Comments
This is a big problem in today's Army. In my opinion, toxic leaders emerge from incompetence, ineptitude and the absence of leadership skills and mentorship. But these Toxic Leaders had a lot of help from their immediate boss for not taking the time to address the problems from the outset and by their subordinates for accepting the conditions set forth. Let's be honest here; toxic leaders don't happen overnight. It takes time to perfect the conditions which create them. As long as big Army continues to ignore this, bigger challenges are certain to emerge. How can we win a two-front war if we struggle with the fundamentals?
While I concur that there is a problem with toxic leaders, try as I may, I cannot personally resolve it.... As a professional that knows how to get things fixed, I simply set up a private civilian e-mail account and brief it to all my troops. I tell them that I do not want simple complaints and whining, send me a comment and explain what the problem is, how it is not in the interest of the Army/unit, and mature suggestions to correct it. They can send from any account and when I look into problems, there message never comes out. My own little 360 evaluation that is anonymous and outside military accounts making the Soldiers feel more comfortable trying it - I have even gotten plenty of accolades for leaders as well. While I cannot personally fix everything, I know when to drop it outside the Command (IG) and such to get it fixed while being the only one taking risk.
On the subject of promotion timelines, the time in grade does not make a better leader. The guys I knew as LTs that were good leaders are now good leaders as LTCs and COLs - the toxic leaders are still toxic. The timelines are less important than the competence and leadership abilities. I have the degrees, skills, experience and initiative to do the job, but after all this time of changes to make someone's legacy, conducting PT that has nothing to do with and no bearing on my duties (yes I have been in direct combat), and seeing the best leaders I have served with/for get out due to their frustration and a poor promotion selection process - I will also take the door and a higher salary at 20 years rather than continuing to run full-speed while staying in place or moving backwards!
Ben
Not only should the photo be removed to prevent bad assumptions and superficial behavior/group think, they should remove religious status as well. Ever since I put down my non-Christian status on my ORB about ten years back, nearly every senior rater has asked me about it as the first or second question during counseling. My performance should matter, not what ideology or lack thereof I privately believe.
From the perspective of one non-select for Major many years ago...
* Pictures: Didn't know that officers had to submit black and white back then and the Army studio screwed me. When I found out, my O-5 boss needed me for something critical at the time I planned to get a new one. As I was already one-time nonselect, I figured it was hopeless and already had the paperwork in for VSI.
* Weight: I'm perpetually around 245 lbs at 6'-2". Even thought about going back on active duty a few years back and got taped and passed easily at 255. Today I'm about 245 in great shape able to bench and fly 250 lbs a dozen times and pedal the elliptical at resistance 13 for half an hour at age 56. You think we look fat...we think scrawny runner types couldn't carry a heavy load up and down that slope for hours. Oh, and I played freshman soccer in college and could do the XVIII Abn Corps 5 mile run in the required time no problemo.
* Toxic leaders: I'm prejudice against short Napoleanic leaders and other a$$holes and admit it. One problem of toxic leaders is that some rebel against them and get screwed...i.e. my freshman year at USMA and my first battalion commander. He went on to make General and was actually very competent. But it was criminal how he treated his staff and leaders. In his defense, he said that it would be criminal to allow your unit to go into combat unprepared.
* Oil and vinegar: sometimes the leader is not toxic but just does not jive with your style. I worked for an eyewash micromanager that bugged me for that reason but he was competent. Time after time, you work for one guy you get along with and another you don't. I admit that I failed to adapt. I got a bit better years later working for someone who drank too much. I don't drink at all and tend to look down on folks with that problem. Obviously that was going to be problematic but I learned to live with it.
* Branches within a branch: I'm sure the airborne and Ranger types get preferential treatment in the Infantry. In Aviation, if you aren't an attack reconnaissance pilot, you don't rate. That's one reason I think the plan to go to a future joint multi-role aircraft is smart. 160th SOAR guys are not looked down on for flying a H-60 and they are armed. I was a lowly Huey pilot and from day one in unit was never allowed to fly much and got all the logistics and staff jobs. You never get better to move to an advanced aircraft at that rate.
The answer? Can't say that most of the LTC and O-6 did not deserve it. They were good and better than me in most cases in the things the Army likes to measure. On the other hand I was working on innovative things in the 1980s and 1990s that took two decades to mature. My staff work and innovative instincts were/are great. I also ran a small business for 13 years.
There are staff and other skills that have nothing to do with being a commander that could bring value to the Army. When I commanded a 130 man ATC company, I had 17 E-7s working for me so I let the NCOs and First Sergeant run the company since I frankly had no interest in acting as if I knew more about ATC than them. Others did not like that and thought I should be chasing the baloney TDA achievements.
Part of the problem is the senior rater profile and the discrepancy between branches. Some branches are harder to get into than others so you compete against the cream of the crop. Also, although politically incorrect to say, we all have seen women and minority officers rise higher than they may have deserved. And frankly, don't believe that some of the below the zone guys walked on water enough to justify early promotion.
Up or out is part of the problem, too. I happily would have stayed on as an RA Captain hoping to make Major down the road but that ended back in 1992. I made Major immediately as a reserve officer but never served in that capacity because I was running a business 7 days a week.
But frankly, life was easy back then. Cannot fathom how anybody stays in the Army with so many deployments AND toxic leaders. But if you are honest, you probably would admit that the multiple deployments and PTSD are what breeds many toxic leaders. Not sure how you solve that.
After additional thought, I couldn't endorse a plan to take your photo without a shirt. Boards would select that guy that looks like a Soldier, not necessarily the guy that is a Soldier and a leader.
Photos should disappear altogether.
If the chain of command can't ensure someone has their uniform straight, or an officer can't be trusted to read AR 670-1 or figure out how to ask for assistance to interpret certain parts, then maybe there are bigger issues. I see no reason to have you or your uniform on an ORB. Introduces too much bias.
I don't have that much of an issue with that posted above so long as the PT test is an accurate measurement of combat fitness, and not parade field fitness. Since that will never happen, I would not support that idea. You'll see a massive up swing in drug use if that happens, and it'll be performance enhancing drugs, not mind altering drugs. Since it's too damn expensive to test for those, that will never be tested.
Also, it's time for the Army to spend the money and get the BodPod - a quick, easy, and accurate way to measure body fat. Too much human error and corruption in the current system. I see people getting by and people getting screwed, all depending on who holds that tape -wrong answer. Sad that we can't routinely trust many of our senior NCOs with a tape measure, but it's the truth.
DA photos should be in PT shorts only for men, and shorts and jog bra for women. (Class A jacket can be on a hanger next to the soldeir so that the board can still inspect skill at putting a uniform together). List actual fitness test score on the report card, not "pass/fail." In fact, list the past 4 scores or a career average (throwing out scores from special schools like Ranger and SF where those who have been understand what I mean). I'm no stud, but my career average is probably in the mid 290s (or well over 300 if extended scale scores were included). Mostly this just reflects that I believed that personal fitness was an important aspect of my job as a leader. You can't follow me if I am dragging along behind you somewhere. Plus I never wanted to be that guy that people looked at and thought "You're SF??" Something one has to earn and revalidate everyday, and leadership is one of those things.
