Comments
Geesh Gian, lighten up. What Mr. Yon basically stated was things are better than they were based upon his observations, it would be a shame if that progress were lost and that girl never had the chance to go to college and that GEN Petraeus is a good commander who has a lot of relevant experience and his advice should be well considered. All of that seems pretty true, obviously true even and Mr. Yon seems a credible reporter. How did GEN Haig and sending small girls to college 20 years down the road get into it?
Your charge of militarism seems overstated. It seems natural enough for people involved in a fight to want to win it. That is not militarism, that is human nature. In the long run it is probably better to win the fights you get into thereby demonstrating to others your stick-to-itiveness. A reputation for stick-to-itiveness is a good thing because it can help prevent fights in the future, again, human nature not militarism.
Sometimes if somebody thinks that a commander is a good one or has done a good job, that is all they are saying. Saviors and narratives may have nothing to do with it.
Oh, but I am being very stupid. This is exactly what we are attempting but we can't find anyone to negotiate with - so to speak - at least according to Peter Bergen (can't find the link on the Foreign Policy "AfPak" blog at the moment, but it's there or on the CNN website).
Bill Roggio at Long War Journal is right: The state of Pakistan is essentially an engine of jihad, both for domestic and regional purposes (strategic depth), and yet we are striving to retain a bilateral relationship because of the Saudi-Iran angle and the Pakistan nuclear arsenal.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2011/06/harkat-ul-…
Sigh. What have you done, Pakistan "handlers" of the past decade? Why did you feed the whole region when it needed to be starved, strategically speaking?
Well, I don't know. This is not easy, is it?
<em>....I scratch my head as to why no one else seems to notice that there is a revolutionary insurgency with the "Big T" taliban in Pakistan, and a resistance insurgency with the "little t" Taliban in Afghanistan....Our efforts focus on the resistance and therefore can only suppress it. Drone strikes and other kinetic ops against the Revolutionary leadership will not resolve that form of insurgency either, but will require reconiciliation of the issues between the Karzai regime in Kabul and the Taliban government in exile in Pakistan.</em> - <strong>Robert C. Jones</strong>
<em>Very</em> interesting point. It reminded me of the following op-ed (excerpt and link below):
<em>This is avoidable. The opposition to Karzai isnt just a rejection of the current government, as the media have emphasized. We provide an alternative vision to Karzais way out of the status quo. It entails a complete disarming of the Taliban, an end to Pakistans practice of giving sanctuary to Taliban militants and a truth-and-reconciliation process for Afghanistan....It is for fear of that outcome that voices for justice and permanent peace have been raised in Afghanistan. Many Afghans believe that to get to a negotiated settlement, the Taliban leaders involved in talks should be relocated to Afghanistan from their current locations in Pakistan, where they are protected by Pakistans intelligence service.</em> - <strong>Amrullah Saleh</strong>
http://pundita.blogspot.com/2011/06/for-six-years-amrullah-saleh-was-in…
But all of this is hard for me to get my head around - both as a civilian and as someone who has never been to Afghanistan.
You have previously mentioned the Karzai regime as a "sanctuary" because there is no place for the Taliban (little or big T) within the current political process.
But Amrullah Saleh and others say the opposite: that they fear a deal between Karzai and the Taliban leadership in Pakistan, especially in a scenario where the Taliban are not disarmed because they are protected - or prevented from negotiating? - by their Pakistani patrons.
If you bring the "large" T taliban into the negotiating process, how do you prevent them from biding their time and rearming? Everyone seems ready to pick up where they left off when we leave.
I still think both "sanctuaries" are key: the sanctuary provided by the Karzai government and the sanctuary provided by the Pakistani government.
Oddly enough, we enable both sides.
Perplexing.
Michael,
I think that is a good military answer. "Ours is not to question why...etc." This is why Operational Design is so powerful, IMO, as it creates a vehicle for a military commander tasked with a mission to not simply analyze the mission and report back how to best execute what he was told to do, but rather to analyze the PROBLEM itself, and perhaps go back to the boss and say "Here is what you asked us to do, and I am prepared to tell you the best way for us to attempt that; however, based on our understanding of the problem and your intent, we believe you have given us the wrong task. We think we can best accomplish the ends you desire by doing this instead, and here is why."
If we just use design as an annex to MDMP and do not adopt the philosophy of questioning the mission in the design phase, we lose the best aspect of that process.
