with tactics but with strategy; but that is not an answer that many folks want to hear (or discuss).
gian
The premise of this criticism is false:
"There are alternatives'' to the current strategy, Gentile said in an interview. "But they are hard to articulate with an Army and senior leaders who've been doing this for nine years and are morally committed to it because we've shed blood and they believe they can make it work.''
We haven't been doing "this" for 9 years. In Afghanistan, we have only just begun the proper campaign with adequate troops. The troop levels never even approached an adequate level for an effective COIN strategy in Afghanistan until August of 2010. So the idea that "this" has been going on for 9 years is complete bunk. We were treading water for the first 8 years while the Bush administration went off to Iraq and flushed any international legitimacy associated with Afghanistan down the toilet.
So give this new phase and new strategy that's just got barely the adequate number of troops a chance to work. The next assessment is in July. That'll have given them about 9 months to show progress.