There are so many simple fixes if we were to get serious about what is truly important.
Jimbo,
Good comments and insight. I'd really like to know what the NCOs are saying about this topic and the discipline issues. I see discipline issues all the time and I take a step back, look around, and wait for an NCO to pounce - doesn't happen.
I see senior NCOs speak to new LTs with disrespect, hear them say things that are out of their lane, even if only joking, and lecture new LTs about the wear of the uniform when they are out of regulations with the uniform (this is around a BOLC school house environment, and have seen it in the Force as well). I have seen 1SGs administer a company PT test in temperatures around the high 30s and low 40s, all bundled up in every piece of snivel gear, drinking coffee, and then yelling at everyone in the formation to dress down to shorts and tshirt - meanwhile, not one person in the company could recall seeing this 1SG take a PT test, or do PT other than harassing the remedial run group or the remedial pushup/situp group. Then I approach that NCO's rater and ask what the deal is, and bring up issues and allow that rater/supervisor the courtesy of fixing his or her own, and I pretty much get a concerned response but no action. I try to stay in my lane but eventually enough is enough. Taking a stand at that time only gets one labeled as a "confronter" and trouble maker.
I think clearly we have issues on both sides of the house.
Charles,
"The recent White Paper on the Profession of Arms should have made an angle to address this issue. Not sure this issue gets the traction needed when it's just a bunch of "disgruntled types" typing away on SWJ or elsewhere."
I can tell you right now on the NCO Forum, the there is little--if any--discussion on toxic leadership. The themes of choice since the white paper came out have been the dearth of discipline, the lack of discipline, the failure of discipline, the loss of discipline.
Well, this thread has inspired me to at least wander back over there and break the ice.
The Army certainly has toxic leaders like that discussed above in regard to the USMC.
I think one of the worst things about toxic leaders is that those around them, the ones that refuse to act the same, the ones that still see the mission and their Soldiers as the focus, are going to continue taking care of those things because they know it's right. So, the mission is accomplished and Soldiers are taken care of as well as possible, so the leader ends up looking good but everyone is out there paying the price for that. That's very disheartening for people to take, especially when they know one of the few options out there to stop the toxic spread is to allow the unit to fail, limiting the resulting OER or NCOER.
In my situations where toxic leadership was present, I've never been able to reconcile allowing the unit to fail. However, I've wanted to do that. But just don't feel it's right for the Soldiers or for my integrity. I have to say though, that this issue has gotten so bad it's made me take a step back and seriously ask myself, "Am I wrong?" Am I wrong to not be self-centered? Am I wrong to not be a spotlighter? It seems that this toxic brand is almost the rule, rather than the exception.
The recent White Paper on the Profession of Arms should have made an angle to address this issue. Not sure this issue gets the traction needed when it's just a bunch of "disgruntled types" typing away on SWJ or elsewhere.
Bill M.,
The Marine Corps is a smaller organization so it has the luxury of creating the self-selection of a more elite group of people than the much larger Army. Yet, I think our uniform Nazis are every bit as strong, if not more so than the Army's. In my world, I think the main culprit is the fact that we draw our 1stSgts and SgtsMaj in a different pool than MSgts and MGySgts. The former get a new specialty code and the latter retain their MOS. The former are all too often specialists in bull$#*t, having been DIs, recruiters, or Marine security guards that never really returned to their MOS. I have no problem with any of those billets. Unfortunately, there is a class of people that use each, especially the DI billet, to escape from their MOS, which they are bad at and don't like, and become a professional drill douche and uniform Nazi. These losers then roll around playing DI full time, which means Marines in their charge become recruits once again. What is more, the policy of assigning these losers outside of their MOS, i.e. an aviation sourced SMadge to an infantry unit, means that all they know is that which does not matter. So, as one Sgt explained to me, you get a guy who shows up in Iraq and can't appreciate the professionalism of his focus on their prep for a mounted patrol, so instead focuses on the fact that their racks in their patrol base are "nasty" and pulls them off the vehicles to police their quarters. This is what makes young Marines want to literally kill their seniors. This is toxic leadership. Does the Army have the same 1stSgt/Smadge model or is it different?
Jimbo, I found an article on th aerostat att VBC, and the bold print stated they provide overwatch for the troops outside the wire. Had to smile at that one, and I'm pretty sure the younger professionals that actually operate it do just that, and then this senior a**hole walks in and wants to spy on his own troops so he can stroke his ego instead of fighting the war.
Let me guess what sin he identified while ignoring the enemy. A Soldier may have rolled up his sleeves part way, or he may have taken his headgear off for a couple of minutes to get some relief from the heat, etc.
Peter, your comments on the Army's reason for banning the five toe shoes is one reason I am happy to be retired from the Army. I now workout out on a Marine base and those shoes (fad or not) are very popular with the Marines. They also appear to be in "much" better shape than the average soldier. They have a culture of fitness (mental and physical) where the Army has a culture of conformity, with conformity being the only standard. Like you said, you can be an obese turd, but if you are in the proper uniform (as defined by some geek who doesn't really care about fitness) and have a good haircut you are all set for a great career.
I visited a dental hygenist on the Marine base whose husband is a senior NCO in the Army. I wanted to get her opinion (a civilian with no real bias, just calls it like she sees it) on her view of the Army and Marines, was there a difference? After asking if I wanted an honest answer, and convincing her that I did, she said overall the Marines were a lot healthier and much happier than most soldiers. Obviously this doesn't apply to the Special Operations side of the Army (although we too had to suffer the same stupid conformity to useless regulations that the Army managed to generate). I don't know if the Marines had similiar problems, but I recall many conventional Sergeants Major focused on stupid uniform policies in Iraq, much more so than focusing on the welfare of their men. Never had that problem on a Marine base in Iraq. They were focused on fighting.
Still remember the story (unconfirmed) of an Army SGM using a drone to spy on his troops on patrol to look for uniform violations. Would have been nicer if he was using the drone to scout ahead of the troops to see there were any ambushes being laid for them, but I guess that isn't a priority they teach in our SGM academy. If that is what our leaders are focused on then we do have serious problems. We truly do have a crisis of toxic leaders in our ranks. Maintaining standards is obviously part of leadership, but the standards they focus on are largely meaningless.
Peter, your comments on the Army's reason for banning the five toe shoes is one reason I am happy to be retired. I workout out on a Marine base and those shoes (fad or not) are very popular with the Marines. They also appear to be in "much" better shape than the average soldier. They have a culture of fitness (mental and physical) where the Army has a culture of conformity, with conformity being the only standard. I visited a dental hygenist on the Marine base whose husband is a senior NCO in the Army. I wanted to get her opinion (a civilian with no real bias, just calls it like she sees it) on her view of the Army and Marines, was there a difference? After asking if I wanted an honest answer, and convincing her that I did, she said overall the Marines were a lot healthier and more happy than most soldiers. Obviously this doesn't apply to the Special Operations side of the Army (although we too had to suffer the same stupid conformity to useless regulations that the Army managed to generate). I don't know if the Marines had similiar problems, but I recall many conventional Sergeants Major focused on stupid uniform policies in Iraq, much more so than focusing on the welfare of their men. Never had that problem on a Marine base in Iraq. Still remember the story (unconfirmed) an Army SGM using a drone to spy on his troops on patrol to look for uniform violations. If that is what are leaders are focused on then we do have serious problems.