This is not a war to be won, and AQ cannot be "contained" in the FATA, nor defeated on any specific piece of dirt. Nor will the denial of any specific piece of dirt much hinder AQ's operations either. As to Afghanistan and their insurgency, I scratch my head as to why no one else seems to notice that there is a revolutionary insurgency with the "Big T" taliban in Pakistan, and a resistance insurgency with the "little t" Taliban in Afghanistan. The resistance can be suppressed, but will always regenerate if the Revolution is not resolved. Our efforts focus on the resistance and therefore can only suppress it. Drone strikes and other kinetic ops against the Revolutionary leadership will not resolve that form of insurgency either, but will require reconiciliation of the issues between the Karzai regime in Kabul and the Taliban government in exile in Pakistan. This is not a military mission, and frankly a large military effort makes the problem worse.
We owe the President smarter answers than "how to win" what we were tasked to do. The President relys on the military to have some expertise on insurgency, not just knowledge of tactics on COIN. Senior military leaders have a duty to advise the Commander in Chief, but instead, as you say, they are simply trying to "win."
We can do better.
Bob
Michael-
I think COL Gentile's points in the past have been on point: that it is disengenuous for the military to demand that the only way "to win" is to conduct COIN a la 3-24/nation-building. That forces the politicians to either choose to support the military or appear to be "against winning". Talk about getting boxed in.
I respectfully disagree that the military's job is to recommend how to "win" it, since "winning" it in this case implies what strategic objectives to shoot for, regardless of the actual linkage to political objectives/national interests. This COA has us in the military setting the political objectives by default.
I'd suggest we should throw-out our views on how to "win" and instead tell the President what we think it will take to meet his objectives and then salute once he makes a decision (as opposed to trying to mold the decision beforehand). We shouldn't tell him that in order to meet the political objective of disrupting AQ it will take nation-building in Afghanistan.
And, just in case you're wondering, I've been to Afghanistan a "few" times (not that that should matter a whole heck of a lot)... ;)
Thank you, Bob,
Your comments bring up important thinking points. I respect Gian but he was rambling a bit on that one. I still read him even when he rambles because he has had significant experience and is a smart man.
Bottom line is that whether or not this war is actually worth it is a separate question re how to 'win' it. Am cognizant that there is little here to win. Like many people who come to this SWJ, I spend years on end in such countries. There just isn't much to win in Afghanistan. (Though the enemy is definitely taking a bad whipping.) Readers here almost certainly know that Afghanistan will not be anything pretty anytime in our lifetimes. But again, that's not the point. The point here is that the recommendation to the President should be How to win it, not about the value of winning it. That's up to the President we elected.
V/r,
Michael
Michael,
You can PCS to Afghanistan and still never come to understand insurgency. This is not a debate about tactics tailored to specific valleys, villages or even districts. This is about an operational design and strategic context that can never be overcome by the hard works of our soldiers, marines, civilians, etc on the ground. So your cheap shot misses the target, IMO.
Gian raises fair points. There are a lot of cheer leaders coming up on the net, and not a lot of objective critical assessment of what they are putting out. I would be interested in hearing your specific responses to Gian's specific concerns.
To many of us it appears the goal is a temporary suppression and a negotiated decent interval to exit under, leaving a mess that will close behind us on Karzai with the same certainty that the NVA descended upon Saigon, or the Red Sea closed upon the Pharoah.
I hear and read little talk of strategic issues cast within a sophisticated understanding of insurgency. But I am listening...
Best Regards,
Bob
So as Yon argues we must do as the general (Petraeus) says, because he is the "man in the arena" and on the ground.
Wow, that sounds like General Haig in World War I telling the wimpy politicians back home to shut up about it and let him get on with the war.
All of it of course reeks of militarism, and of the mistaken notion that once wars start (even limited ones with questionable objectives) they must be won; victory must be achieved as the military has defined it.
This is militarism plain and simple, and Yon is on board promoting it.
I grow weary of these puff pieces with the stock bromides: progress is finally being achieved; we just need to stick it out for as long as the generals tell us to; the savior general is on board to rescue us from our flawed, previous methods; and someday we will win as long as we maintain political will. This is all code for staying there for a generation if not more. But lets not stop at a mere generation, Yon lectures us and says it is a "century" long process.
You see what Michael Yon doesnt seem to understand is that sometimes in these kinds of limited wars, victory is highly overrated, especially when victory as defined by the military is no longer worth pursuing relative to the cost in blood and treasure.
But then I often wonder if Yon has gotten himself too much wrapped up in it all (the narrative of progress, of savior generals combining with brave men on the ground saving Afghan girls and eventually sending them to college, all the while bashing insurgents when they pop up), and the idea of spending a century in Afghanistan with more blood and treasure spilled is attractive to him. In this piece he almost seems giddy with the prospect of staying there until 2120 or beyond.
Gosh if this isnt the nightmare of perpetual war maintained through outright militarism I dont know what is.
gian