I am no fan of the 5-finger shoes as I think most people wear them as part of a silly fad, but I had to look up the reasoning behind the Army banning them. I was thinking maybe something along the lines of people getting injured in them due to not working into them properly, etc. Of course it wouldn't be something so practical. "Those shoes that feature five separate, individual compartments for the toes, detract from a professional military image and are prohibited for wear with the IPFU or when conducting physical training in military formation." So, shoes meant to improve someone's gait detract from a professional military image, but grossly obese people wearing the IPFU are good to go? That's the sense I got from seeing the guys in PT gear 24/7 around Kandahar. The institutional leadership in the military today across all services is so tragically out of touch that it drives me to speechless and violent fits of anger. I would love to see the smug look on some senior SNCO's face after he came up with the sentence above. Disgusting.
Charles,
At first look, I'd say no, just incompetent by way of lacking innovation, lacking bravery and being overly-risk averse. Rather than choosing to be leading-edge in physical development, they routinely choose to be lackluster and johnny-come-latelies to the fitness party. I keep hoping that someone, somehwere in the Army will routinely demonstrate bravery, creativity and a "Who dares, wins" attitude. I really have yet to see it from anyone over the rank of O4.
I'm not ruling toxicity out, just can't really tell from this policy on the surface.
I wonder if the new guidance on five finger shoes goes under the toxic leadership heading. The Army just outlawed the five fingers type shoes for wear with the IPFU. Funny how the people that are writing those messages are the same people that probably haven't seen a PT field in the past five years.
<b>Michael C. Sevcik:</b><blockquote>"But every one of these Army level policy and cultural changes are really hard - most impossible!..."</blockquote>If you think training in the rain is hard and unpalatable -- your implication -- trying fighting in it for weeks at a time; better yet change that to snow. The attitude that says administrative change is too hard but accepting poor conditions is manly, just the right thing to do or something along that line is part of the 'suck it up, take two salt tablets and drive on' mentality problem that fosters toxicity. I have no problem with that mentality when it's appropriate. Sometimes though one needs an ASA instead of a salt tablet. In fact, aren't salt tablets now sort of frowned upon? Things change. What has not changed is a personnel system developed in 1917, refined in 1940 and merely tweaked -- often in bad ways -- since then...
I must admit that the phrase 'stay in your lane' is a trigger phrase to me -- I've seen it used too often by senior folks to excuse not citing or attacking a problem. The fascinating thing is that most, not all, of those same folks were prone to be at least mildly toxic or marginally competent, were prone to micromanagement and failing to make the chain of command work in order to appear to be 'take charge' types 'doing good work' on their watch (or in the current rating period...).
While we can probably agree that there's a difference between toxic and incompetent, I believe there's also a difference between staying in one's lane and not fighting city hall. In both cases the net difference can be significant but both can also be inimical to an organization.
Fascinating that people who would not tolerate receiving fire from a specific location and would do their best to remove that source of impediment at some cost will not remove administrative impediments that arguably do more significant and longer term damage...<blockquote>"In the mean time perhaps we should train in the rain. In your lane: train, educate and lead by example as a model of good leadership and always do your best to never tolerate "toxic" leaders."</blockquote>I agree and think most of the Army is doing that. My fear is that the toxicity count appears to be rising. Some of that is societal and that is truly difficult to change but much of it is systemic and that while also difficult to change is not nearly as hard to do. The issue should not be the difficulty but whether there is a need and it is fact our personnel system creates many problems other than toxic leaders, some far more severe as well.
As has been mentioned by others above, the Colonels and Generals don't want to change the system; after all, it worked for them so it must be good.
Those 2LTs will have to do it. Or the Captains and Majors. I suspect they will. Hope so...
I'm not sure I understand the point of this posting. We've all seen these guys (or gals). So what? Those below them can't do anything about it because they risk being charged with insubordination at a minimum; those above don't care because the toxic leader produces results and "gets things done" as our LTCs in Iraq put it.
Even when the toxic leader is a senior NCO and field grade officers, as well as other members of the organization, are making the higher-ups aware of the toxic behavior, the individual/ individuals remain because of the reasons above. Regarding the toxic senior NCO, this guy was directed to be redeployed by the BDE CDR and still kept in theater despite numerous complaints including one about an apparent threat he voiced against a CPT.
Perhaps the best way to deal with toxic leaders is to carefully document their behavior, attempt to deal with the individual first, then through the chain of command, and finally through public exposure of the problem/ individual. Hopefully no one will kill themselves or their buddies along the way before the guy is removed.
In the mid 70's I reported for duty as a brand spanking new 2LT excited to in the 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas. I was appalled as often is the case with a new 2LT that we going to train in horrible weather -- tornado threats, wind, rain, sleet, snow and cold. We had the audacity to spend two months in Germany on a winter REFORGER - as the many readers of this blog will remember the Germany weather sucked every single day.
My battalion commander said it all in a pithy and insightful comment - "when it rains outside, you train in the rain." It was kinda like being forced to take drink a steaming hot cup of shut the F*&^% up!
Heres the analogy for many of these blog suggestions for the toxic leadership problem: the OER system could be better, bureaucracy of assignment process could be better, 360 evaluation systems could help, local promotions might help (Im skeptical on this one), promotions based on technical/tactical competence might help, increasing the time and experiences needed before promotion might help, listing the traits we desire in our senior leaders and sending it to the new Chief of Staff, might help and fixing a promotion board process might help. Other suggestions in this blog like reducing GO slots, tax exempt policies, etc. might also help???
But every one of these Army level policy and cultural changes are really hard - most impossible! Kind of like a bunch of 2LTs at Fort Riley bitching about the weather? You cant change it - maybe big Army will maybe not???
In the mean time perhaps we should train in the rain. In your lane: train, educate and lead by example as a model of good leadership and always do your best to never tolerate "toxic" leaders.
Michael C. Sevcik
Well, one could incorporate what one finds in the National Guard (there is some greatness to it, but bad as well).
When I left the Regular Army to go to law school I joined the Guard as a mid-grade Captain and served there for 8 years or so. Here is what I learned:
1. Poor leaders stick at two critical grades, E-6 and O-4. If a guy is reliable to come to drill he will rise to those grades, but not above. Sadly, with no PCS moves involved, this means that ulitmately a large percentage of these positions become choked with a mix of dead wood and toxic leaders. I saw a lot of sharp young troops come off of active duty as E-4/5 and simply fade away after a year or so being trapped under some ancient, F'd up lifer sqaud leader.
2. OERs are only important for when one goes to a DA board. Most promotions and command assignments are personal. Decision rests with the TAG, and he makes it based upon his personal knowledge of every aspect of you, with input from people he has known for years that also have personal knowledge of every aspect of you. They probably only glance at your OERs. With a good TAG this is awesome. Talent is plucked from the masses, promoted and placed into key positions. With a bad TAG it makes Afghan patronage look mild. I've seen both. Oh, and (learned from personal experience) only the Governor can take out a bad TAG, DA IG has no juice.
Ideal would be to craft a mix of the goodness of the Guard system with the checks and balances intended of the active system. Certainly SOF could do this if allowed their own personnel system, and that would make a lot of sense.
For the big services, creating paths for success that don't demand command (we've all seen people put into command because they had to have one even though everyone knew it would be a disaster); and that like the Prussian system branch into command or staff tracks. Some guys are great leaders, others great staffers, fewere still are both. Redefine success and position leaders to succeed.
Peer and subordinate input is key, but keep it simple. "Would you follow this leader in combat, yes or no"? A simple stop light chart would tell you all you need to know. One for subordinates, one for peers. For the senior rater, "Would you want this leader to command one of your units in combat?" or "Would you want this leader as a critical staff officer in combat?
Really comes down to a control issue. Where should control be, and how does one guard against abuses in that control authority. The message to the Chief should be clear: The current system does not work. Fix the system, not the soldier.
(Oh, and then back in the active force for 8 years of GWOT service. As a mobilized soldier I managed my own career, picked my own assignments, and OERs were moot. Just do my best, focus on the mission and the men. Sometimes the boss was happy, sometimes he wasn't, but he always got straight input and honest effort.)
Bob
First, I want to make a distinction between toxic leadership and just plain incompetent or poor leadership. Toxic leaders view the world - and their position and purpose in it - differently from the rest of us. They seek to use their institution and organizations and membership as ways and means for their own self-centered purposes; they may be very skilled at problem design, resource allocation, or motivating people to bend to their will, but its for selfish ends. Incompetent or merely poor leaders, are not anymore inherently selfish than the rest of us, they just cant motivate people or effectively view problems to begin to understand solutions. They may just be unintelligent, and incapable of understanding the problems of how to defeat the enemy or how to apply technical skills to a problem that lies within their domain. Toxic leaders have different problems - their problem is how to get themselves to the next level as fast as possible, eliminating any impediments that could disrupt that process.
I applaud most of the recommended changes above. I would also put forward another two recommendations for improvement; both are far-reaching and would impact the manner in which we fight wars, but also the purpose for which we promote officers.
The first problem is that our organizations are too deep - we have too many echelons. Visibility of toxicity is lost more than three degrees of separation away from the source of the problem. The deployed US military can have as many as 14 separate echelons between those who interface with the environment (i.e.: do the fighting) and the theater-level policy/decision makers. At each echelon, staffs create their own internal hierarchies that add as many as 9 more echelons to this total information chain. As an alternative approach that has been proven over time, in the SOF chain, there are no more than four echelons in a theater (five, if the theater includes a JFSOCC or CFSOCC) and this provides a great deal of agility of effort and resources when the highest leadership is this close to the ground (this is certainly NOT to say that SOF does not have its share of toxic leadership, it definitely does, for other reasons outside the scope of this blog entry). But when there are more echelons, there is greater chance that any toxicity at the lower or middle levels is utterly lost in the chain of command. In this situation, any operational or other indicators of toxic leadership get painted over in each successive echelons assessments (MOEs and MOPs are less sensitive to toxic leadership at higher levels and it seems to disappear altogether when there are three or more echelons between the source and the operational measuring stick). I propose that we vertically integrate as much as is necessary to prevent this level of opacity. Headquarters staffs ought not to have more than three echelons (from worker bee to Commander), and we eliminate altogether at least one staff-owning echelon: the Division. This was already proposed and accepted as part of Army Modularization, so lets follow through. My personal preference would be to delete more lines from the MTOE, but that is as far as is practical for now. A shallower organizational chart will allow the effects of toxic leadership become more visible to the senior commands.
The second problem is that the Army promotes for the Army bureaucracy, not for the skill of the branches. Hence we have lesser-skill-qualified people running the key component of the branches - promotions and command assignments -- and thus lesser-skilled communities within the Army as an institution. I think we would have better Infantry if the Infantry promoted from within, and same for the other branches (I think the Functional Areas operate closer to this, but I do not know for certain). The role this plays in promoting (pun intended) toxic leadership is that toxic leaders do what they need to in order to get ahead. Thus, their OERs always look fantastic for what the Army wants to see and they get promoted. They may reflect absolutely none of the expertise that the members of their command expect of their leadership. And, he may also have been a true Asshole (in the Dr. Sutton sense). In fact, the toxic leader who gets an "Above Center-of Mass" rating may have been widely regarded as a buffoon when it comes to actually leading troops in combat or in solving problems at home station, but he looked great to his Rater and Senior Rater.
A solution is that the promotions are done more locally - within the branches or even lower - with direct input from the 360 perspective and in accordance with the branches unique models of professionalism and effectiveness. The branches then take volunteers or select who goes to represent the branch outside of the branch in the greater Army and Joint worlds, again, based on how good of a Officer they are based on their professional communitys verdict. Where a great Infantry Offcier is chosen by direct leadership, bravery and ground-level tactical problem solver, a great Signal Corps officer is not made by being a company commander of troops over whom he/she exercises no control when deployed, but by their technical and planning expertise as employed in creating an effective tactical or theater operational communications architecture that supports the operational commanders plan as well as resource and manpower management and training to support it. The point is, the different branches are very different professional communities and should be able to choose who gets rewarded based on what their version of excellence is. A major issue that this model would help eliminate is it could prevent a toxic (or even incompetent) leader from getting promoted or assigned to a higher command position because the members of hi/her unit were too professional to let the organization fail in its mission, thus making him/her look like they are actually a good leader. We not only eliminate toxicity by virtue of those same subordinates and peers having a direct say in the process, but we further professionalize the branches by promoting and selecting for command from within, again, in accordance with what makes those communities successful.
Thats my $.07.
Quoth <b>Publius:</b><blockquote>"I always felt senior NCOs were the worst offenders, with officers in the grade of 06 close behind. But that's just me. And I have good friends who've retired from both areas."</blockquote>From the early 50s through the 90s, I totally agree with his allocation of levels for the bad rap applicable to the minority that behaves badly.
My spies tell me there's been no change today and in fact are particularly scathing about my fellow Sergeants Major of the current generation and the length of time toxic Field Grades are allowed to continue to fester and do damage before being removed -- if they're caught at all...
As an aside, there were many reliefs for cause during Viet Nam, so many in fact that some GOs -- De Puy being one -- were hated at MilPerCen for all the extra work they caused by those reliefs. Thus one of the goals in DOPMA was to insure that reliefs became more difficult. We have a personnel system that supports itself, not the Army.
"Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose." The more things change, the more they stay the same.
- Alphonse Karr
Karr wrote that more than a hundred years ago and the older I get the more I appreciate the long-dead Frenchman. I'm now older than dirt. I received my first order from an NCO in 1963. Then came orders from officers. Then I became an NCO. And then an officer. And you know what? We had toxic leadership in the 60s. And in the 70s. And the 80s. I always felt senior NCOs were the worst offenders, with officers in the grade of 06 close behind. But that's just me. And I have good friends who've retired from both areas.
Of course this isn't new. Look at the number of officers relieved and/or retired by Generals Marshall and Eisenhower at the onset and during WW2. What differentiated WW2 from Korea and Vietnam (my fun time), which could at least be characterized as "wars," and everything that's followed (more like the Korean euphemism "police action") is that WW2 was serious. It was for all the marbles and even the institutional Army, the default position of which is "asshole bureaucracy," had to bow to the will of some damned fine senior officers. In WW2, the Army was actually forced to modify many treasured practices in order to harness this huge fighting machine comprised of millions of people who really didn't give a shit about the Army's traditions to actually defend the nation by actually winning a war. The Navy and the Marine Corps had to do the same thing.
Over the years, it got worse and worse, as the memories and players from an all-out war retired and went away. In Vietnam, we fought a so-called war where the war itself was secondary to the bureaucratic imperatives of the institutional Army. It's worsened since: soldiers involved in military actions that don't really have any sort of existential flavor, meaning that bureaucratic processes always trump military prowess, and further meaning that everyone in uniform is just a small cog in the large green machine.
In bureaucracies, accomplished bureaucrats reign supreme. Leadership diminishes in importance next to the ability to "manage" and to navigate the shoals of the sanctified OER and career development process. In such a system, selfless development of subordinates may not only seem to be a waste of time, it may actually be a career killer if one is viewed as being too "soft" for advancement to higher rank.
IMO, modern American society has contributed greatly to the "toxic leadership" issue so many officers and NCOs complain about: Just think, if that colonel you love so much weren't making your life miserable, he/she might be a master of the universe on Wall Street, robbing poor people of their life's savings and otherwise assisting in ruining our economy.
A lot of it's just the times. We fight endless wars, but we don't win them. Guys in the military just kind of hang around, shuttling back and forth from Nineveh to Tyre, fulfilling the old Vietnam saying about we the unwilling, led by the unknowing, doing the impossible, for the ungrateful....and so it goes.
You could also blame Elihu Root....
I disagree with the comment on mandatory CC/PSG time, as I think that is part of the problem. Currenlty, people that may be technically competent, but horrible leaders, MUST be put in command position. Why not allow them to chose, or BN CDRs to place them in solely technical jobs? With the understanding that they won't be promoted as quickly, if at all. This might a) create competition for those CC/PSG slots b) cull the herd of those that know they don't or can't function in those slots.
This oculd be applied to all of those KD positions - XO, S3, BN CMD
Viewing Peter's comments, I like just about all of them. I would be hesitant to mandate retirements or SERB - I'd like those that love being in a uniform to be able to stay in it, so long as they are productive. Being passed over isn't always a sign of a lack of production. Some people make it to E8 or O4 or whatever, and they are comfortable and extremely competent there - but perhaps shouldn't be promoted above that rank. Tricky deal.
Also, not sure how the compensation thing would work.
Michael:
Bob's correct on all counts. I am indeed the worst offender at inadvertent anonymizing -- I'm old, he has no excuse -- and neither of us does personal.
Both of us believe the system is at fault. While all people are different and all are products of the society from which they come (thus excusing the system to an extent) they must adopt the habits of the systems in which they operate or they will be ejected by those systems. The Congress, well intentioned but dangerous, DOPMA, Title IV and others intrusions are part of the problem but the Army still is responsible for the bulk of it.
I personally am a military a$%hole of some renown but my toxicity was directed frequently at my seniors, occasionally at my peers and never to my subordinates -- well, hardly ever. A combination of the then system and education plus training all contributed to my ability to direct the spew as it were. My sensing is that direction would not allow me to survive in today's Army -- and that's sad.
You are, I think, only partly correct in this:<blockquote>"The solution IMHO lies not in a broken personnel system rather in the training, education and experiences of our officer and NCO leaders."</blockquote>I agree that good training, education and experiences can ameliorate the flaws in a personnel system that selects without real regard to competence and capability as opposed to conformance and compatibility -- but it cannot <i>significantly</i> (I'd say not even marginally adequately...) correct for those systemic flaws.
In this, OTOH:<blockquote>"...most...Army leaders...live the Army values, are tactically and technically competent, as well as superb leaders. Of course, some are "toxic" ass-holes."</blockquote>We'll have to disagree. I think that if 'many' were substituted for most, I'd generally agree but would still point out that the vagaries of system will often put one that we would all recognize as not at all in conformance with your statement in positions of great power. That's a system flaw...
That some marginally competent and / or overbearing fools slip through and rise is inevitable but in watching this lashup for a great many years, the number that slip through has risen steadily from the 5 to 10% or so of the 1950s to the 20-25 % or so of the 1990s (that IMO and based on service, uniformed and DAC, from 1949-1995) and -- according to many serving now -- >33 % today, a number that would seem to be unacceptably high. That, too, is a system flaw...
Michael,
I hit the wrong buttons here as well, and Ken is perhaps the worst offender! Nice to know I am in good company with George W.
But keep your thick skin on, I offer no personal attacks to those selected for such commands. As I said, it is a function of a toxic system rather than individuals, and perhaps rather than "hating the game" we should seriously set out to fix it.
Cheers!
Bob
Hi Bob,
I am anonymous at 9:46 am, 28 JUN 2011. I have no idea how or why anonymous got on my post as I always put my name on posts (see above and dozens of others on SWJ blog). I thought I had my name on this post too - not sure how it dropped off???
"The fact you are anonymous validates my position and undermines your own more than anything I might write, but I will add a few words as well"
Perhaps rather than validating or undermining any position, I somehow pushed the wrong button--certainly no intent to hide my comments.
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"One of the difficulties in bringing about change in an organization is that you must do so through persons who have been most successful in that organization, no matter how faulty the system or organization is. To such persons, you see, it is the best of all possible organizations, because look who was selected by it and look who succeeded most within it. Yet these are the very people through whom we bring about improvements." - George Washington
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Ken, Bob & Eden,
I am skeptical that the OER system is to blame. While a big fan of the 360 evaluation concept, it is not going to fix this toxic leader issue. Toxic leaders are part of every organization on the planet. They are not new. CSA is not going to fix. While maybe our attempt at PCC to work on this leadership problem wont solve it in all cases, perhaps it will make a difference for a few. The solution IMHO lies not in a broken personnel system rather in the training, education and experiences of our officer and NCO leaders. And Bob, I fully admit that perhaps the principle reason I was selected to command a brigade - "because Im better at sucking up than all the other battalion commanders when I was a Bn Cdr." But I dont think that is the case in most of our Army leaders. Most live the Army values, are tactically and technically competent, as well as superb leaders. Of course, some are "toxic" ass-holes. Regards,
Michael C. Sevcik
Anonymous,
The fact you are anonymous validates my position and undermines your own more than anything I might write, but I will add a few words as well.
You see our anointed commanders and CSMs as "the solution." Indeed they must be. Yet they are also a product of the problem as well. As a junior leader I took the position that there were few problem soldiers, that in most cases such problems could be traced to problems of leadership. Far easier to blame the soldier, far smarter to see such soldiers as also being metrics of larger leadership problems that need to be addressed with every bit as much certainty as the punishmented doled out to the offender.
Too often we focus on symptoms as being the problem itself. Examples are endless. Is "terrorism" a problem or a symptom? I would argue that it is a symptom that gives us problems, but that enduring solutions rest much deeper and often far from the terrorist himself. Such analysis requires one to be honest with how their own well intended behavior may well be a part of the true problem contributing to the symptom one seeks to resolve.
So too with "toxic leadership." To use a bit of slang, "Don't hate the player, hate the game." As you point out so well, every general officer got to that position through the gate of BN/BDE Command. Likewise all got to and through that gate by competing successfully under an evaluation system that Stephen Covey would categorize as a "win-lose system." Besides the unhealthy environment naturally associated with such systems, it is made even more toxic in the fact that the overarching criteria is not what one does, or how one leads, but rather how their boss's boss FEELS about them based upon limited interaction, biased inputs, and as constrained by a profile system that demands that only a certain % can be judged as "successful."
What General is going to be willing to stand up and admit that he is the product of a grossly flawed system and that other officers he or she by-passed over the years were perhaps the better leader??? Not many.
So Mr. Anonymous, I suggest you simply take the test. List for yourself the traits you believe are most important for a military leader, be it at squad or Division level; and then please sir, explain to me how our OER form and system selects for those traits.
We can do better. Our soldiers deserve better. Our nation deserves better.
Bob
Consider the following personnel system:
1. Candidates are selected for promotion by members of a secret committee that don't know them.
2. The members of the secret committee will never have to suffer for the mistakes they make, or benefit from their good choices.
3. The members of the secret committee will have no experience in the technical field of most of the candidates they consider.
4. The basis for judging the fitness of the candidates for promotion is a one-size fits all report that all acknowledge is of minimal value and is used regardless of the candidate's technical field. Snake-eating special forces operators, pilots, supply specialists, doctors, or finance guys, they all use the same form.
5. Only a small percentage of candidates can be denied promotion.
6. No matter how brilliant the candidate, at best he or she can be promoted one year early.
7. Under no circumstances can the candidates receive any feedback from the secret committee; the rationale behind selection or non-selection must remain confidential.
8. Mix in various quotas and other fiddles for the convenience of the personnel office.
It's no wonder we have some toxic leaders; it is a wonder that the ystem works as well as it does.
<b>Anonymous at 9:26:</b><blockquote>"Your comment about the toxic leader not being likely to think it is directed at them was brought out by George Reed. My view: this toxic problem is centered on an arrogant and sick soul. Who better to enforce humility that a toxic company commanders boss...</blockquote>Unexplained is what to do about the problem that most of the toxicity emanates at Battalion and above and that those 'leaders' not only tolerate but encourage development of leaders in their own image.
Talk about foxes and henhouses...<blockquote>Change in the Army and the solution to the Armys toxic leadership problem will be cured one formation and one individual at a time."</blockquote>Given the fact that most such toxicity originates in the arrogance of an individual, you're correct.
However, when an organization has constructed a system that promotes arrogance (pun intended...) such a solution is likely to take a long, long time if it ever appears. The US Army promulgates Army Values <a href=http://www.army.mil/values/>(LINK)</a>. Those values draw a lot of snickers from the troops who see them as good goals that are routinely ignored and too rarely exemplified by a great many of their seniors...
The Army thus might be well advised to shelve those unless they're going to select persons that exemplify them rather than selecting persons who accord them lip service while doing everything their Boss wants them to do the way he wants them to do it and trampling initiative of subordinates in the process of being risk averse.
It has been noted that an Army by design must take combat risk and that historically, the US Army has shown it can and will do that -- but that career risk is avoided at all costs. If one avoids such risk, one becomes a survivor, will almost certainly get promoted and, if possessed of enough ago and drive, be selected for Command. As Bob Jones wrote, those folks are self selecting and congratulating while being clone prone, they see no flaws in themselves and want subordinates in their own image. Few General Officers are going to acknowledge they are products of a poor system; so too are few COLs and LTCs likely to do that.
In a doomed and very foolish effort, partly at the behest of an ignorant Congress, to prove that anyone can be an effective Commander with 'fair' and 'objective' assessment and 'proper' education and training, we have developed a quite poor hyper competitive system that punishes the good and rewards mediocrity and compliance.
The personnel system must be fixed or improvement will never be seen. That and the insane belief, engendered by experience in 1917 and repeated in 1940, that a massive pool of serving officers must be maintained at all costs. That's likely no longer applicable and even if it is, there are better ways to to achieve those numbers other than massive, underemployed yet overworked staffs (service on which arguably could drive anyone to toxic behavior...).
Fortunately, there are a lot of good people about who offset and overcome institutional design failures. More of them and less toxicity are possible but <b>change</b> in personnel education, training AND selection is needed.
Hi Bob, You mentioned, "Not to point out the obvious, but if you sit around in a circle of people who were chosen to lead under a system that is producing toxic leaders, you are not likely to find many who think it is directed at them. Kind of like holding an AA meeting at a bar." True enough and I agree however I dont think that your AA analogy is entirely relevant.
The focus of discussing George Reeds article on toxic leadership at PCC is not directed entirely at individuals, rather at commanders. Our students are responsible for leading formations with hundreds and often thousands of Soldiers. They are the principle trainers who are responsible for everything that happens or fails to happen in their formation. Bn/Bde Cdrs and CSMs are in a position to solve the toxic leadership issues in their formation... .and in future assignments as virtually "ALL" general officers come through the Bn/Bde command route.
Im skeptical of any plan to change the Army through an OER or through the Chief of Staff. The Army culture is too powerful as is the toxic leadership problem. A really good CSA may nudge the Army culture a bit, but not very much. Bde/Bn Cdrs on the other hand can and often do have a huge impact on the unit command climate. A good command team can change a toxic environment to a healthy one.
Your comment about the toxic leader not being likely to think it is directed at them was brought out by George Reed. My view: this toxic problem is centered on an arrogant and sick soul. Who better to enforce humility that a toxic company commanders boss.
Change in the Army and the solution to the Armys toxic leadership problem will be cured one formation and one individual at a time.
For Michael C. Sevcik.....You are correct in my approach. I guess I default to that route because I see that physical and superficial facade as one of the most serious problems we have. Additionally, the "need" to climb the ladder is another, hence my comment on timelines. It is certainly debatable about whether my issues posted are on target. However, from my position, what I'm seeing is junior officers told that they need all sorts of stuff hanging from their uniforms in order to be a credible leader. Their performance as a leader seems to be secondary. I think this starts a culture of gilded assessments and phony credibility. As an officer matures it just continues. The importance of irrelevant things becomes elevated: your alma mater, your schools attended, units deployed with, etc, to include a PT school based on events that don't carry over to combat, and so forth. I believe this superficially based ethos is what others pointed to: unscrupulous behavior, selfishness, an so on.
Just my take.
Perhaps if we take away some of the superficial stuff, the rest will fall into place?
28June11
My opinion is that 'toxic leaders are a by product and not a source of larger issues within the Army. Having been training, deploying, and returning from war for nearly 10 years now a lot of our garrison/non-combat development of both NCO and Officer junior leaders has been neglected. The neglect of professionally developing our junior leaders outside of combat experience is being felt in our midlevel ranks now as those junior leaders move up in rank, and move up quickly. The fact that promotions rates have been so high says we are promoting less holistically developed junior leaders more quickly and at a larger number. That said, often 'toxic leadership has less to do with development and education and more on personality and scruples. Someone that is impersonal and has low scruples by placing their own wants and needs over their subordinates is 'toxic. I have learned over my 10 years that you cannot teach someone to care about others and want to be a positive mentor; they either have it or not. Im not sure 360 evaluations are the right answer, but I think everyone recognizes that something must be done to correct the current leadership climate because todays 'toxic junior and mid level leaders are tomorrows senior level 'toxic leaders. Whatever the answer is it must be implemented and implemented soon.
CPT Matthew Shown
Student, Command and General Staff School
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Belvoir, Virginia
"The views in this commentary are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government."
Matt, funny you should phrase your last sentence that way. I have a cog tattoo to remind myself of what I really am to the Army, lest I ever feel important.
The NCO side of the house is in no better order. It's been decided that the current issues [suicide, drug and alcohol abuse, etc] in the force are caused by a lack of 'discipline,' and not the abundance of OPTEMPO. Therefore, so we need to ratchet down on the force. Any chance that increased emphasis on 'discipline' is going to have an unintended consequence in encouraging toxic leadership?
Actually, it may not be an unintended consequence. Wander around on the NCOnet for a while and read the topics. It would be easy to come away with the impression that to many in the forum, a dose of toxic leadership is what the force needs.
Or you could skip the forum and read CSM Troxell's comment in the Army Times about the need to instill a dose of healthy fear. Apparently he's never cracked FM 6-22, Army Leadership nor FM 7-22.7, Army NCO Guide and read what they say about fear. Fear is something to help Soldiers cope with and overcome, not something to inculcate.
With only 12 years in the service and some experience, I have to concur on several comments already stated. One, we are promoting WAY TOO FAST. I, like many in my year group, pinned on MAJ at exactly 9years and 6months from my commissioning. While I would not turn down the promotion nor the raise associated, I would not have cared if my promotion would have been at the 12-13 year mark, instead. You cannot replace experience and know how with rank, PERIOD. As far as "toxic leaders" in the Army we have had them for years, even when I was "maturing" through the years in my early Army life, I had several horrible leaders, to include commanders at different levels. The Army did the right thing, one was immediately retired with less than 1 1/2 years in battalion command, and the other was retired, even after attending the Army War College, never making the COL list. More recently, in the past few years I have worked for several COLs/LTCs and their CSMs/SGMs. While most of them were great, there were still a few that were poor leaders and should have been marched straight through the retirement process and out of the Army. Just because your father is a GO, you think you will be a GO? Really? Just because you were an aide de camp for a high profile GO, you will eventually make GO? Really? Just because you have three previous raters on your BG board, you think you will make the list? Really? I think the Army continues to serve injustice as these "toxic leaders" are relieved, but not marched out to retirement, guess what, these folks are still intervening daily with subordinates. We are in the age of no mistakes. Subordinates will not become future leaders if they are not allowed to grow on their own with proper guidance. The best COLs/LTCs I have had were those that actually allowed me to think on my own, gave guidance, and told me to run with it and steered me back in just right before I ran off the cliff. Now days, it is more like, they are showing me what egg to suck, how to suck the egg, and how hard or soft to suck the egg. Whatever happened to the old saying, "Staff sucks, get me back to the Soldiers." I don't hear that much anymore. Now, it is more like, "just doing my time, get promoted and retire at 20 or 22."
How do we fix this? My recommendation will be an echo of what has been said.
1. Increase time in grade for EVERYONE, enlisted and officers, double mandatory KD time.
2. We are way overdue for a 360degree evaluation. Too many are fluffed, and this has become the standard. Few years ago, I was brought into my BCT CDR's office because I blocked a NCO to 2-2. He could not do the simplest tasks for his MOS. He was properly counseled, I even sent him to additional, during duty, courses. I was "not being influenced," but "strongly recommended" I changed it to 1-1. I did not budge and later called a "non-team player."
3. Bring back mandatory company commands/platoon sergeant time (for basic all branches). These are leadership positions, you fail, you will never see the next rank or if barely succeeding, add years to your time in grade until you show progress.
4. Reduce maximum time in grade at the E-9/O-6 level. We do not need a SGM or COL with 30years in, UNLESS they are in a command type position and continue to succeed. Otherwise, they become albatrosses for others. Been passed over X2 for CSM? or GO? Then here is your mandatory retirement orders, go find a six figure contracting job.
5. Bring in the Selective Early Retirement Boards for both, enlisted and officers. Thank you for your service, here is your retirement paperwork, go find a six figure contracting job.
6. Drastically reduce GO slots (along w/their SGMs/CSMs). A few years ago it seems to fix the problem, put a GO in charge of it. How about expand responsibilities of other GOs? GOs must be capable of wearing several hats.
7. Compensate those that are successful to ensure they do not retire to those six figure contracting jobs. Like how we compensate low density medical surgeons.
8. Require HQDA approval for any Combat Zone Tax Exclusion visits by those not assigned to units in the Ready Cycle to deploy. How many times do I have to see you Leavenworth or TRADOC guys? You think my Soldiers don't get angered by you coming through getting couple of months of CZTE and then a few months later you do the same thing? Yes, small things like that displays poor leadership for others to see.
9. Require combat deployments for all before promotion to E-9 or CW4/O-5. We are the United States Armed Forces, our number one mission is to win its wars and defend the interests of the United States. In absolutely no way do I degrade those in staff positions or TDA, those are extremely long hours and difficult jobs. But guess what, read sentence two again in this paragraph. You succeed in combat as a leader, you are more than likely to succeed as a staff person. I am sure there are more to debate on this.
I do not mean to rant but the fact is, our Army needs some drastic changes; and yes, Rome was not built in a day, but it did slowly crumble as it failed to adapt, develop and change. We have some great thinkers out there, military and civilians, listen to them, they may actually be on to something.
This is not a new or isolated condition. It has been a growing problem since the early 1990s, probably earlier. In some situations -- from what I have seen in 20 years with 55+ months of operational deployed time, is it is most acute in deployed situations -- and it is endemic to the deployed headquarters, Bde and above. With some exceptions, it is worst at the higher echelons.
The Army values results over respect, statistics over integrity, and conformity over freedom of thought. The creativity and agility the Army chicken-lips to its junior officers is squashed by the senior O5 and O6 population who run those staff sections, and people learn from that. The primary method of enforcement is directive leadership style. The place where it is worst, and the place where it is the hardest to detect and isolate, is in the highest level headquarters for the respective theaters. This is because the bureaucracy is strongest and, therefore, so is the pressure to conform. It also happens to be the dumping ground for incompetents, which reinforces and escalates the problem exponentially.
The common reaction from subordinates is to conform until you can get out. That is why the early-out option in the late 90s got flooded, and why the Army can't fill its mid-career officer manpower gaps. The Gen-X'ers and Millenials have little -- and decreasing -- tolerance for the traditional leadership methods of the Army. Especially if they feel they make little or no meaningful difference. Outright oppression is merely the icing on the cake -- over the last year, I've been told by three senior-ranking officers that I'm "not supposed to think."
The Age of the Willing Cog in the Machine is over. And the Army better fix itself, or the nation will suffer.
As they say, "What he said..."<blockquote>"Only one thing matters: Make your boss happy, and don't make any mistakes. This is a Darwinian process of elevating checklist oriented, micromanaging, risk-adverse psychophants into our most important positions. Certainly some true stars rise as well, but it creates the environment that is so toxic."</blockquote>I've watched this closely for over 60 years and have seen it grow from a minor factor and slowly worsen to the point where it is a major impediment to the Army.
I started in an Army that wherein almost all Officers and NCOs wanted to do the right thing; after retirng from active duty I became a DAC and at the end of 45 total years I left an Army wherein the majority just wanted to keep their Boss happy and too many had no idea what the right thing was...
The Army was not better off for that in large measure because a system that thinks everyone can command well or at least adequately if properly trained is dooming itself to failure as that is just not correct -- nor would it be if our training were competent which it generally is not. Thus we breed mediocrity and it becomes self reinforcing.
The Congress and DoD are not blameless in all this but the bulk of the blame -- a word of choice -- falls directly upon DA and the senior leadership. A one-time Chief of OPD and his Deputy derived a new OER with which selection boards would see only ratings and verbiage, the names of the raters would be relegated to a page not to be in promotion packets. Everybody loved it -- until it hit the first GO in the building where it promptly died -- due to excess toxicity, I have little doubt...
Bob has provided a good recommendation there...
Michael,
Not to point out the obvious, but if you sit around in a circle of people who were chosen to lead under a system that is producing toxic leaders, you are not likely to find many who think it is directed at them. Kind of like holding an AA meeting at a bar.
This is an age old problem, one that is laid out so well in the classic "Once an Eagle." My personal opinion is that much of this lays at the feet of the almost total focus on Senior Rater Profile for officers. Only one thing matters: Make your boss happy, and don't make any mistakes. This is a Darwinian process of elevating checklist oriented, micromanaging, risk-adverse psychophants into our most important positions. Certainly some true stars rise as well, but it creates the environment that is so toxic.
Kind of like corruption in the Afghan government. It is the system that is toxic, and that toxic system brings out the worst in those who rise within it. So too our officer promotion and evaluation system.
I always thought a great test would be to have all the senior leadership make a list of the traits they think are most important in a military leader. Then get out a blank OER and describe how that form within the ever different but never changing system selects for those traits. Answer: It does not.
You can do this with your pre-command students. Then have them make suggestions as to how to make the process more likely to select for those traits and send it up to the Chief of Staff.
Bob
Hi George,
We have had almost every battalion/brigade level command designee (and CSM) who attends PCC at Fort Leavenworth, read your original article for the past four years. Importantly, we routinely discuss "toxic" leadership as part of our classes here. I would like to think we are making progress here and with the efforts throughout the rest of Army with this toxic problem....but I really have no way to measure this???
Charles,
I really like most of your thoughts but your solution for toxic leaders focuses on physical well being, the assignment procedures or recertification of technical & tactical competence. None of these really apply as the central problem with toxic leaders is one of arrogance. The problem with a toxic leader resides in their soul! It's particularly disturbing when a young officer or NCO sees the mean & arrogant toxic SOB promoted and adopts the very same and wrong lesson about leadership.
The good news is that this topic is getting some attention. I started researching this in 2003 and back then the notion that leadership style mattered much or that toxic leaders could cause harm was simply not on the agenda. I am very much heartened that work is being done to document the problem and more are taking notice.
Anonymous is correct in that we'll never totally fix the toxic leadership problem because there will always be a distribution of lousy to excellent leaders, but we can definitely manage the problem better. I would like to see those in positions of authority understand that it is their job to identify and deal with those who have a destructive leadership style and feel empowered to do so. I think it would make a difference if those in key positions understood that it is not enough to be in charge or be technically competent. Leadership involves inspiration and motivation as well; building collective trust and a sense of purpose and commitment. As a system I hope we can develop tools to help identify and deal with toxic leaders before they spread their poison throughout the unit.
Technical incompetence is one problem. Toxic leadership is another. You can be very technically competent and still be interpersonally handicapped. We seem to have a wide band of tolerance when it comes to acceptable leadership behavior. That problem is increased by promotion times that are too short and operational needs that inhibit quality cuts and necessitate excessive promotion rates. It may well be the primary job post-Iraq and Afghanistan to rebuild the profession of arms, and especially the leadership.
Chris, I agree that rank doesn't make you a leader, and obviously a college degree and so called leadership schools don't produce leaders. Contrary to the Army's propaganda that leaders are made, not born, I think leaders are generally made during childhood upbringing. That is when their characer is formed, and character more than anything defines leadership.
While not necessarily practical, I would like to see a system where everyone comes in as junior enlisted (cohort) and after a year or so, peers determine who our taxpayers should invest in so we can develop them into officers who actually lead, instead of individuals who just checked a block. Being a field grade officer should mean something more than you just stuck around long enough (and it doesn't take very long anymore) to get promoted. Hell, if you don't commit a crime you are almost guarunteed to at least make LTC. What does it mean?
I don't see this problem getting fixed, we might be able to make improvements, but we'll never fix it (no Army ever has). However, one step in the right direction would be to greatly reduce the size of our officer corps (downsize needless staff positions).
What is disturbing to me is that we have a category of "leadership" that includes the "toxic" type.
What this indicates is that leadership in the Army is associated more with legal positional authority than it is as decided by subordinates.
In other words, these toxic people in positions of power are arguably NOT leaders. Why do we give them the slightest respect and dignify them by calling them "leaders" at all. They are poor officers and NCOs who abuse their official authority, they are NOT leaders.
Once the Army institution changes their approach to leadership (just because you are an officer or NCO does NOT make you a leader), then the culture will on the way to "recovery" (i.e. reform).